Last updated 09/07/24: Online ordering is currently unavailable due to technical issues. We apologise for any delays responding to customers while we resolve this. For further updates please visit our website: https://www.cambridge.org/news-and-insights/technical-incident
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Publication of the Peace Pastoral, which has been extensively discussed in journals, has had little effect in persuading scholars or commentators on the ethics of nuclear deterrence. A review of the literature generated by The Challenge of Peace provides a survey of the current state of opinion on this question. The bishops, who seek to apply traditional just war categories to the novel situation of the nuclear era, are opposed by representatives of other traditional positions (the arms control community, which tolerates the targeting of civilians, and the “limited war” school, which eschews civilian targets). Two new approaches, likewise opposed to that of the pastoral, set more radical limits to nuclear targeting. All the critics regard the teaching of the pastoral letter, which condemns all militarily meaningful use of the nuclear arsenal, as an anachronistic exercise in the nuclear era.
1 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response (Washington, D.C., United States Catholic Conference, 1983).Google Scholar
2 For example, McCormick, Richard A. S. J., “Notes on Moral Theology,” Theological Studies, 45, no. 1 (03 1985)Google Scholar; Dwyer, Judith A., “The Morality of Using Nuclear Weapons,” New Catholic World, no. 226 (1983), 244–48Google Scholar; and Winters, Francis X., “The American Bishops on Deterrence — “Wise as Serpents: Innocent as Doves,'” Science, Technology and Human Values, 8, Issue 3 (Summer 1983), 23–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and “Did the Bishops Ban the Bomb? Yes and No,” America, 149 (1983), 104–108.Google Scholar
3 The first indications of the forthcoming condemnation may be discerned perhaps in To Live in Christ Jesus: A Pastoral Reflection on the Moral Life (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1976).Google Scholar
4 One of the revolutionary developments derived from the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) was the authorization of national conferences of bishops to speak authoritatively on matters of morality primarily affecting the people of one national church. Without this new dynamic of collegiality in magisterial teaching, the American bishops would undoubtedly not have taken the initiative to determine the morality of nuclear war without the prior teaching of the Holy See.
5 When the final tally was taken in Chicago on 3 May 1983, the pastoral letter was approved 238 to 9.
6 The virtual unanimity of the bishops' final judgment is principally attributable to the limits placed on the range of final options available to the bishops by the ancient Church teaching on the rights and limits of war, called the just war theory. No bishop, despite his own personal inclinations, would have dreamed of imposing as Catholic teaching (and therefore binding on Catholics) either of the two extreme positions which often impede such discussions in other circles: unilateral disarmament or “military necessity.”
7 Cf. footnote 31 of the pastoral letter for fuller references to the vast literature on the tradition.
8 It was historically decisive for the evolution of the pastoral letter on war and peace that they had antecedently (since the 1973 Roe vs. Wade decision of the U.S. Supreme Court) taken a high profile political position contesting the drift in American legal and social thought toward liberalized abortion laws. Indeed it was their record of episcopal advocacy on this complementary right to life issue that provided the opening to those in the hierarchy who sought to complete this advocacy by drawing attention to the threat to innocent life arising from the risk of nuclear war.
9 For a sampling of this discussion as it took place in the mid-1970's, cf. the record of a year-long seminar among ethicists and policymakers at Georgetown University (1974–75) in Ford, and Winters, , eds., Ethics and Nuclear Strategy? (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1977).Google Scholar
10 Walzer, Michael, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 282Google Scholar
11 For an example of this initiative being taken by Catholic military officers in raising the moral question for theologians and bishops, cf. Schratz, Captain Paul R. “War, Morality and the Military Profession,” Proceedings of the Naval Institute, 09 1983, pp. 46–51.Google Scholar
12 The bishops have added publicity to the relevance of the scientific and professional literature on the (un)controllability of nuclear war, which they cite in the pastoral, esp. in footnotes 61 and 62 of the final text.
13 Isaiah, 11 and 65.Google Scholar
14 The argument for this interpretation of the teaching of the letter is spelled out in Winters, , “Did the Bishops Ban the Bomb? Yes and No,” p. 105Google Scholar, and will be explicated below in responding to the major challenge to this interpretation, that of Bruce Russett. (Cf. footnote 40, below.)
15 The Challenge of Peace, nos. 138, 188.
16 The letter's condemnation covers all militarily meaningful uses of the present arsenal. Since the central argument of the letter stems from the bishops' acceptance of the professional consensus that a war fought with the present arsenal probably could not be controlled, the bishops' judgments would require revision if technological advances were (as currently seems impossible) at some future point to guarantee reliable control of nuclear hostilities.
17 The Challenge of Peace, nos. 150, 155, 216.
18 Among those within the Catholic community who have at times advocated this position, cf. Russett, Bruce, “A Countercombatant Alternative to Nuclear Madness,” in Ford and Winters, Ethics and Nuclear Strategy? pp. 124–43Google Scholar; and Winters, F. X., “Morality in the War Room,” America, 132 (1975), 106–110.Google Scholar
19 Quoted in The Challenge of Peace, no. 173.
20 The classic modern example which illustrates this timeless principle is the conduct to have been expected during the Nazi era if one were hiding Jewish refugees from the regime. If asked about the whereabouts of refugees, the one questioned would be morally expected to lie about the facts because the questioner had no right to an honest answer.
