¹ Executive Agreement Series 456, Department of State (Washington, 1945).Google Scholar

² In refererence to the negotiations concerning the nature and functions of the Allied Control Commissions for the Axis satellites, Cordell Hull explained: “We felt that the Control Councils should act under instructions of the Soviet High Command only during the military period, which would come to an end with the termination of hostilities against Germany. Between that time and the conclusion of peace with the satellites, we felt that the three Allied Governments should have equal participation in the work of the commissions, and that their representatives should be able to report directly to their respective Governments.” The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1949) II, 1461Google Scholar, Cf. Stettinius, Edward R., Roosevelt and the Russians (New York, 1949), 43, 65, 87.Google Scholar

³ Schoenfeld, H. F. A., “Soviet Imperialism in Hungary” Foreign Affairs, 26 (1948), 555CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Article 18 has the same text in the Bulgarian and Hungarian Armistice Agreement. The corresponding article of the earlier-concluded Rumanian Armistice Agreement revealed Soviet intentions more ckarly; for it simply stated that an Allied Control Commission “will undertake until the conclusion of peace the regulation of and control over the execution of the present terms under the general direction and orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, acting on behalf of the Allied Powers. As a result of American diplomatic efforts in Moscow, paragraph 2 was added to Article 18 in the Bulgarian and Hungarian armistice agreements.

⁵ There then followed a citation to “Annex I,” the rather vague text of a letter transmitted on July 12, 1945, to the representatives of the U.S. and U.K. Governments on the ACC in Hungary. The Soviet Government promised in this letter that the President of the ACC would call conferences with the British and American representatives once every ten days or more frequently in case of need. American and British representatives were promised free movement. Moreover, it was provided that directives of the ACC on “questions of principle” would be issued to the Hungarian authorities by the ACC after agreement on these directives with the English and American representatives. These and other pledges concerning the new order of work for the ACC were not kept.

⁶ New York Times, 08 10, 1945.Google Scholar

⁷ Art. 6. c. Bulletin of the Department of State, 16 (1947) 1161.Google Scholar

⁸ Concerning some aspects of the negotiations between the American and Russian members of the ACC in Hungary, see Lehrman, Hal, Russia's Europe (New York, 1947), 192–195.Google Scholar

⁹ The ACC for Italy was established in November, 1943 and was abolished on January 31, 1947. Bulletin, 11 (1944) 137–138Google Scholar and 16, (1947) 1258.

¹⁰ For example, Molotov at Potsdam complained because of this situation, Byrnes, James F., Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), 74.Google Scholar

¹¹ Campbell, John C., The United States in World Affairs 1945–1947 (New York, 1947), 52–54Google Scholar. For further details see, United States and Italy 1936–1946, Documentary Record, State Department, European Series No. 17 (Washington, 1946)Google Scholar. Holborn, Hajo, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies (Washington, 1947).Google Scholar

¹² For the list of the notes, see Hungary and the Conference of Paris II. Published by the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Budapest, 1947), 155–163.Google Scholar

¹³ Mosely, Philip E., “The Occupation of Germany—New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn,” Foreign Affairs, 28 (1950), 604.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴ Byrnes, James F., op. cit., 255Google Scholar. Cf. Welles, Sumner, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York, 1951), 209.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Bulletin, 15 (1946) 638Google Scholar and 16 (1947) 341. Of the total credit authorized for Hungary by the Surplus Property Administration, over 15 million dollars had not been utilized when the U.S. Government suspended the execution of the surplus property credit agreement on June 2, 1947, after the Communist seizure of power in Hungary. Bulletin 16 (1947), 1166.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Woodbridge, George, The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (New York, 1950), III, 368Google Scholar. Economic Rehabilitation in Hungary. Operational Analysis Papers, No. 47. UNNRA European Office (London, 1947)Google Scholar. 1. Under this program medical aid and emergency supplies of food and clothing have been furnished to priority groups.

