1 The best and most exhaustive biography of Suarez is by de Scorraille, Raoul (Paris, 1913)Google Scholar, in two volumes, of which the first is an elaborate biography, the second a report on the works and an appreciation of Suarez as theologian, philosopher, and moralist. For Suarez as theologian, Werner's, KarlFranz Suarez und die Theologie der Spātscholastik (Regensburg, 1861)Google Scholar, is still important. An excellent biography is to be found in the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique (Vacant-Mangerrot) volume XV, 1Google Scholar, column 2. Cf. also my StaaUlehre des Franz Suarez (M. Gladbach, 1927).Google Scholar

2 Cf. Scorraille, , I.c. Vol. II, Oeuvres de Suarez.Google Scholar

3 Ramière formulates this feature of Suarez' method very well when he says, “In a question which one thinks Saint Thomas has exhaustively treated, Suarez finds a multitude of new points of view.” Revue du Monde Calholique (1862), p. 387 ff.Google Scholar

4 Cf. Ehrle, , Notizen über einige berühmiere nachtridentinische Theologen Katholik (1865), p. 576.Google Scholar

5 Joachim, , Jungiua und sein Zeitalter (Stuttgart, 1850), p. 12.Google Scholar

6 Principles du Droit Publ. 1, second column, p. 24.Google Scholar

7 Geschichte der Ethik (1906), I, P. b 12.Google Scholar

8 Leçons de Philosophie du Droit (Translation of the Original (1936), p. 157).Google Scholar

9 Fondements du Droit des Gens (Visseriana, Bibliotheca) (Leyden, 1925), vol. IV, p. 32.Google Scholar

10 Archiv für Rechts and Wirtschafts Philosophie, vol. X, p. 235 (Berlin, 1917.Google Scholar The same thesis is represented by Scott, James Brown: The Catholic Conception of International Lara (Washington, 1934)Google Scholar; Eppstein, John: The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations (London, 1936)Google Scholar; Camilo Barcia Trelles: Les théologiens espagnoh da XVIe siècle et lécole moderne du Droit International, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 43 of the Hague Academy of International Law. Cf. especially, Mesnard, , L'essor de la Philosophie Polilique da XVIe siècle (Paris, 1936), p. 627Google Scholar; my State in Catholic Thought (second edition, 1947), p. 461 ff.Google Scholar

11 L. C. I., P. 191.Google Scholar

12 Böumker, Clemens rightly speaks of the “freiere Thomismus” of Vasquez and Suarez and the “strenge Thomismus” of Bannez. Chrisll. Philosophic des Miltelalters (Berlin, 1923), p. 407.Google Scholar

13 Cf. Hans, Meyer, Philosophy of Saint Thomas (St. Louis, 1944), p. 532f. “Because of the factual difficulties, many admirers of Saint Thomas have adopted the modified Thomist doctrine of Suarez with respect to the principle of individuation and the distinction between essence and existence.”Google Scholar

14 In his essay “Thomas van Aquin als Problematiker,” Stimmen der Zeit, vol. 109, p. 168, E. Przywara points out that in his latest works Saint Thomas leaves the way open to the Scotist-Suarezian positive attiude toward the individual.Google Scholar

15 Dictiotmaire de Théologie Calholique, XIV, 2, col. 2695.

16 Cf. Gundlach, G.: Soziologie der Kalholischen Gedankenwelt und des jesuiten ordens (Freiburg, 1927), p. 60. A penetrating and scholarly book, whick is most important for any one interested in scholastic social philosophy.Google Scholar

17 De Legibus, II, c. 16, 16.Google Scholar

18 (Salzburg-Leipzig, 1935).

19 Cf. Gundlach, G., Gregorianum, Vol. XVII (1936); 280, 284 ff. On the other hand a comparison of the practical applications in Welty's book with those of Maritain, in The Person and the Common Good (1947), seems to show that the distinction Personality-Individuality leads to opposite practical consequences. This does not particularly recommend the distinction.Google Scholar

20 Suarez has been attacked for this “novelty” by some writers, for example, Lavanches, O.P., Le concept de droit selon Aritote et Saint Thomas (Montreal-Paris, 1933), p. 400 ff. Allegedly by substituting this new definition, Suarez made of justum something purely subjective, a “faculté morale de la volonté et a lui assigné comme fin la liberté; ca suppose qu'on fait du vouloir humain et de la liberté la règie de la moralité—against the traditional concept of “jus” as the objective justum. But there is nothing very new about this “subjective concept,” nor does Suarez speak of a faculty of the will; the definition is familiar in the Roman Law: Liberty as a facultas naturalis, jus utendi fruendi jus habere, transferre. Just. I, 3; II, 2, 3, 5; Saint Thomas himself uses it also, though less frequently in the subjective sense. Cf. The Note to Art. I, Q. 57 of theII, II of the S. Th. (Lethielleux, 4th ed.) Francis of Vittoria uses frequently the terms facultas in the sense of right (jus), for example De Polestate Civile, 10.Google Scholar

21 This denial of the famous clause: “Etsi Deus non daretur” need not be criticized by the argument of the atheist observing the natural law, that is, psychologically this obligation need not be present in the concrete mind under all circumstances. But philosophically Suarez seems to be right in his argument that the Deus legislator is an essential part of the idea of natural law as the principle of obligation. Cf. also Saint Thomas, De Ver., Q. 22, a 2, ad I: Omnia cognoscentia cognosamt implicate Deum in quolibet cognito.