21 Michel Duclos, writing under the nom de plume, Gorand, Francois, “La dissuasion nucleaire,” Etudes, 10 1983, pp. 377–88Google Scholar, et al., as indicated below, footnotes 26–34.
22 Tucker, Robert W., “The Nuclear Debate,” Foreign Affairs, Autumn 1984, pp. 1–32Google Scholar, et al., as indicated below, footnotes 35–48.
23 Strictly speaking, this vision is not a school of thought, but confined to the writing of Leon Wieseltier, as studied below, footnotes 49–55.
24 “Apocalypse,” the Greek work for revelation (literally unveiling), is traditionally associated with the drama of the end of the world, the moment of fiery judgment that brings to a close the trial of history, complete with punishment and reward in proportion to human merit. Apocalypse is intended in the present context to signify this common feature of these arguments: the explicit claim made by each author that it might be necessary for man (that is, American and Soviet man) to bring the human experiment to a close, taking the role attributed to Jesus Christ in the New Testament version of the apocalypse. History in these political perspectives is man's province to control and, if need be, terminate.
25 Gorand, Francois, Etudes, 10 1983, p. 386.Google Scholar
26 Krauthammer, Charles, “On Nuclear Morality,” Commentary, 10 1983, pp. 48–53.Google Scholar
27 Ibid., p. 49.
28 Ibid., p. 52.
29 Okin, Susan M., “Taking the Bishops Seriously,” World Politics, 36, no. 4 (1984), esp. 553.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
30 Cf. footnote 14 above and 40 below with associated texts for this argument.
31 Schell, Jonathan, “Reflections: The Abolition,”Google Scholar a two-part series, appearing in The New Yorker, 01 2 and 9, 1984 (pp. 36–75 and 43–94).Google Scholar I have stressed that the strategic position recommended by Schell as U.S. policy is not one with which he would personally associate himself. (Part I, 2 January, p. 69). This distinction serves as a major theme of the closing remarks below. Cf. also Schell, , “Talk of the Town,” The New Yorker, 23 05 1983, pp. 31 and 32.Google Scholar
32 The criticism arises unfortunately from Schell's mistaken view that the bishops said “no” to nuclear weapons (“Reflections”, 2 01 1984, pp. 68, 69).Google Scholar It was, of course, nuclear war to which the bishops said “no.” This error of analysis on Schell's part is capital, for it leads him to charge the bishops with making a “U turn” (Part I, p. 69)Google Scholar
33 “Talk of the Town,” The New Yorker, 23 05 1983, pp. 31 and 32.Google Scholar
34 Schell says that he himself would want the retaliation to be a phone call. It is not clear why a nation would have a right to make a rather different retaliatory move when Schell feels that he would have no such right.
35 Tucker, , “The Nuclear Debate,” pp. 19, 20, 21.Google Scholar Tucker is the only author studied here who concedes the possible deterrent utility of the arsenal itself.
36 Ibid., pp. 15, 19, 20, 22.
37 Russett, Bruce, “Ethical Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security, 8, no. 4 (Spring 1984), 36–54; esp. 52, 53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
38 Ibid., pp. 53 (and footnote 19).
39 A chronicle of the evolution of episcopal statements by European hierarchies is available in Winters, , “Nuclear Deterrence Morality:” Atlantic Community Bishops in Tension,” Theological Studies, 43 (1982), 428–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and “After Tension, Detente: A Continuing Chronicle of European Episcopal View on Nuclear Deterrence,” Theological Studies, 45 (1984), 343–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
40 The decisive evidence that the second and all successive drafts condemn all militarily meaningful use of the arsenal is found in the combination of the repeated phrase “We must say ‘no’ to nuclear war,” and the excision of the passage which had allowed a specific retaliatory use against military force. The excised passage was found on pp. 30 and 31 of the first draft.
41 Russett, , “Ethical Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence,” p. 40.Google Scholar
42 This is the thoughtful position Russett has advocated for at least a decade. Cf. footnote 18 above. It was not that of the bishops after revisions made in the first draft.
43 Cf. the judgments of Tucker, Wohlstetter, Krauthammer, Wieseltier, Duclos and others studied in the present review.
44 Commentary, 06 1983, pp. 15–35.Google Scholar
45 Winters, F. X., in “Albert Wohlstetter and His Critics,” Commentary, 12 1983, pp. 4–6.Google Scholar
46 Pp. 963–94.
47 Ibid., p. 991, 993.
48 Ibid., p. 993. (Emphasis on “chances” added.)
49 “When Deterrence Fails,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 1984, pp. 827–47.Google Scholar His critique of the bishops pastoral letter is found in Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace (New York: A New Republic Book, 1983), pp. 73 and 74Google Scholar; “Nuclear Idealism, Nuclear Realism,” The New Republic 11 03 1985, pp. 20–25.Google Scholar
50 “When Deterrence Fails,” p. 827.Google Scholar
51 Ibid. pp. 830, 835.
52 Ibid., p. 836 (Cf. 828 for a more tentative assessment.)
53 Ibid., p. 836–46.
54 Ibid., p. 845.
55 Ibid., p. 839.
56 Tucker, , “The Nuclear Debate,” p. 22.Google Scholar
57 The Listener, 6 08 1964, pp. 185–87 and 205.Google Scholar