¹⁷ Bulletin, 12 (1945) 127, 968.Google Scholar

¹⁸ This American promise was several times reiterated and kept. The return of the gold of the Hungarian National Bank valued at approximately $32,000,000 was significant assistance to Hungary and greatly facilitated monetary stabilization in 1946. Bulletin, 15 (1946) 638 and 16 (1947) 962Google Scholar. In connection with the release of Robert A. Vogeler, the American Government promised to facilitate the delivery of the remaining Hungarian goods in the U.S. zone of Germany, in accordance with Article 30 of the peace treaty. Bulletin, 24 (1951) 723.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Hungary and the Conference of Paris II (Budapest, 1947) 4–9.Google Scholar

²⁰ Article 13 set forth: “The Government of Hungary undertakes to restore all legal rights and interests of the United Nations and their nationals on Hungarian territory as they existed before the war and also to return their property in complete good order.”

²¹ In speaking of the situation in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary Mr. Bevin observed: “The Governments which have been set up do not, in our view, represent the majority of the people, and the impression we get from recent developments is that one kind of totalitarianism is being replaced by another. This is not what we understand by (hat very much overworked word ‘democracy,’ which appears to need definition, and the forms of government which have been set up as a result do not impress us as being sufficiently representative to meet the requirements of diplomatic relations.”

²² Leading Western newspapers featured front-page articles and editorials on the Hungarian elections. The following dispatch of the London correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor (10 9, 1945)Google Scholar was typical: “This concrete proof that free elections—as they are understood in the United States and Great Britain—have occurred in at least one Balkan country is heartily welcomed by Anglo-American officials. This election result would indicate that even in areas beyond Anglo-American control—and about which many officials had been privately worrying—the peoples of Europe can be given a chance to choose their own officials honestly and openly. …In view of the fact that Hungary is wholly under control of the Red Army and that this quite naturally has been of no small benefit to the Communist Party, some observers had been concerned that it might be difficult to conduct completely free and unhindered elections. The result of the week-end balloting would seem to have disposed of that worry in convincing manner.” Cf. New York Herald Tribune, 11 6, 1945Google Scholar; Journal de Genève, 11 9, 1945.Google Scholar

²³ Bulletin, 13 (1945) 478.Google Scholar

²⁴ On December 14, 1945, the Senate confirmed the nomination of H. F. A. Schoenfeld as American Minister to Hungary, and on January 26, 1946, the American mission at Budapest was raised to a legation. Bulletin, 13 (1945) 1023 and 14 (1946) 352.Google Scholar

²⁵ In reference to Bulgaria and Rumania, Eden explained to Molotov at Potsdam that formal recognition was constitutionally impossible for Britain until peace was concluded. Byrnes, J. F., op. cit., 74.Google Scholar

²⁶ When Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden went to Moscow in October, 1944, to see Stalin and Molotov, they extended the arrangement still further, even reducing to percentages the relative degree of influence which Britain and Russia individually should have in specified Balkan countries. Cables from our Embassies in Moscow and Ankara mentioned that Russia would have a 75/25 or 80/20 predominance in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, while Britain and Russia would share influence in Yugoslavia 50/50. Later the Russians took it for granted that by the agreement of June, 1944 Britain and the United States had assigned them a certain portion of the Balkans including Rumania and Bulgaria, as their sphere of influence. This assumption had its untoward effect at the Yalta Conference in February, 1945.” Hull, Cordell, op. cit., II, 1458Google Scholar. Cf. Welles, Sumner, Where Are We Heading (New York, 1946), 151Google Scholar. Byrnes, , op. cit., 53Google Scholar. Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York, 1948), 832–834.Google Scholar

The alleged wartime agreements notwithstanding, in April, 1944, as the Red Army crossed the boundaries of Rumania, Molotov stated: “The Soviet government declares that it does not pursue the aim of conquering any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the existing social order in Rumania.”

²⁷ See footnote 6.

²⁸ Schoenfeld, H. F. A., loc. cit., 558.Google Scholar

²⁹ A photograph of this letter was published in the Yellow Book of the Hungarian Government: Documents on the Mindszenty Case (Budapest, 1949), 54Google Scholar. There are probably many forgeries in this volume but this particular letter was not disavowed.

