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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
THE “third world” of the developing and, for the most part, newly independent nations is, for Communists of all brands and allegiances, both a crucial arena of political competition against the “imperialists” and the center of their hopes for new victories. Yet there are important differences in the way Moscow and Peking view these opportunities. The Soviet leadership believes that the many poor and ambitious countries will, later if not sooner, decide that Communism offers them the best prospects for raising their status in the world. Chinese Communist propaganda, on the other hand, calls for an ever more militant struggle of “national liberation” to expel the “imperialists” from Asia, Africa, and Latin America and to unite the developing countries under Peking's leadership. Thus, in addition to being a principal focus of Communist hopes and efforts, the question of the “correct” policy toward the third world has unleashed deep-set rivalries and antagonisms between and within ruling and nonruling Communist parties alike.
* This study was prepared for the European-American Colloquium, held at Bellagio, in October 1965; permission for publication is gratefully acknowledged to the Colloquium and to the Johns Hopkins Press, which is preparing the symposium for publication under the editorship of Professor C. Grove Haines, Director of the Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University.
1 I am very grateful to Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier for her valuable assistance in this and other research projects.
2 Yi-min's, Chao speech, Peking Review, No. 30, 07 23, 1965, p. 13Google Scholar. The Soviet position is most clearly stated by Lev Sedin, the New Times correspondent at the Helsinki Congress; “Ship of Peace,” New Times, No. 30, 07 28, 1965, pp. 3–5Google Scholar.
3 For a discussion of the Lenin-Roy controversy see Chapter III, “The Second Comintern Congress,” in Whiting, Allen S., Soviet Policies in China, 1917–1924 (New York, 1954), pp. 42–58Google Scholar.
4 In the report of the Central Committee Georgii M. Malenkov drew attention to “the new and mighty upsurge of the national liberation struggle” and offered Soviet “understanding” to countries that opposed the aggressive policies of the American and British bloc. Pravda, October 6, 1952, pp. 2–4.
5 In September, 1965, the Soviet government issued two statements on Kashmir and on two occasions the Soviet leaders addressed letters to Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub appealing for a peaceful settlement and expressing concern for world peace, while avoiding taking sides in the dispute.
6 Khrushchev's speeches before the United Arab Republic National Assembly and at the Aswan Dam ceremonies; Pravda, May 12, 1964, pp. 1–2, and May 18, 1964, p. 3.
7 During Nasser's visit to the Soviet Union in 1965, the Soviet spokesmen paid tribute to his far-reaching reforms but carefully avoided calling them socialist. This interpretation contrasted markedly with Nasser's description of “socialist transformations” in the United Arab Republic since the 1952 revolution. To his hosts these steps signified a decisive choice of a “noncapitalist path of development,” which, in current Soviet theory, leads to socialism. Mikoyan's and Nasser's speeches at the August 31 friendship rally; Pravda, September 1, 1965, pp. 1 and 3.
8 The Yugoslav Communists displayed a high degree of tolerance toward the role of non-Communists in bringing about the advent of socialism long before Soviet spokesmen did so. The 1958 Program of the Yugoslav party stated that in the developing countries “… a number of parties and movements … may, for a given period of time, play a positive role in the development of society and even pave the way to socialist development. In some Asian, African, and Latin American countries, a positive role in society's advance toward socialism may, at a given stage, be played by popular and nationalist movements with progressive views, which have come into being in the struggle against imperialism and capitalist monopolies.… Workers' movements, provided they are free from dogmatism and opportunism—bear this in mind and moreover lend their support to these parties and movements as pillars of progress, as long as they remain such, and cooperate with them as with equal partners.” The Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists (Beograd, 1958), p. 67Google Scholar. See also Griffith, William E., “Yugoslavia,” in Africa and the Communist World (Stanford, 1963), edited by Brzezinski, Zbigniew, pp. 116–141Google Scholar.
