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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
The legitimate goals of political communities and the proper objectives of law have been themes of political philosophy since its inception. Philosophers' disagreements about the nature of political life and law have occasioned divergent accounts of the best or ideal government and have generated an even deeper controversy as to whether the best case should be the measure of political phenomena in the first place. For the purpose of analysis, three kinds of political theories can be distinguished. Characteristic of the first kind is the belief that people can attain a wide range of excellences and that the function of a political community is to foster in a direct manner the best or most complete form of human excellence, regardless of how rare the individuals who profit from this guidance. Accordingly, a central concern of “idealistic” or “utopian” political philosophy is elaborating the nature of the absolutely best political order and the conditions of its emergence. Among the central activities of governments so conceived are moral and intellectual education, as presented, for example, in the works of Plato and Aristotle. A second kind of political theory shares the belief in a multiplicity of hierarchically ranked human ends but denies that the highest possibility for human development should serve as the foremost principle determining political institutions and governing political decisionmaking.
1 All page references in parentheses in the body of the article are to Al-Shifā' al-Ilāhiyāt, eds. Moussa, , Dunya, , and Zayed, , revised by I. Madkour (Cairo, 1960)Google Scholar (hereafter Al-Ilā-hiyyāt). English translations of this work unless otherwise noted are those of Marmura, Michael in Lerner, R. and Mahdi, M., eds., Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (New York, 1963), pp. 99–110Google Scholar. An abridged version of this study was read at the 11th Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association in New York City, November, 1977.
2 Rosenthal, E.I.J., “Maimonides' Conception of State and Society,” Studia Semitica I: Jewish Themes (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 275–78, 286–88Google Scholar (reprinted from I. Epstein, ed., Moses Maimonides [London, 1935]); Rosenthal, , Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 113–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Strauss, Leo, “Quelques remarques sur la science politique de Maïmonide et de Fārābī,” Revue des Êtudes Juives 100 (1936), pp. 2–6Google Scholar; Walzer, Richard, Greek into Arabic (Oxford, 1962), pp. 19–20, 243–47Google Scholar; Pines, Solomon, “Some Problems of Islamic Philosophy,” Islamic Culture, 11 (1937), 69–73Google Scholar. The pioneering work in uncovering the Platonic element in Islamic and Jewish political philosophy was Strauss's, Philosophie und Gesetz (Berlin, 1935)Google Scholar. In two recent studies Pines appears to qualify his assessment of Alfarabi's Platonism somewhat: see “Philosophy,” in The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. II, The Further Islamic Lands, Islamic Society and Civilization (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 795–98Google Scholar, and “The Translator's Introduction,” in Moses Maimonides: The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Pines, S. (Chicago, 1963), esp. lxxxviii–lxxxixGoogle Scholar. In another place (“Alfarabi on Revelation and Political Wisdom,” a paper read at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in San Francisco, September, 1975), I argue that Aristotle is as great an influence for Alfarabi's political philosophy as is Plato.
3 Rosenthal, E.I.J., “Avicenna's Influence on Jewish Thought,” in Studia Semitica I: Jewish Themes, pp. 290–307Google Scholar (reprinted from G.M. Wickens, ed., Avicenna: Scientist and Philosopher [London, 1952], pp. 66–83) and “Ibn Sinā: the Synthesis,” in Political Thought in Medieval Islam, pp. 143–157. There are very few studies of Avicenna's political thought, undoubtedly because little of his immense corpus is devoted to this subject. The major histories of Islamic philosophy (Fakhry, Majid, History of Islamic Philosophy [New York, 1970]Google Scholar; O'Leary, de Lacy, Arabic Thought and Its Place in History, rev. ed. [London, 1939]Google Scholar; Corbin, Henri, Histoire de la philosophie islamique [Paris, 1964]Google Scholar) omit Avicenna's political theories, confining themselves to the psychological aspects of his theory of prophecy.