³⁰ Népszava, 12 11, 1945.Google Scholar

³¹ Woodbridge, George, op. cit., III, 360–368.Google Scholar

³² Bulletin, 15 (1946): 229–232, 263–265, 638–639.Google Scholar

³³ Bulletin, 16 (1947) 584Google Scholar. The chairman of the ACC was at the same time commandant of the Russian military forces in Hungary. To elude all Western intervention, Marshal Voroshilov, or his deputy, usually did not explain whether he addressed his demands to the Hungarian Government in the name of the ACC or as the commander-in-chief of the occupying forces.

³⁴ See for details, Kertesz, S. D., “The Methods of Communist Conquest: Hungary 1944–1947,” World Politics, 3 (1950) 20–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁵ Most of the Western observers professed similar optimistic views about the prospects of democratic developments in Hungary. For example, the London Times in an article (December 18, 1945) on “Unrecognized Rumania” compared the Rumanian situation with that of Hungary and highly praised the wisely cooperative and realistic policy of the Smallholders Party. In reference to the Hungarian situation the article concluded that “the prospects of democratic development, based on loyal cooperation between the main parties, remain fair.” In the same sense, Jaszi, Oscar, “The Choices in Hungary,” Foreign Affairs, 24 (1946) 454.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁶ See the notes of August 14, 1945, November 12, 1945 and May 8, 1946 addressed to the United States, British, and Soviet Governments. La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris (Budapest, 1947), 7–14, 21–36, 56–62.Google Scholar

³⁷ Cannon, Cavendish W., head of the American delegation at the Danubian Conference in Belgrade on 08 13, 1948Google Scholar, stated that “It is interesting to note that the postwar government of Hungary, on November 12, 1945, addressed a note to the United States, British and Soviet Governments, giving its views on the Danube question. It called attention to the great importance to Hungary of a regime which guarantees full freedom of navigation. It suggested that the prewar system of international navigation be reconstituted with provisions for changes required by new conditions. The Hungarian Government did not envisage elimination of nonriparian representation, for it suggested consolidation into one Commission of the European Commission of the Danube and the International Commission of the Danube. Both Commissions, as the Conference is aware, had non-riparian representation. There have been changes since 1946 but we believe the long-term economic interests of Hungary remain the same.” Bulletin, Vol. 19 (1948) 283.Google Scholar

The Hungarian representative, Foreign Minister of the by then completely Communist dominated Hungarian Government, did not reply other than by his one hundred percent support of the Soviet position—which in fact denied that freedom of navigation for which the Hungarian Government had dared to raise its voice three years before.

³⁸ The Russians did not make a secret of their intentions in connection with the Yalta pledges and the fate of the Eastern European countries. “A freely elected government in any of these countries would be anti-Soviet, and that we cannot allow,” declared Marshal Stalin at Potsdam, according to a member of the American delegation. Mosely, Philip E., Face to Face with Russia, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 70, 1948, p. 23.Google Scholar

³⁹ For which, see the New York Times, 08 10, 1945.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ The Soviet draft treaties for the Danubian ex-Axis Satellite countries put forward in the session of the Deputy Foreign Ministers during March 1946 were briefer even than the armistice agreements themselves. They contained no mention of the restoration of Northern Transylvania to Rumania. Campbell, John C., op. cit., 115.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Paris Peace Conference 1946. Selected Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office. (Washington) 1123, 1153, 1194–1195.Google Scholar For the full text of the declaration of the American Delegate, Thorp, Willard L., see Bulletin, XV (1946) 745–748.Google Scholar

⁴² Campbell, John C., “Diplomacy on the Danube,” Foreign Affairs, 27 (1949) 315–327.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴³ The statement of the President released to the press by the White House on June 14, 1947 set forth:

“At the time of ratification of the treaties establishing peace with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, I feel I must publicly express regret that the governments of those countries not only have disregarded the will of the majority of the people but have resorted to measures of oppression against them. Ever since the liberation of these countries from the Nazi yoke and the commitments undertaken by the three Allies at Yalta, I had hoped that governments truly representative of the people would be established there. Such governments do not exist today in those three countries.