9 In his report on the 1960 Moscow Meeting of 81 Parties, Khrushchev stated that “the aid of the U.S.S.R. and other socialist states to the countries that have won independence pursues but one aim—to help strengthen the positions of these countries in the struggle against imperialism, develop national economy, and improve the life of the people.…” “But it by no means follows that socialist aid exerts no influence on the prospects of further development of the countries that have won freedom.” Pravda, January 25, 1961, p. 4. B.N. Ponomarev was much more explicit: “The aid extended by the socialist countries helps to lay the material foundation for the genuine independence of peoples who have rid themselves of colonial rule. Moreover, it stimulates interest in socialism and engenders a desire to use socialist methods in order to build a thriving economy: it offers moral support to the progressive forces in the newly emerged states, promotes their unity, and assists them in their search for the correct ways of national development. In these circumstances the growth of the working class and other progressive changes in the social structure as well as greater activity on the part of the entire population make it possible for all former colonies eventually to take the non-capitalist way. The peoples themselves will decide what path to take and when to take it.” “Some Problems of the Revolutionary Movement,” World Marxist Review, V, No. 12 (12 1962), 11Google Scholar.
10 Castro declared Cuba to be a socialist state in April, 1961, and the Cubans observed their May Day under “the glorious banner of socialism.” But Pravda's May Day slogans ignored this claim and hailed the Cuban people for their construction of a “new life” (April 9, 1961, p. 1). During President Dorticós' September, 1961, visit to Moscow, this divergence in interpretations continued. But on February 18, 1962, the Soviet government, in a warning to the United States, pledged its support to a “people's Cuba,” and the 1962 May Day slogans (Pravda, April 15, 1962) acknowledged that Cuba was “building socialism.”
11 It has been suggested that the purge of Anibal Escalante, one of the top Communists, from the ORI (Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas) in March, 1962, was due to Castro's desire to demonstrate to the Russians that his control over his new party could not be questioned. Cattell, David, “Soviet Policies in Latin America,” Current History, 11, 1964, p. 288Google Scholar.
12 Castro's Second Havana Declaration (February, 1962), maximizing the use of force, and Ernesto “Che” Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare (1959) are frequently quoted by Chinese propaganda.
13 Szulc, Tad, “Cuba Began Role in Zanzibar in 1961,” New York Times, 01 23, 1964Google Scholar. See also Szulc's dispatches on Guevara's visit to Algeria, “Guevara on Trip Linked to Congo,” and “Cuban Bid to Join Algiers Parley Seen,” New York Times, December 17, 1964, and January 13, 1965. The first corroborated evidence on an important scale of Cuban subversive activities in Latin America came in July, 1964, when the OAS condemned the Cuban government for its “acts of aggression and intervention” after an inter-American investigation team confirmed the Venezuelan complaints that Cuba was shipping weapons to a terroristic group. Davids, Jules, The United States in World Affairs, 1964 (New York, 1965), pp. 223–224Google Scholar. On a CBS-TV interview in December, 1964, Guevara stated that while Cuba was “not sending arms to other Latin American countries,” it had “helped some of our Latin American companions [comrades] to acquire military knowledge.” Johansson, Bertram B., “Cuba Admits Subversive Aid,” The Christian Science Monitor, 12 15, 1964Google Scholar.
14 Observer, , “Vopreki natsional'nym interesam Al'zhira,” Pravda, 12 7, 1962, p. 5Google Scholar.
15 Ibid., May 20, 1962, p. 2.
16 “Sozdat' revoliutsionnyi front vsekh patriotov,” ibid., August 4, 1963, page 5.
17 Sobolev, A., “National Democracy—The Way to Social Progress,” World Marxist Review, VI, No. 2 (02, 1963), p. 41Google Scholar.
18 Goodluck, W.O., “Nigeria and Marxism” (Excerpts from an address before the Moscow Conference of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations on the Centenary of the First International), World Marxist Review Information Bulletin, No. 34 (03 4, 1965), pp. 56–57Google Scholar.
19 “Russians to Lecture in Ghana,” New York Times, May 10, 1964; “Kenya to Take Over Lumumba Institute,” ibid., May 1, 1965.
20 “Gruppa maliiskikh partiinykh rabotnikov zakonchilâ uchebu,” Pravda, April 8, 1965, p. 3.
21 Even though Soviet scholars and publicists do not customarily refer to the Congo (Brazzaville) as being on the noncapitalist path, in August, 1965, during President Massemba-Débat's visit, A. Mikoyan stated that the Congo had chosen the noncapitalist path. But, according to President Massemba-Débat, his country had already chosen “scientific socialism.” For their speeches at a reception at the Embassy, Congolese, see Pravda, 08 19, 1965, pp. 1 and 4Google Scholar.
