56 Mogi, Sobei. The Problem of Federalism, I. 145Google Scholar.

57 Since the rise of the national state the question of sovereignty has been of considerable interest to Catholic thinkers. The Church has felt compelled to deny amphatically the assertion of Bodin and Austin that there can be no equal or superior authority to the state. On the other hand, believing that order is to be preferred, other things being equal, and that therefore established governments should be supported, and perhaps aware that any attack on authority, per se, would run counter to the organizational principle of its own sphere, the Church has never denied the legitimate claims of state power, properly denned. Sovereignty, proceeding through the God-people-government stages, thus becomes “the supreme legal, political, and physical power of the State to do everything that the State has a moral right to do.” Ryan, and Boland, , op. cit., p. 50Google Scholar (authors' italics). The specific location of this supreme power is a question of lesser moment. Modern Catholic authorities regard the location as being dependent upon the particular form of government being considered. In the United States, for example, sovereignty is divided between the branches of the federal government, the states, and the people. Ibid., p. 52. This location concept is essentially the same as John Dickinson's “working theory of sovereignty,” although the latter makes a more careful distinction between political and juristic sovereignty. Vide his “A Working Theory of Sovereignty,” Political Science Quarterly, XLII, 524–548 (1927)Google Scholar.

58 A. R., p. 192 ff.

59 Jefferson, , Writings, X, 263 ff. (ed. by Ford, P. L., 10 vols., New York, 1892–1899)Google Scholar.

60 Webster, , Speeches and Orations of Daniel Webster, p. 276 (ed. by Whipple, E. P., Philadelphia, 1879)Google Scholar.

61 Calhoun, John C., Works, I, 131 (6 vols., New York, 1861–1864)Google Scholar. It is worth noting that Brownson, unlike most of the nationalist thinkers of this period, actually agreed with the secessionist philosophers as to what their position was. His difference with them was over its rightness.

62 The theory that the United States became a united nation from the date of independence had been developed by a few thinkers prior to Brownson s time, but with less subtlety and for the specific purpose of defending nationalism against the states' rights theory. The first statement of the doctrine seems to have been made by Thomas McKean, Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania court. In the case of Respublica v. Sweers, he declared: “From the time of their association, the United States necessarily became a body corporate; for there was no superior from whom that character could otherwise be derived.” I Dallas 41 (1779)Google Scholar. James Wilson, one of the most erudite of the “founding fathers,” expounded this theory during the debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and in his law lectures at the College of Philadelphia, quoting the organic doctrine of the state of Burlamaqui (vide Principles of Natural and Political Lam, tr. by Nugent, T., Boston, 1792)Google Scholar to support his argument for “inherent” national power dating from independence: “The case is here very near the same as in that of several voices collected together, which, by their union, produces a harmony, that was not to be found separately in each.” Wilson, James, Worlds, III, 395 (ed. by Wilson, B., 3 vols., 1804)Google Scholar. The more orthodox theory, viewing the states as sovereign prior to the Constitution, is well stated by Henry, St.Tucker, George, Commentaries on Blackstone, pp. 187 ff. (Richmond, 1803)Google Scholar.

63 The contract theorists, it will be recalled, were inclined to merge state and government and contrast them both with society, defined either as the state of nature or as population territorially and institutionally unorganized. The pluralists, Laski, Cole, and Duguit, have also identified state and government as the same, but set the individual, acting through sub-national and international groups, against it. Of the modern theorists, Brownson was nearest the neo-Aristotelian concept of Professor Maclver: “Custom … and law … are both expressions of the social sense, the sense of solidarity, the sense of common interest. In this subjective fact we find the root of the unity of society, not in the state, which is only the form through which that unity is expressed.” The Modern State, p. 481 (1926).

64 Cf. MacIllwain, C. H., The Growth of Political Thought in the West, pp. 392–393 (New York, 1932)Google Scholar; Renan, Ernest, Discours et conférences, pp. 277–310 (Paris, ed. of 1922)Google Scholar. Lord Acton gives a somewhat different, and more critical, Catholic interpretation of nationalism, but recognizes its mission in offsetting the extremes of absolutism and individualism. The History of Freedom and Other Essays, pp. 295 ff. (London, 1909)Google Scholar. The intimate relation between nationalist and religious thought has been frequently noted. Both are inspirationalist and sometimes revivalist in character. The connection is particularly apparent in Brownson's thesis. Vide Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W., Introduction to the Science of Sociology, p. 931 (Chicago, 1924)Google Scholar.

