This article, which originated as a response to a conference paper by Barry Cooper, has reached its present state due to the encouragement of Ellis Sandoz and the helpful criticisms of Robert McMahon and Glenn Hughes.

1. There is a sizable literature on Aristotle's analysis of nous, not all of which is directly relevant to the present study. I have benefited most directly from Byrne, Patrick H., Analysis and Science in Aristotle (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997)Google Scholar and from Reeve, C. D. C, Practices of Reason: Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)Google Scholar. On Eric Voegelin's understanding of nous, the most helpful works to date include McPartland, Thomas J., Lonergan and the Philosophy of Historical Existence (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2001)Google Scholar, especially chap. 9, entitled “Noetic Science: Aristotle, Voegelin, and the Philosophy of Consciousness”; Thompson, William M., “Philosophy and Meditation: Notes on Voegelin's View,” in The Politics of the Soul: Eric Voegelin on Religious Experience, Hughes, Glenn, ed (New York: Rowan and Iittlefield Publishers, 1999), pp. 115–35Google Scholar; Morrissey, Michael P., Consciousness and Transcendence: The Theology of Eric Voegelin (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), pp. 22, 61–5 and 76–8Google Scholar; Hughes, Glenn, Mystery and Myth in the Philosophy of Eric Voegelin (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1993), pp. 26–8 and 53–6Google Scholar; and Webb, Eugene, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), pp. 95–103 and 181–5Google Scholar. While several of these authors (McPartland, Hughes, Morrissey, and Webb) focus upon the connection between Voegelinian and Aristotelian noetic science, no one has yet adequately reconciled Voegelin's view of nous with certain passages from Aristotle that I bring forward in this essay. McPartland, who acknowledges the difficulty, does not resolve it: he argues that for Voegelin and Aristotle alike nous is a matter of science. The present study takes this thesis for granted, but asks further—“nous of what?” and “science of what?”—and develops the consequences of these questions for understanding Voegelin's political science in relation to Aristotle's.

2. Voegelin, Eric, “Remembrance of Things Past,” in Anamnesis, ed. and trans. Niemeyer, Gerhart (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), pp. 3–4Google Scholar.

3. Ibid., p. 5.

4. On Voegelin's view of nous and noêsis as an antidote to social disorder, see Ranieri, John J., Eric Voegelin and the Good Society (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1995), pp. 51–53, 158Google Scholar.

5. Anamnesis: Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Politik (Munich: R. Piper, 1966)Google Scholar; “Reason: The Classic Experience,” The Southern Review 10 (1974): 237–64Google Scholar. Both analyses appear in the English translation of Anamnesis to which all subsequent citations will refer.

6. “Reason: The Classic Experience,” p. 94.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid. p. 94 (emphasis mine)

9. Ibid. p. 90. Cf. Voegelin, Eric, Order and History, vol. 3 Plato and Aristotle (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), pp. 238–39 and 253–57Google Scholar.

10. “The Consciousness of the Ground,” p. 149Google Scholar.

11. See, e.g., “Reason: The Classic Experience,” pp. 89,93 and 97Google Scholar.

12. “Reason: The Classic Experience,” p. 96Google Scholar.

13. Voegelin's descriptions are drawn from Plato's, Republic 508e–509bGoogle Scholar and Philebus 30c–eGoogle Scholar and from Aristotle's, Metaphysics, 12.7Google Scholar (cf. On the Soul, 3. 5Google Scholar, and Nicomachean Ethics, 10. 7Google Scholar).

14. Voegelin, Eric, The New Science of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 156Google Scholar.

15. See Voegelin, , “Reason: The Classic Experience,” pp. 91 and 113Google Scholar. It should be noted that Voegelin thought his own noetic analysis of the structure of being went further than that of the ancients in attending to the spheres not only of man and society, but of history as well. See Voegelin, Eric, “About the Function of Noesis,” in Anamnesis, pp. 206–13Google Scholar. This development is not relevant, however, to the argument of the present article.