22 Problems of the National-Liberation Movement of the Arab People,” World Marxist Review, VII, No. 9 (09, 1964), pp. 62–63Google Scholar.
23 “Centenary of the First International; International Commemoration Session,” ibid., VII, No. 11 (November, 1964), 74.
24 “Za mir, natsional'noe osvobozhdenie, demokratiiu i sotsial'nyi progress,” Pravda, December 11, 1964, p. 5.
25 However, a few well-placed and high-ranking Communist officials or advisers in a one-party state can exercise considerable influence. This has been the case in Algeria, where the increasing evidence of Ben Bella's reliance on Communist advisers and their slogans undoubtedly contributed to his overthrow. It was followed by wholesale dismissals and arrests of the Communists and a return to traditional values of Islamic socialism, announced by Colonel Houari Boumedienne in his July 5, 1965, speech to the nation. In the UAR, the appointment of former Communists to the Press Council and the infiltration of newspaper publishing by Marxists have led to the removal of some anti- Communist nationalists. Cf. Smith, Hendrick, “Arrest of Pro-West Publisher Signals New Gain for Left in Cairo Press,” New York Times, 08 2, 1965Google Scholar.
26 “Draft Program of Communist Party of India,” World Marxist Review information Bulletin, No. 18 (07 9, 1964), pp. 23–24Google Scholar.
27 People's Daily, March 4, 1965; translated in Peking Review, No. 11, 03 12, 1965, p. 14Google Scholar.
28 “O klassovoi strukture v slaborazvitykh stranakh,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 4, 1962, pp. 68–82Google Scholar.
30 “Sotsializm, kapitalizm, slaborazvitye strany,” ibid., No. 4, 1964, pp. 116–131, and No. 6, 1964, pp. 62–81; an abridged version in English, Special Issue of MIZAN, VI, No. 10 (11, 1964), iii, 33Google Scholar.
31 “Political Resolution of the Seventh Congress, Communist Party of India,” World Marxist Review Information Bulletin, No. 32 (02 5, 1965), p. 28Google Scholar.
32 “Al'zhirskii narod v bor'be za natsional'nuiu nezavisimost',” Kommunist, No. 16 (11, 1960), pp. 76–87Google Scholar.
33 Kaboshkin, V. and Shchirovskii, Yu., “Al'zhir: ot natsional'nogo osvobozhdeniia k sotsial'nomu,” Kommunist, No. 16 (11, 1963) p. 114Google Scholar.
34 Since 1958 the U.S.S.R. has either set up or contracted to build about ninety schools, ranging from large technological institutes to small vocational centers. There are also numerous training courses at Soviet aid projects in which, according to Soviet claims, over one hundred thousand skilled workers have been trained. Almost ten thousand students from Asia, Africa, and Latin America are enrolled in Soviet institutions of higher learning, and over 16,000 industrial and farm workers have received technical training in Soviet factories and collective farms. In addition, many journalists, economists, engineers, agronomists, and other professional groups have attended special short-term courses and seminars in the Soviet Union. Valkenier, Elizabeth K., “Red School Wedge,” The Christian Science Monitor, 04 23, 1965Google Scholar;Petrushev, A., “Vazhnyi faktor ekonomicheskoi nezavisimosti razvivaiushchikhsia stran,” Vneshniaia torgovlia, No. 8, 1965, pp. 3–7Google Scholar.
35 Fellows, Lawrence, “Kenyatta Spurns Soviet Arms Gift,” New York Times, 04 30, 1965Google Scholar.
36 Vneshniaia torgovlia, No. 8, 1964, p. 13Google Scholar.
37 At the 1964 discussion in the Institute of World Economy on the developing countries, G. Mirskii pointed out that hasty nationalization could “only damage the economy.” V. Kollontai, challenging R. Ulianovskii's view that the state sector was inherently anti-capitalist, argued that it could serve as an instrument for expanding the influence of private capital; (the MIZAN summary, pp. 3 and 7). For a discussion of divergent views on the nature of state capitalism in the former colonies see Dinerstein, Herbert S., “Soviet Doctrines on Developing Countries; Some Divergent Views,” in New Nations in a Divided World, edited by London, Kurt (New York, 1963), pp. 80–83Google Scholar.