It is, however, in the interests of the Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian peoples to terminate the state of war which has existed between their governments and the United States for over five years. The establishment of peace will mean that all occupation forces (not including Soviet units needed to maintain lines of communication to the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria) will be withdrawn from these countries and armistice Control Commissions terminated.” Bulletin, 16 (1947) 1214.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ New York Times, 03 18, 1948.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ The texts of the Soviet alliance system were published in Documents and State Papers, I. (1948) 219–249.Google Scholar Hungary signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual aid with Yugoslavia on December 8, 1947, with Rumania on January 24, 1948, with Soviet Russia on February 18, 1948, with Poland on June 18, 1948, with Bulgaria on July 6, 1948, and with Czechoslovakia on April 16, 1949. The treaty of friendship concluded with Yugoslavia was denounced on September 30, 1949.

⁴⁶ Nagy, Ferenc, The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain (New York, 1948), 209–210.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Campbell, John C., The United States in World Affairs 1945–1947 (New York, 1947), 115, 117, 123.Google ScholarMosely, Philip E., “Soviet Exploitation of National Conflicts in Eastern Europe,” The Soviet Union (Notre Dame, Indiana), 75.Google ScholarNagy, Ferenc, op. cit., 218–219.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ “In general, the United States sought fair terms for Hungary, but it did not want to place itself in the position of Hungary's champion against Allied Nations.… Furthermore, Hungary's record as a junior partner of the Axis, both before and during the war, hardly entitled her to over-sympadietic treatment at the peace settlement. That was die main reason why the Hungarians, despite the validity of many of the arguments they presented, found so few friends at Paris, even among the democratic nations outside the Soviet bloc.” Campbell, John C., “The European Territorial Settlement,” Foreign Affairs, 26 (1947) 214.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The Russian attitude towards Hungary was much less favorable. Foreign Secretary Eden, Anthony explained in Washington on 03 12, 1943Google Scholar that “he thought Stalin would want to be pretty arbitrary about Hungary because the Russians do not like the Hungarians, and Stalin would be unwilling to give them any favors at the Peace Table.” Sherwood, Robert E., op. cit., 711.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Mosely, Philip E., loc. cit., 79–80.Google Scholar Cf. Hungary and the Conference of Paris (Budapest, 1947), II.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ For the reasons of the change of American policy towards Russia, see, Byrnes, James F., op. cit., 255–256.Google Scholar Cf. Stone, Isaac A., “American Support of Free Elections in Eastern Europe” Bulletin, 17 (1947) 311–323, 407–413, 434.Google ScholarSoviet Violations of Treaty Obligations. Document submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Bulletin, 18 (1948) 738–744.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Bulletin, 16 (1947) 495, 583–584, 1215–1216.Google Scholar

⁵² Hungary's wartime contacts with the Western powers were an ominous memento in this respect. Notably, in 1943–44 the Hungarian Government conducted armistice negotiations with the United States and United Kingdom on the understanding that an Anglo-American landing would take place in the Balkans. Subsequent events turned out differently and the experience was anything but encouraging. Cf. Kertesz, S., “The Plight of Satellite Diplomacy,” Review of Politics, 11 (1949) 51–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵³ Welles, Sumner, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York, 1951), 138. Cf.Google ScholarHull, Cordell, op. cit., 1165–1174, 1451–1458.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Welles, Sumner, Seven Decisions, 145.Google Scholar Winston Churchill stated in his instructions to Foreign Secretary Eden, on 01 8, 1942Google Scholar that “there can be no question of settling frontiers until the Peace Conference.” The Grand Alliance (New York, 1950), 695.Google Scholar Juridically this remained the Anglo-American thesis throughout the war. Major exceptions, however, occurred, like the Yalta Decision. Moreover, the general course of events since 1944 proved once more diat in international relations the accomplished facts very often are more important than declarations of principle.