16. On the point of resistance, Voegelin expressly agrees with Plato that the proper response to social disorder is not revolution, violent action, or compulsion, but persuasion (pace Drury, Shadia B., “Augustinian Radical Transcendence: Sources of Political Excess,” Humanitas 12 (1999): 27–45, esp. p. 43)Google Scholar. See Voegelin, , “Reason: The Classic Experience,” pp. 90–91Google Scholar; see also, Ranieri, John J., “Grounding Public Discourse: The Contribution of Eric Voegelin,” in Hughes, Politics of the Soul, pp. 33–64, esp. p. 41Google Scholar.

17. I am thinking primarily of Posterior Analytics, 2.19Google Scholar, and Nicomachean Ethics, 6. 2, and 6Google Scholar, which I discuss below; but compare Metaphysics, 1.1Google Scholar.

18. Posterior Analytics 71b9–19.

19. Ibid., 100b5–16.

20. “Experience” is used here not in its everyday sense but in its technical sense of grasping the common element in like particulars and the common connection in like events. For further discussion of this term, see Byrne, , Analysis and Science, pp. 174–75Google Scholar.

21. Posterior Analytics 99b35–100a9 (translation mine, relying on Barnes).

22. The example is my own, not Aristotle's. It is meant simply to supply a concrete example of what Aristotle understood to be the process by which nous moves from a set of particulars that are related in some unknown way to the articulation of a starting point for scientific demonstration—in this case, that “all pouch-nurturing mammals are marsupials.” For an example of this process in the art of medicine, see Byrne, , Analysis and Science, pp. 174–75Google Scholar.

23. See Aristotle, On the Soul, 3. 5Google Scholar; Nicomachean Ethics, 10. 7–8Google Scholar; and Metaphysics, 12. 6–10Google Scholar.

24. Posterior Analytics 100b3

25. Nicomachean Ethics 1139b25–31 (translation Barnes).

26. Aristotle restricts the meaning of science (epistêmê) in Ethics, 4, to its most precise sense—conclusions reached by demonstration concerning things that are imperishable, exist of necessity and cannot be otherwise (one thinks of demonstrations in math and logic). But Aristotle often uses epistêmê in a less restricted sense to refer to knowledge (however tentative or imperfect) in fields where the subject matter is by nature changeable and conclusions hold only for the most part (hôs epi to polu) (see e.g., Metaphysics 1027a20–l, 1025b26 ff; Ethics 1180b13–23; 1094a26–28); the study of ethics and politics are described as such, as are myriad other sciences such as physics, biology and zoology. For the purposes of this paper, I intend the word science to denote the less restrictive of these two senses, so that ethics, politics, biology and physics, as well as math and logic are all potential branches of science. What all these fields have in common, despite their many differences, is a structure in which first principles are attained by noetic induction and further conclusions are reached by deduction. For a more detailed treatment of Aristotle's several meanings of science and the role of nous in them, see Reeve, , Practices of Reason, pp. 7–30Google Scholar.

27. See, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics, 6. 6Google Scholar; cf. Posterior Analytics, 2. 19Google Scholar.

28. In fact, in Nicomachean Ethics, 10. 7Google Scholar, Aristotle explicitly refers to the activity of nous as divine. On the close relationship between human and divine nous in general, see Lear, Jonathan, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 135–41 and 293–309CrossRefGoogle Scholar, who discusses important passages such as On the Soul, 3. 5Google Scholar, and Metaphysics, 12. 6–10Google Scholar, that space does not permit me to discuss here. Let me also stress that I am not at odds with a thesis like Lear's; I grant that nous has divine aspects. What I am arguing here is simply that nous, divine aspects and all, can be disposed in different ways, and that the way it is disposed when doing noêsis is not the same as the way it is disposed when engaged in ethical and political science.

29. Aristotle's failure to mention the divine on certain occasions appears to have frustrated Voegelin. See esp. his discussion of Aristotelian phronêsis in “What Is Right by Nature?” in Anamnesis, pp. 65–66Google Scholar.