22 The state is not the ultimate aim of the natural social process: That aim is mankind with its own “constitution” and law—the natural law—and with its own common good. The organization of mankind is much looser, its character much more spiritual; but it must be stressed that mankind is a true community in relation to which the state, despite its character as a perfect and therefore, in suo ordine, relatively closed society, is an open society, and becomes itself “member.”

23 That becomes clear in Suarez' insistence upon the distinction personae ul membra, and ut singuli homines, ut particulares personae. F. I., De Leg. III, c. II.

24 The words of Suarez are quite clear about this “Unio Politica, quae non fit sine aliquo pacto expresso vel tacito.” De Opera sex dierum, c. 7, n. 3. “Communitas politica coepit … per voluntatem omnium qui in ilia convenerunt.” De Leg. III, c. 2, n. 3. The multitudo is distinguished from the communitas politico because men are congregated speciali voluniale seu consensu communi in unum corpus politicum … uno societaiis vinculo. De Leg. III, c. 3, n. 1; Ipsa communitas (politica) coalescit medio consensu et Voluniale singulorum.” De Leg. I, c. 6, n. 19.

25 Cf. Tischleder, P.: Ursprang und Träger der Staatsgemalt nack Thomas v. Aquin und seiner Schule (Gladbach 1923).Google ScholarBellarmine, St. Robert says: “Res publica ab hominum consensu originem habet.” Auctuarium Bellarminianum, ed. by Le Bachelet, (Paris, 1913), p. 234Google Scholar. Cf. de Lagarde, G.: La Naissance de l'esprit laic au Declin du Moyen Age, 6 vols. passim (Paris, 1939).Google Scholar

26 Cf. my Staatslehre der Franz Suarez, p. 110 ff.Google Scholar, and State in Catholic Thought, p. 240 ff.Google Scholar

27 It should be mentioned here that the so-called translation theory was quite familiar in the legal thought of the Middle Ages and was by no means foreign to Roman law. Germanic law considered, as the foundation of the King's or Duke's (dux) power, a pactum by which authority had been transferred—with conditions and reservations—to the King; the “democratic” structure of the tribal states is quite obvious as is shown by Dopsch, : Grundlagen der ewopātschen Kullurentwicklung (1928), I, 13Google Scholar; and Brunner, H.: Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte (2nd ed., 1906), I, 16–18. (Cf. for the Roman Law Ulpian (Dig. I, 4, I) and Cajus Just. I, 2, 3). Justinian on the contrary speaks of the imperium, quod hobis a coelesti majestate traditum est. (Cod. Just. I, 17, 2, 8) a divine right theory! At Suarez' time the court lawyers were propounding the divine rights doctrine and the legibus solutus theory meant also that the king is not limited by the pacta. Suarez had, therefore, to go to the foundations of the whole theory.Google Scholar

28 De Leg. III, c. 3, n. 6.

29 Cf. my Suarez, p. 206 ff.Google Scholar; Arnold, : Bellarmine, p. 136 ff., and passim.Google Scholar

30 De Leg. III, c. 19, n. 6; VII,. c. 13, n. 5. Perfecta monarchia originates when the people transfer their original sovereignty “absolute et simpliciter.” Def. Fid. III, c. 4, n. 4.

31 Def. Fid. III, c. 2, n. 1.

32 Cf. my Suarez, p. 188 ff.Google Scholar; State, p. 451 ff. for particulars.Google Scholar

33 An interesting case of misunderstanding is that by an opponent and by a defender of Suarez. Cathrein, Suarez. V. S.J. (Moral Philosophy (1924), II, 505)Google Scholar criticized Suarez because he supposedly recognized only one legal title for the holding of political authority by one person or ruler, namely the translation by the people. Yet Suarez distinguished sharply between the primaeva institutio of monarchy which is based on consent and translation, and the institution of the crown prince after the death of the king, by hereditary succession. Costa-Rosetti, who revived the translation theory in the late nineteenth century (Phil. Mov. (1890), p. 600) did not make Suarez' distinction so clearly and was thus wide open to criticism. Suarez was here clearer than his opponent Cathrein and than his defender Costa-Rosetti. Suarez recognizes also that a free immediate democracy can, on account of a just war made by a neighboring king against it, lose its primaeva popular sovereignty through debellatio and becomes a monarchy without a translation and consent. Yet even here, Suarez points out, a quasi-contractus is at the basis of the new regime, because after all the king received his power through hereditary succession, which entitled him to the debellatio after a just war, by primaeva imtitutio.Google Scholar