This essay is a response to Rosenthal's study. I believe he fails to distinguish between the nonpolitical aspects of the prophet's message — which do have man's intellectual development as their purpose — and the political aspects which are, for the most part, embodied in prohibitions and commands. He adduces the law's concern for people's “wellbeing in the hereafter” as evidence for its role in promoting ultimate happiness or perfection. This interpretation appears to assume the equality (in the hereafter, in happiness, or in the “eternal world”) of those who have attained moral perfection alone and those who have attained intellectual perfection. It ignores the two kinds of morality alluded to by Avicenna and discussed below, pp. 10–11. And it enables Rosenthal to say that “the divinely revealed law contains also the truth about God, his universe, his angels, the hereafter, reward and punishment, and providence,” without attempting to reconcile this assertion with the fact that Avicenna explicitly confines the law to conveying a very few truths about God (He exists, is one, and has no equal) amidst a sea of symbols and similitudes. Symbols are not truths; they may even contradict truths (e.g., Avicenna stipulates that God's majesty must be depicted in physical terms, whereas in truth God is incorporeal). Avicenna further stipulates that it is not proper to reveal that symbols are symbols and that there is a truth which needs to be uncovered (Al-Ilāhiyyāt 10.2 [end]).
4 Al-Ilāhiyyāt 10.3 and “On Predestination,” in Arberry, A.J., Avicenna: On Theology (London, 1951), p. 39Google Scholar.
5 In this study, the phrase “the Platonic position” refers to the teachings of the Republic as they were understood in medieval times (and are sometimes understood today). This use promotes two kinds of misunderstandings. First, the word “position” suggests that the Republic is a dogmatic, not a dialectical work. Second, this use ignores the political teachings of the Laws and the problem of the relation of the Laws to the Republic. The Laws was available to the Muslim community —in a summary or in its entirely; and Alfarabi wrote a commentary on it. Speaking of a Platonic position and a retreat from it in this way is thus inaccurate as far as Plato's philosophy is concerned. It can be justified on the grounds that medieval political philosophy is ordinarily discussed in such overly simplified terms. Further, by taking the dogmatic doctrine of the Republic as a fixed pole, it is easier to see the real novelty of Avicenna's political thought. In a similar way, Alfarabi's idealism is presented here simplistically. Elsewhere I have argued the influence of Aristotle's Politics and Plato's Laws on Alfarabi's political philosophy.
6 Chaps. 10.2–3 are included verbatim in Al-Najāt.
7 Tahsīl al-Sacādah [Attainment of happiness] (Hayderabad, 1345 A.H.), pp. 40–41Google Scholar; Kitāb al-Hurūf [Book of letters], ed. Mahdi, Muhsin (Beirut, 1969), 131:6–9Google Scholar.
8 See, for example, Alfarabi, , Fī Arā Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fādilah, ed. Dieterici, Friedrich as Alfārābīs Abhandlung der Musterstaat (Leiden, 1895), C. XXXIIIGoogle Scholar.
9 Contrast this passage in Al-Ilāhiyyāt with Arberry, , Avicenna: On Theology, p. 39Google Scholar.
10 The citizens of the ignorant cities, according to Al-Siyāsah al-Madaniyyah [The political regime], are “political beings”: the various goals they pursue are not grounded in or supported by beliefs about the deity and the universe. The immoral cities (al-mudun alfāsiqah) differ from the ignorant ones in that the citizens of the former possess beliefs about such matters (Al-Siyāsah al-Madaniyyah, ed. Najjar, Fawzi [Beirut, 1964], 103:18–104:2)Google Scholar. In Ihsā' al-cUlūm [The enumeration of the sciences], the expression “ignorant cities” is used generically for all nonvirtuous communities and the distinction between nonvirtuous communities with and without beliefs about principles is not made.
11 Al-Ilāhiyyāt 10.1 435:13, cUyūn al-Hikmah, ed. Badawi, A. (Cairo, 1958), 16:4–5Google Scholar.
12 Fusūl Muntazacah [Selected aphorisms], ed. Najjar, Fawzi (Beirut, 1971), #28 45:3–6Google Scholar.
13 Ibid., #30 47:6–9.
14 Ritual acts are first mentioned in connection with reinforcing belief in God and the resurrection and, hence, in securing mankind's survival.
15 “The noblest of these acts of worship, from one point of view, should be.…” The other point of view is not explicitly identified (445: 1ff.).
