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U. S. Foreign Policy and the Soviet Satellites
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Extract
The term “satellite” clearly indicates a relationship of inequality and dependence between master and “follower” states. It stands to reason, therefore, that dealings with the present satellite states in Eastern Europe cannot be viewed in the same light as relations with completely independent nations, but must be considered special problems within the general field of American-Soviet relations.
It is one of the ironies of history that of all the belligerent nations of World War II the civilian-minded United States alone fought the war in almost exclusively military terms, concentrating her efforts on victory in the field of batde and giving scant attention to the post-war constellations. In line with this short-range attitude, the United States supported two principal political concepts with regard to Eastern and South Eastern Europe. She clearly recognized that the Soviet Union had a right to have friendly governments along her frontier, that is, governments which would not permit their countries to become avenues of aggression against the Soviet Union.
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References
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