30. The terminological distinction is my own, not Aristotle's; and I do not mean for it to imply that divine insight is somehow uncertain or unscientific compared to insight in the sciences. I am merely attempting to distinguish between insight into being itself on the one hand, and into “things” on the other. I have chosen the word “theological” to describe the noêsis of On the Soul, 3. 5Google Scholar, and Metaphysics, 12. 7Google Scholar, only after rejecting several alternatives such as “metaphysical” and “ontological,” which would have probably made Voegelin cringe. I derive support for the term “theological” from Voegelin's late essay “Anxiety and Reason,” pp. 106–107Google Scholar.

31. As per On the Soul, 3. 5Google Scholar, and Metaphysics, 12. 7Google Scholar. My understanding of the movement from scientific to theological noetic activities owes a debt to Oakeshott, Michael, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 11Google Scholar, who describes the theorist's activity as one of being “perpetually en voyage.” It must be noted, however, that Oakeshott differs from Aristotle and Voegelin alike in removing all sense of a telos or divine ground as the ultimate goal of the search

32. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Ostwald, Martin (Englewood Cliffs: Library of Liberal Arts, 1962), 1096b35–1097a8Google Scholar.

33. On nous as supplying the first principle of ethics see Nicomachean Ethics 1143a35–b5; and Reeve, , Practices of Reason, pp. 56–61Google Scholar.

34. Nicomachean Ethics 1101b35–1102a4: “eudaimonia is one of the goods that are worthy of honor and are final. This again seems to be due to the fact that it is a starting point since for its sake all of us do everything else” (translation Ostwald); Nicomachean Ethics 1139a36–b5: “Thought itself moves nothing, only thought which is directed to some end [heneka] and concerned with action.…the end of action is an end simpliciter: either the good life [eupraxia] is the end [telos] or desire directed toward the good life. Thus choice is either nous motivated by desire or desire operating through thought, and in this sense, man is a starting point of action” (translation mine, relying on Barnes and Ostwald); See also Reeve, , Practices of Reason, pp. 56–61Google Scholar

35. Nicomachean Ethics 1095b6 (translation Ostwald); cf. 1098bl–5.

36. See Byrne, , Analysis and Science, p. 195Google Scholar. It is noteworthy that Aristotle does not mention the divine aspects of human nature until book 10 of the Ethics, and, even there, cuts his analysis short on grounds of irrelevance: “The moral virtues, being connected with the passions, belong to our composite nature; and the virtues of our composite nature are human, just as the life and the happiness that correspond to these. But the excellence of nous is quite separate; we must be content to say this much about it, for to describe it precisely is a task greater than our present purpose requires” (1178a20–24, translation mine).

37. A more detailed analysis of the way nous works in Aristotle's ethical and political science would differentiate various stages in the overall movement of nous including (1) observed facts (phainomena), (2) people's noetic beliefs about them (endoxa), (3) the use of dialectic to solve the puzzles (aporia) surrounding people's beliefs, (4) frequent return to the original facts, and, finally, (5) the articulation of refined noetic first principles. For a persuasive analysis of these various elements of Aristotelian method in terms of nous, see Reeve, , Practices of Reason, pp. 34–66Google Scholar.

38. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers of this journal for pointing out to me this potential objection. Space does not permit an extensive discussion of the way nous works with phronêsis (the relevant texts for which would include Nicomachean Ethics 1142a10–30, and 1143a25–1143b5), but nothing in my present argument hinges upon such a discussion, and I shall hopefully be able to address these questions in a future paper.

39. Nicomachean Ethics 1104a7–9.

40. Ibid. 1094a18–26,1095a10–12, 1103b26–30, 1144b12, 1179a33–1179b4.

41. Ibid. 1143b35–b5,1144a22–35, 1144b12.

42. Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Tredennick, Hugh (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1989), 994b9–16Google Scholar. I leave “nous” in the Greek, while Tredennick translates it as intelligence (a common rendering).