16 Avicenna does not explicitly rank the three practical sciences. He does rank the three theoretical sciences and gives the grounds for doing so. The three practical sciences can be ranked on the same basis.
17 Avicenna mentions the future life (munqalab) in the section on politics, but the antecedent is the human species. “Future life,” therefore, can only mean something like the continuance of the species, and not the immortality of its individual members.
18 Türker, Mubahat, ed., as “Mūsā ibn-i Meymūn'un: Al-Makäla fī sina-cat al-mantik,” Ankara Üniversitesi Dil tie Tarih-Coĝrafiya Fakültest Dergisi, 18 (1960), 62–63Google Scholar. Maimonides begins by enumerating four parts of practical philosophy and then discusses only three of these. See Strauss's, comments in “Maimonides' Statement on Political Science,” in What Is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, Ill., 1959)Google Scholar.
19 Fī Sina-cat al-Mantik 63:3–5, 11–13.
20 For caql as practical wisdom, see Kitāb al-Hudūd, ed. and trans. Goichon, A.-M. as Avicenne. Lime des definitions (Cairo, 1963), 12:1–3, 9–13, p.13, note 4, p. 15, notes 2,4Google Scholar.
21 Al-Siyāsah 79:3–9. Alfarabi calls the rule of this man “excellent” or “virtuous” (80:5f.). However, he also seems to acknowledge a virtuous rule when the ruler has not acquired theoretical perfection (Ihsā' al-cUlūm [Enumeration of the sciences], ed. Amine, Osman [Cairo, 1968], 126:9–24 contrasted with 129:2–7Google Scholar; Kitab al-Millah [Book of religion], ed. Mahdi, Muhsin as Alfārābīs Book of Religion and Related Texts [Beirut, 1968], 56:14–16Google Scholar contrasted with 60:5–7; Fus ūl Muntazacah #58 66:8–67:12).
22 Ihsā' al-cUlūm 129:8–11, Al-Millah 60:14–16.
23 Al-Siyāsah 80:15–81:2, Al-Millah 49:9–14.
24 Avicenna's attempt to justify particular Islamic laws in their details seems to be an example of kalām as much as an argument of political philosophy.
25 Al-Siyāsah 81:2–4. However, in Fusūl Muntazacah four possible types of rule are mentioned as virtuous, two of which make use of law (#58).
26 See, for example,Alfarabi, , Falsafat Arisṭūlāṭīs, ed. Mahdi, Muhsin (Beirut, 1961), 59:8–15Google Scholar with 62:4–10 for the contrast between man's needs defined as necessities of life and all man's needs, which encompass nonphysical as well as physical needs.
27 Al-Siyāsah 69:16–17 (wa'l-insān min al-anwa-c allatī Iā yumkin an yatimm lahā al-darūrī min umūrihā wa-lā tanāl al-afdal min ahwālihā iliā bi-ijtima-c jama-cāt minhā kathīrah fī maskinwāhid).
28 Fus ūl Muntazacah #89 92:5–6. For a comparable idea in Plato, see Republic vi 496c–497a, 499b.
29 Taḥṣīl al-Sacdah 39:11–13 (English translation by Mahdi, M. in Medieval Political Philosophy, p. 76Google Scholar).
30 Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 6.12 1144al–3Google Scholar.
31 Taḥṣīl al-Sacādah 16:15–17; Al-Hurūf 69:20–21.
32 Al-Ilāhiyyāt 10.1 3:12–4:6.
33 Kitāb al-Jadal (Book of dialectic, Alfarabi's commentary on Aristotle's Topics), Bratislava University, MS. TE 41, no. 231, fols. 223b19–224a3, 224b6–12.
34 Taḥṣīl al-Sac-adah 45:12–13, 46:6–11. Alfarabi adds that if no use is made of a philosopher disposed to come to the aid of the community in which he lives, that person is still a “true philosopher” (ibid., 46:12–14; similarly Fusūl Muntazacah #32 49:3–6). This complicates the status of the philosopher's practical perfection, since it would seem that an art not exercised is not an art fully actualized. Perhaps Alfarabi considered his political writings as an alternative mode of exercising deliberative political excellence.
35 Fusül Muntazacah #30 47:9–10.
