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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
TheProblem of the origins and development of the office of Reich President in the Weimar Republic is of interest for several reasons, possibly the principal one being its relation to the general problem of Hitler's accession to power. It will be recalledthat Hitler came to power initially as Chancellor in a “Presidial” cabinet, that is, one responsible to the President rather than to the Reichstag and governing bythe use of the President's emergency powers. I propose to discuss here the role of the President of the Reich, as conceived of by the constitutional framers, in the light of the emergence of the Presidial cabinet.
1 Under such conditions the Nazis'chances would not have been bad, as an understanding with the Center seemed to be in the making with the Goering- Kaas talks.
2 Reprinted in pamphlet form as Deutschlands Kuenftige Staatsform (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1919).
3 Deutschlands Republikanische Reichsverfassung (Berlin, 1923), pp. 68–73Google Scholar.
4 I take it that the unsoundness of this thesis, either as an analysis of the logic of parliamentary institutions, or as an interpretation of the British and French systems, needs no spelling out here.
5 This proposal was, of course, an application of Weber's well-known views on the ways in which authority is made legitimate to the German situation.
6 I have avoided stressing the specific provisions of Article 48 of the Constitution, which, it seems to me, follow from the general conception of the Presidency which was entertained; it is on this general conception that I think it more profitable to dwell.
7 This is not to take unfair advantage of hindsight. Weber himself had pointed out the danger in the pamphlet cited.
8 This is again an example of the hold of Rechtstaatlichattitudes appropriate to the Imperial system. Weber, however, showed himself free from such attitudes, even suggesting the possibility of using the power of patronage to strengthena proposed Reichsrat against the popular chamber. Op. cit., p. 21. Preuss's attitude on this score was the more typical one.
9 Preuss, , op. cit., p. 72Google Scholar.
10 Again, this conclusion was possible without the benefits of hindsight. It was predicted, for example, by Axel Freiherr v. Freytagh-Loringhoven in his Die Weimarer Verfassung in Lehre u. Wirklichkeit (Munich, 1924), pp. 123–4Google Scholar.
11 Cited in Ranchin, Jacques, Le Chef de I'etat et la Constitution du Cabinet en Droit Public Allemand (Paris, 1936), p. 36Google Scholar.
12 Weber and Preuss voiced their warnings in the works cited. Redslob warned of the danger of Presidential dictatorship in the French edition of his book, which appeared a few years after the Weimer Convention. See Redslob, , Le Regime Parlementaire, Bibliotheque Internationale de Droit Public, Paris, 1924, pp. 285–6Google Scholar.