43. See esp. Ethics, 1. 6 (above), 6.12 and 6. 2 (in note 35)Google Scholar.

44. Ibid., 6.11, 1143a35–b5; Reeve, , Practices of Reason, pp. 57–60Google Scholar.

45. Voegelin, , “What Is Nature?” in Anamnesis, p. 84Google Scholar.

46. This may be a fault in the translation. What Voegelin seems to want to do is to raise the question of the precise relationship between the limit of human action and the limit in the ground of being (or, in other words, the limit reached by scientific nous and the one supplied by theological noêsis). And although this is not a question that Aristotle himself raises at this point, it is a tremendously important one. Voegelin's answer (as best I can make it out) seems to go like this: there would appear to be two “limits” discovered by nous, one human and one divine; but to recognize this distinction is to beg the question of the relationship between the two; and the only way to understand their relationship is to have an understanding of the divine ground; which would mean turning our attention to the divine (engaging in what I have called theological noêsis); therefore, the very fact of the human limit necessitates theological noêsis and the whole distinction between the human and divine limit ought to be dropped. See especially ibid. p. 86; and cf., p. 66.

47. Ibid., pp. 86–87.

48. As the philosopher Michael Oakeshott puts it: “[The theorist] easily understands that nothing will come of questioning everything at the same time. Indeed, he recognizes this to be the condition of any specific achievement in understanding. He has a heavenly home, but he is in no hurry to reach it. If he is concerned to theorize moral conduct or civil association, he must forswear metaphysics” (On Human Conduct, p. 25)Google Scholar.

49. Voegelin, Eric, The Authoritarian State: An Essay on the Problem of the Austrian State, in The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 4, ed. Weiss, Gilbert, trans. Hein, Ruth (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1999)Google Scholar. On the general tenor of Voegelin's other work during this period, see Webb, , Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, pp. 21–22Google Scholar.

50. See Voegelin's remarks about the meaning of “theory” in New Science of Politics, pp. 64–66Google Scholar. For a different interpretation of the place of Voegelin's early political writings within his overall philosophical project, see Cooper, Barry, “How Voegelin Can Assist Empirical Political Science” (Paper presented to the Eric Voegelin Society at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 1999), pp. 7–12Google Scholar.

51. See, New Science of Politics, pp. 5–6, 25, 64–70Google Scholar.

52. Voegelin's emphatic assertions throughout the New Science of Politics that he is following an “Aristotelian procedure” are, I think, to some extent misleading (e.g., pp. 28, 31, 34, 52, 80, etc.). It is certainly an Aristotelian procedure to begin from political phainomena and endoxa as Voegelin does in his lecture “Representation and Existence” (pp. 27–51)Google Scholar. But to launch a full-fledged inquiry into the standards of truth and into the ground of truth according to which political theorists clarify the endoxa (as Voegelin does, pp. 52ff), is to my mind no longer Aristotelian political science; it may well be Aristotelian, and it may well be a kind of science; but it does not follow that it is political science. Hence we run into the problem here with which this essay has been concerned all along: Voegelin's so-called “new science of politics” is more a science of the divine than it is a science of politics.

53. Voegelin, , “Reason: The Classic Experience,” pp. 112, 113–15Google Scholar. The noetic differentiation of man's historical consciousness is Voegelin's own addition to the classical analysis.

54. Ibid., p. 113.

55. There may be grounds here for a Voegelinian critique of Aristotle's Ethics: in isolating the human good in his study of ethics, and in seeking the noetic first principles of ethics while paying insufficient attention to the divine ground, Aristotle may be seen as violating Voegelin's “principle of completeness.” A passage from Voegelin's “What Is Nature” even hints at such as critique: “Aristotle's idea of man as an immanently formed thing having its fulfillment in a this-worldly happiness is something definitely influenced by the model of an organism.” (See “What Is Nature?” p. 84Google Scholar): But if such a critique is to be found in Voegelin's work, it is certainly muted, to say the least.

56. The directional order runs as follows: On the vertical axis, order flows upward in a “foundational” way (one cannot have divine insights without an inorganic and vegetative nature as a foundation), but at the same time order flows downward in a “formative” way (the divine nous is the formal cause of reason; reason the formal cause of the passions, and so on). On the horizontal axis, by contrast, order flows only in the foundational way from person through society to history.

57. Ibid. p. 113; cf. p. 115.