65 de Maistre, Joseph, Essay on the Generative Principle of Political Constitutions, ch. 1 (anon, trans., Boston, 1847)Google Scholar. De Maistre found in Catholicism the source of the ethical and social continuity of the state. An authoritarian in politics, he yet saw the state as subject to essentially super-natural direction and control.

66 Comte, Auguste, Positive Philosophy, I, 193 ff., and III, passim (tr. by Martineau, Harriet, 6 vols., London, 1913)Google Scholar. In his positivism, Brownson was closer to Comte than to De Maistre, for the former, unlike the latter, wanted to preserve the essence of the Catholic state doctrine, without its medievalism and super-naturalism.

67 A. R., P. 250. It is interesting to note that just one year after Brownson's American Republic appeared, a full length study of conventions was published, Jameson's, John AlexanderA Treatise on Constitutional Conventions (Philadelphia, 1866)Google Scholar, which developed at length Brownson's conception of the function of conventions.

68 Before Brownson, nationalist thinkers in America had made use of the idea of the popular convention as the basis of the written constitution principally to defend an expanded interpretation of national powers and to justify the right of the Supreme Court to veto acts of Congress. Chief Justice Marshall, for example, used this concept in the case of McCulloch V. Maryland (4 Wheaton 316, 1819)Google Scholar to enlarge the “necessary and proper” powers of the national government vis-a-vis the states, and in Marburg V. Madison (I Cranch 137, 1803)Google Scholar to develop his argument in favor of the inherent power of the Court to pass on acts of the Legislature. Brownson, however, rejected practically all of the nationalist list of powers, defended Congress in relation to the other two branches, and gave to the convention the very function which Marshall appropriated for the Court.

69 Vide the uses of Rousseau in the development of Idealist thought in Vaughan, C. E., Studies in the History of Political Thought before and after Rousseau, II, passim (2 vols., Manchester, 1925)Google Scholar.

70 A. R., p. 348 ff.

71 Fitzhugh, George, writing from the Southern viewpoint, saw the same socialistic tendencies, in his Sociology for the South, or the Failure of Free Society, pp. 34–81 (Richmond, 1854)Google Scholar.

72 The phrase is Cohen's, Morris. Vide his Reason and Nature, p. 390 ff. (New York, 1931)Google Scholar.

73 Brownson's effort to avoid the extremes of individualism and absolutism is not dissimilar to the analysis of the Swiss jurist, J. K. Bluntschli: “The one-sided view of the ancients, which overlooked the individual in the nation, seriously endangered his liberty and his welfare, and led up directly to the omnipotence, which easily degenerated into tryanny, of the state. The equally one-sided view of the moderns, which is unable to see the wood for the trees, fails to recognize the majesty of the state, and thus tends to dissolve it into a confused mob of individuals and to encourage anarchy.” The Theory of the State, p. 307 (Oxford, 1892)Google Scholar.

74 A. R., p. 392 ff.

75 A. R., p. 409.

76 With considerable acumen, Brownson points out that the checks against centralism in England take the form of setting classes and interests against one another. Viewing English politics of his own time he concludes that this principle leads to political corruption and intrigue, causes irrational fluctuations of policy, and perpetuates an atomistic approach to political processes. In France, Brownson feels, checks against centralism are totally ineffective because the control over the constitutional structure comes from within the government itself. While Brownson may have underestimated the significance of the informal conventions as a factor in English government, his criticism of the French system is valid and certainly borne out by recent events which have seen both the structure and philosophy of French government “legally” altered. Vide Loewenstein, Karl, “The Demise of the French Constitution of 1875,” American Political Science Review, XXXIV, 867–895 (10, 1940)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

77 A. R., p. 260 ff. The principle of the importance of private rights, of conscience, of religion, and of family, are similarly the chief support of modern Catholic arguments against child labor and compulsory public education legislation.

78 Dred Scott V. Sandford, 19 Howard 393 (1857)Google Scholar.

79 Cf. Friedrich, C. I., Constitutional Government and Politics, ch. 11 (New York, 1937)Google Scholar; Willoughby, W. W., The Constitutional Law of the United States, III, 1616–35 (3 vols., New York, 1929)Google Scholar; Finer, Herman, Theory and Practice of Modern Government, I, 153 ff. (2 vols., London, 1932)Google Scholar.

80 Cf. the views of Follet, Mary P., who has set down some of the principles necessary for the realization of creative and unifying political experience in democracy, in her Creative Experience, passim (New York, 1924)Google Scholar.