38 Summing up the 1964 discussion in the Institute of World Economy, V. Tiagunenko, who heads that Institute's section on the developing countries, maintained that it would be wrong to forbid at the present time the development of private capital even in countries which had advanced farther than others along the path of social progress. “The social sector is not as yet capable of supplying [these] countries with the essential goods. The backwardness of these countries is so great that it is necessary to utilize for economic development all the means that are available, naturally under the control of the state. Total banning of private capital could result in political harm.” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 6, 1965, p. 79Google Scholar. Later in the year Tiagunenko wrote: “The countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America cannot, naturally, count on the socialist countries satisfying all their needs in capital, equipment, technical aid. They have to satisfy a considerable part of their needs through the imperialist countries. Thanks to the support of the socialist countries, they now have the opportunity to act as independent and equal partners in their relations with the imperialist states. Moreover, by permitting the imperialist monopolies to invest capital in this or that branch of the economy, the economically backward states can now set conditions and utilize the means thus received to speed up their development.” Ibid., No. 11, 1964, p. 16. A recent article on Guinea discussed dispassionately the contribution made by foreign companies, especially FRIA, to its economy. Midtsev, V., “Gvineia na novom puti,” Kommunist, No. 12 (08, 1965), pp. 85–93Google Scholar.
39 At the April, 1964, conference on the agrarian problem in the Afro-Asian countries, held at the Institute of the Peoples of Asia, the collective report stated that recent contributions to the classic Marxist-Leninist position on this question held that the solution of the land problem in the interest of the peasants consisted in a gradual introduction of measures that limited capitalist relations and prepared the ground for a socialist transformation of the countryside. Aleksandrov, Yu. G., “Agrarno-krestianskii vopros v razvivaiush chikhsia stranakh Azii i Afriki no sovremennom etape,” Narody Azii i Afriki, No. 5, 1964, p. 210Google Scholar. A purely political approach to the peasant question— ”liquidate landowners as a class,” “all land to the peasants” — seems no longer to predominate. Economic aspects of land reform (such as absorbing surplus rural labor, maintaining productivity) are under serious discussion. Thus, S. Kulik, writing on Kenya, stated: “At the present time the government cannot proceed with direct expropriation of the settlers' land. To decide on such a step would mean putting the country's economy on the verge of catastrophe.” “Agrarnyi vopros v Kenii,” Mirovaia ekonamika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 11, 1964, p. 111Google Scholar. And K. Inov, discussing the international significance of land reform in East Germany, condemned as “leftist” and anti-Marxist those views that advocated compulsory cooperatives: “The Leftist desires to outrun events and execute a leap straight into higher economic forms (collective farming), without painstaking and systematic work in creating the political and economic conditions, were, to say the least, thoughtless.” He stressed that “the transition of the peasants to collective farming was effected without prior nationalization of land,” and that “only seven years after land reform did the voluntary movement of the peasants towards forming cooperatives start and gradually expand, initially in the form of cultivation clubs and then going on to higher forms.” “Solving the Agrarian Tasks of the Revolution,” International Affairs, No. 9, 1965, pp. 51 and 55–56Google Scholar.
40 Nowadays Soviet experts usually visit a given country to study possible development projects prior to making a formal aid commitment. Thus, the joint communiqué, following the visit by a delegation of the Kenya government to Moscow, stated that the Soviet Union would formally undertake to build various projects and grant appropriate credits after on-the-spot consultations and investigations by Soviet and Kenyan specialists. Pravda, May 18, 1964, p. 2. The Russians have also come to require adequate cooperation from the recipient countries. In Indonesia, where none of the Soviet-aided industrial projects has gotten off the ground because of Indonesia's failure to provide its share of development funds, Mikoyan found it necessary, during his visit in July, 1964, to lecture his hosts publicly on the need for careful and patient planning. Pravda, July 3, 1964, p. 5.
41 In 1965 a new Soviet trade organization, Zapaschasteksport, was set up to help solve the spare parts problem. At present there are 36 spare parts depots abroad and their number is scheduled to grow. The Soviet aid agencies maintain service centers in twenty developing countries, but these have been found insufficient. Kirillov, A., “Vypusk mashin i oborudovaniia rastet,” Vneshniaia torgovlia, No. 6, 1965, p. 6Google Scholar.