34 Cf. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, vol. 37 (1945), p. 259 ff., from the allocutio to the officers of the Roman Rota, October 2, 1945.Google Scholar

35 Billot, Cardinal, S.J., who on account of his connection with the Action francaise cannot be accused of any personal bias in favor of “Democratism,” adheres in his Tractalus de Ecclesia Christi, (Rome, 1921, 4th ed.), p. 488 ff.Google Scholar, to the traditional doctrine; it would be a strange thing, if Leo XIII or for that matter Pius X—in his Letter of August 25, 1910 Ada Aposlolicae Sedis, Vol. II (Sillon Affair), p. 607 ff.Google Scholar, especially 613)—had intended a condemnation of a sentenlia communis up to the nineteenth century and even then never given up by many theologians and philosophers. Cf. Tischleder, P.: Staatsgewalt und Katholisches Gewissen (1927); my Stale, p. 451 ff.Google Scholar

36 Cf. Moreno, Isidoro Ruiz: El Derecho Internacional Publico antes de la Era Christiana (Buenos Aires, 1946);Google Scholar and (for the Graeco-Roman civilization) Voigt, : Die Lehre vom Jus Naturale, Aequum et Bonum und Jus gentium der Romer (Leipzig, 1856)Google Scholar. Cf. also Nussbaum, Arthur: A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York, 1947), chap. 1 and 2.Google Scholar

37 Cf. the titles of the respective works of J. B. Scott and John Eppstein.

38 Hildenbrand, , (Geschichte und System der Rechts trnd Staatsphilosophie, 1860) slates that a kind of international Merchant Law was the original form of international law (I, 612).Google Scholar

39 The authoritative edition is Relecciones Theologicas, a critical edition by Getino, Luis G. Alonso, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1933)Google Scholar, 1934. A good translation of all pertinent texts from the writings of Vittoria is to be found in Scott's, J. B.The Spanish Origin of International Law (Part 1) (1934)Google Scholar, Appendices. Cf. also, De Indis et de Jure Belli, Classics of International Law (1917), with the valuable introduction by Nys, Ernest.Google Scholar

40 An excellent discussion of all these arguments and their refutation by Vittoria, De Soto, Molina, etc. may be found in Haffner's, JosephChristentum und Menschenwürde (Trier, 1947), p. 197 ff.Google Scholar

41 Nys, Ernest first pointed this out and declared Vittoria to be “the father” of the modern theory of international law—Les Origines du Droil International (Brussels, 1894), p. 11Google Scholar. Many have followed him, but Haffner points out that immediately after his sentence, quod naturalis ratio inter omnes gentes constituit, Vittoria contines to speak of a jus apud omnes nationes, thus holding to the old traditional formula—loc. cit., p. 233.Google Scholar

42 Cf. De Leg., II, c. li, 20; I, c. 6, n. 18Google Scholar; De Bella Sect., c. 6, 5.Google ScholarCf. my Suarez, p. 277 ff.Google Scholar, and Haffner, , loc. cit., p. 234.Google Scholar

43 Suarez: the Jus gentium consists of rules which states must observe inter se. Natural law issues by evident illation from natural principles; Jus gentium, by consent. (De Leg. II, c. 17, n. 8; c. 19, n. 8; c. 20, n. 7.).

Grotius: Natural law is right inference from the principles of nature; Jus gentium is some form of common consent and belongs to the mutual society of nations inter se. (De Juri Belli of Pacis. Prol.: 40; II, c. 8, I, n. 2.).

Cf. Larequi, L. in Razon y Fe, vol. 88 (1929), III, p. 226 ff., who in this article on Suarez' influence on Grotius brings in a host of identical quotations.Google Scholar

44 Cf. Delos, I. T.: La Société Internationale el les Principles du Droil Public (Paris, 1929)Google Scholar; and DeSolages, : La Théobgie de la Guerre Juste (Paris, 1946).Google Scholar

45 Cf. Ignacio, P.Menendez-Reigada, G., O.P.: La Ciencia Thomisla, vol. 39 (1929), I. p. 316Google Scholar; and Venancio, P.Carro, D., O.P.: Domingo de Soto y el derecho de gentes (Madrid, 1930), p. 60.Google Scholar

46 Cf. the instructive article of Eerich Hula: “The Punitive War,” Thought (1946).Google Scholar

47 Cf. Def. Fidei, III, c. 22 on the duty of Christian princes to submit their disputes to quasi-obligatory arbitration by the Pope.