81 A. R., p. 379 ff.

82 Vide Wilson, Francis G., Elements of Modern Politics, p. 303 ff. (New York, 1936)Google Scholar.

83 Vide Smith, T. V., The American Philosophy of Equality, passim (Chicago, 1927)Google Scholar. In the light of subsequent history, with the demonstrated importance of women's activities in national and local affairs, and particularly during war emergencies, Brownson probably would have modified his views on this point in terms of his public function principle.

84 A. R., pp. 384–385. These principles of public administration had been insisted upon by thinkers prior to Brownson, but seldom as part of a systematic theory of American government. The “scientific” study of administration in the United States is usually dated from Wilson's, Woodrow essay, “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly, II, 197–222 (1887)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

85 A. R., p. 270 ff.

86 On the desirability of local independence Brownson finds himself in thorough accord with Jefferson, just as he had some bases of agreement with Calhoun. What Brownson neglects in his analysis of parties is the possibility that they may achieve a sounder and more civic-minded view of their function in a democracy, accepting the essentially moral principle that party struggles are struggles for compromise rather than victory. He also ignores the function of party leaders as brokers between interests. Yet his criticism is not without merit and significance, particularly in view of the present fact that a single party, grown overstrong, is potentially a serious threat to the democratic process.

87 A. R., p. 385 ff.

88 Cf. Spengler, Oswald, Today and Destiny, pp. 110–112 (ed. by Dakin, E. F., New York, 1940)Google Scholar. It must be added that Brownson is progressive and sanguine in his views on the destiny of human society, particularly in America, and exhibits none of Spengler's mystical fatalism. Heinnch von Treitschke, while rejecting those moral purposes and limitations of the state which Brownson found to be fundamental, similarly argued for the value and function of the military spirit. Politics, ch. 1 (tr. by Dugdale, and de Bille, , London, 1916)Google Scholar.

89 Brownson declares for a minimum of one hundred thousand professional soldiers to form the cadre of an army of three hundred thousand when full mobilized. Surely a fairly modest program in terms of contemporary military organization! A. R., p. 389.

90 Mosca, Gaetano, The Ruling Class, pp. 240–243 (tr. by Kahn, H. D., New York, 1939)Google Scholar.

91 A. R., pp. 389–390.

92 A. R., pp. 430–432. The Roosevelt-Churchill, eight point “Atlantic Charter,” involving the exertion of the moral and physical influence of the United States upon European politics, in terms of a realistic appraisal of America's own national interests, may be taken as a possible example of the sort of voice Brownson expected the United States to have in European affairs. While the “Atlantic Charter” was drawn up for special purposes and related to problems peculiar to the present world conflict, it includes at least three principles in harmony with Brownson's theory of American national policy: no territorial changes without the consent of the nation involved, self-determination in matters of internal government, and the justification of the use of force to resist aggression and defend legitimate interests. For the eight points and discussion thereof, vide Newsweek XVIII, 8, pp. 11–14 (08 25, 1941)Google Scholar.

93 Shotwell, James T., On the Rim of the Abyss, pp. viii, 335–344 (New York, 1936)Google Scholar. Vide also the distinction, made earlier and without American reference, between internationalism and cosmopolitanism, by Zimmern, Alfred, America and Europe, pp. 65–80 (New York, 1929)Google Scholar. Brownson would have agreed that international cooperation can be achieved without the artificial and premature substitution of a cosmopolitan sentiment for existing national loyalties.

94 A. R., p. 352.

95 Cf. Bluntschli, , op. cit., p. 25 ff.Google Scholar, who states admirably the need for spiritual maturity among nations before real international harmony can be accomplished.

96 For a discussion of the elements of conservatism, vide Wilson, Francis G., “A Theory of Conservatism,” American Political Science Review, XXXV, 29–43 (02, 1941)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

97 While the definition here suggested is seldom so stated, it is a common, true, and basic element in theories of liberalism. For discussion, vide Feibleman, James, Positive Democracy, pp. 151–166 (Chapel Hill, 1940)Google Scholar.

98 Democracy was once considered the natural and inevitable culmination of the whole course of Western culture. Bryce, Lord, Modern Democracies, I, ch. 4 (2 vols., New York, 1921)Google Scholar. This belief having been rudely shattered by the rise of dictatorships, there is an increasing tendency to defend democracy in abstract, even psychological, terms, without reference to the governing factors of concrete social, political, and economic conditions. For an interesting, contemporary example of this sort of over-simplification, vide Thompson, Dorothy, “Who Goes Nazi?” Harpers, vol. 183, pp. 237–242 (08, 1941)Google Scholar.

99 Vide the criticism of this Catholic attitude by Rev. A. Muller, S. J., in Ryan, and Boland, , op. cit., pp. 241–242Google Scholar.