42 In the last two years the U.S.S.R. has resorted to sharing in the output of its aid projects. For example, a Soviet-built cannery in Guinea is to export tinned foods to the Soviet Union under the terms of the trade agreement. ‘Soviet Specialists in Guinea,’ New Times, No. 24 (06 16, 1965), p. 29Google Scholar. In October 1963, the U.S.S.R. concluded an aid agreement with Afghanistan whereby the former undertook to organize the annual extraction of two billion cubic meters of natural gas; the agreement provided for the construction of a pipeline to Soviet territory and the annual export of 1.5 billion cubic meters, or three-fourths of the output, to the Soviet Union. ‘ Rasshirenie ekonomicheskikh sviazei,’ Pravda, October 18, 1963, p. 5.
43 Cuba has been unable to deliver the sugar contracted for delivery to the Soviet Union, and the latter has had difficulties in collecting from Havana repayment on development and balance of payments credits, estimated at $500 million. At present, the Soviet solution seems to be to streamline the island's sugar industry through intensive technical aid and to help Cuba reenter the world market so as to lessen its dependence on the bloc. However, so far, this solution has involved additional credits. The latest credit, of an unspecified amount, for the development of the sugar industry was granted in September, 1965. “Sovetsko-kubinskoe soglashenie,” Pravda, September 7, 1965, p. 3. In the meantime both sides chafe under the burden. It is reported that Che Guevara's eclipse is due to his criticism, made at the February, 1965, Afro-Asian Economic Seminar in Algiers, of Soviet insistence on repayment. Collier, B.L., “Fall of Cuba's No. 2 Man is Laid to Ideological Rift,” New York Herald Tribune, 06 28, 1965Google Scholar. There are frequent reports from the Communist bloc of popular discontent with excessive generosity in extending aid to Cuba, such as was expressed during the May Day demonstrations in Prague in 1964. “Students Battle Police in Prague in May Day Clash,” New York Times, May 3, 1964.
44 And indeed the Russians have shown extraordinary patience and tolerance toward Sukarno's failure either to come through with repayments for their extensive military aid (estimated at about one billion dollars) or to provide support in the dispute with China. In 1963 the Soviet Union consented to a moratorium on service payments; another moratorium was arranged during Mikoyan's visit in July, 1964. Despite Mikoyan's blunt request that Sukarno promise assistance in overriding the Chinese veto on an invitation to the 1965 Afro-Asian Conference, the final communiqué on the visit did not mention any Indonesian backing for the Soviet presence at the second Bandung.
45 The October 21, 1963, People's Daily article “Apologists of Neocolonialism” (the fourth in the series of Chinese commentaries on the open letter of the C.C., CPSU) argued that national independence and social progress are advanced by revolutionary struggle and not by economic aid, as the Soviet leaders claim. The article did not dismiss aid altogether, but it assigned secondary importance to it and accused the Russians of holding that since colonialism had disappeared the central task of the national liberation movement was that of economic development. Similarly, Huang Chanpeng's article “‘Underdeveloped Economics’ is the New Colonialist Theory,” Red Flag, No. 18, 1963Google Scholar, attacked Soviet concern with the problem of economic backwardness; such an approach “obliterates the conflict of class opposition, drugs the people's revolutionary determination, halts their flourishing national and democratic revolutionary struggle by reducing the whole relationship between the exploiter and the exploited to that of the ‘aiding’ and the ‘aided.’ ”
46 For recent contrasting Chinese and Soviet statements on war and revolution see General Liu Piao's article “Long Live Victory of People's War,” Peking Review, No. 36, 09 3, 1965, pp. 9–30Google Scholar;Starushenko, G., “Vymysl' i pravda ob osvoboditel'nykh voinakh,” Kommunist, No. 12 (08, 1965), pp. 94–97Google Scholar; editorial, “Sovetskaia vneshniaia politika i obshchestvennyi progress,” ibid., pp. 3–12. Liu Piao advocated an uninterrupted series of people's wars as the highest form of revolution and as the best means for destroying the United States. G. Starushenko tried to remove the stigma of Communist responsibility for local wars by stressing that they arose only when the objective and subjective conditions were ripe. The editorial advocated peaceful settlement of all disputes, no matter how small, because a policy which did not take “realities” into account would mean “an uninterrupted permanent war.” (Starushenko, ibid., p. 10).
