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The Truman Administration and the Separation of Powers: the Case of the Marshall Plan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Quentin L. Quade
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Extract

Presidential responsibility for foreign policy is something of a commonplace today. Indeed, most analysts see Presidential dominance in foreign affairs as a more or less necessary result of the conditions of the times, which often demand the kind of unified and prompt action which only the Presidency is capable of in the American system. Yet it can be argued that the very factors which have brought Presidential conduct of foreign relations into the national spotlight have simultaneously worked to limit the decisiveness of his control over foreign policy. The period since World War I, and particularly since World War II, has seen the United States becoming more deeply involved in what can be called “positive” policy, policy that requires financial support, or new administrative authorizations, or the assignment of new personnel. And the natural corollary of such policies is the growth in significance of that element of government, which must give legislative authorization for any such undertakings. There has been, in a sense, a reassertion of traditional separation of powers in the area of foreign policy.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , January 1965 , pp. 58 - 77
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1965

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References

1 See Corwin, Edward S., The President: Office and Powers, 4th ed. (New York, 1957), p. 222Google Scholar; Hyman, Sidney, The American President (New York, 1954), p. 293Google Scholar; Rossiter, Clinton, The American Presidency (New York 1956), p. 15Google Scholar.

2 The obvious exception to this argument is when the United States is at war or in an extreme emergency. “Then the legislature tends to devolve too much power on the Executive and to resign its critical functions in foreign policy.” Elliott, William Y., United States Foreign Policy: Its Organization and Control (New York, 1953), p. 45Google Scholar.

3 The writer has in mind here such conditions as the Republican-controlled 80th Congress, which was pledged to budget-cutting; the widespread belief that Truman was only a “historical accident” with no mandate (typified by J. W. Fulbright's suggestion that Truman appoint Senator Vandenberg Secretary of State, then resign and have Vandenberg become President); the growth of neo-isolationism which sought American withdrawal from world responsibilities because the United Nations was supposed to handle them.

4 New York Times, June 23, 1947, p. 1.

5 Idem.

6 New York Times, July 22, 1947, p. 14.

7 Truman, Harry S., Memoirs (Garden City, New York, 1956), II, 117Google Scholar.

8 Idem.

9 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on Emergency Foreign Aid, 80 Cong., 1 Sess. Hereafter cited as House Hearings, Emergency Foreign Aid. The President's letter is reproduced on pp. 1–2.

10 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 93, Part 8, 10595–10597.

11 New York Times, December 16, 1947, p. 1.

12 Congressional Record, op. cit., 11749–11754.

13 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 94, Part 3, 2996–2998.

14 House Hearings, Emergency Foreign Aid. Marshall's testimony, taken on November 10 and 12, covers pp. 2–39. Douglas' testimony was heard on November 12, and covers pp. 39–41.

15 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on United States Assistance to European Economic Recovery, 80 Cong., 2 Sess. Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings, European Recovery.

16 Ibid., 3.

17 Ibid., 75 ff.

18 Ibid., 248 ff.

19 Ibid., 303 ff.

20 Ibid., 354 ff.

21 Ibid., 383 ff.

22 Ibid., 429 ff.

23 Ibid., 444 ff.

24 Ibid., 477 ff.

25 U.S Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on United States Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program, 80 Cong., 2 Sess. Hereafter cited as House Hearings, European Recovery.

26 Idem.

27 New York Times, July 11, 1947, p. 1.

28 Idem.

29 New York Times, July 12, 1947, p. 1.

30 New York Times, July 22, 1947, p. 9.

31 Idem. Though Vandenberg, in his July 10 announcement, had said such meetings would be regular, the writer was unable to discover any successors to the two instances cited here.

32 Vandenberg, Arthur H. Jr,. (ed.), The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, 1952), p. 404Google Scholar. In a letter to the writer, March 5, 1963, Lovett stated: “I do not think any appraisal of ERP could be complete without recognizing the extraordinary role which Senator Vandenberg played in it and the extremely close cooperation that existed between the Congressional committees and the Department of State.”

33 Vandenberg, , op. cit., p. 386Google Scholar.

34 Hearings, House, Emergency Foreign Aid, 40Google Scholar.

35 Senate Hearings, European Recovery, 303–316Google Scholar.

36 Idem.

37 Hearings, House, European Recovery, 29–32Google Scholar.

38 Ibid., 75.

39 Senate Hearings, European Recovery, 1Google Scholar.

40 Ibid., 315–316.

41 Ibid., 248 ff.

42 Ibid., 354 ff.

43 Ibid., 77 ff.

44 Hearings, House, Emergency Foreign Aid, 9Google Scholar.

45 Ibid., 6.

46 Senate Hearings, European Recovery, 2Google Scholar.

47 Hearings, House, European Recovery, 72Google Scholar.

48 Senate Hearings, European Recovery, 245–246Google Scholar.

49 Hearings, House, European Recovery, 75–76Google Scholar.

50 Congressional Record, op. cit., Vol. 94, Part 3, 2997.

51 Senate Hearings, European Recovery, 477.Google Scholar.

52 Ibid., 444.

53 Ibid., 478–491.

54 Ibid., 480.

55 Hearings, House, European Recovery, 227Google Scholar.

56 Senate Hearings, European Recovery, 75–76Google Scholar.

57 Hearings, House, European Recovery, 229Google Scholar.

58 Marshall, ibid., 31.

59 Senate Hearings, European Recovery, 31–32Google Scholar.

60 Ibid., 33–34.

61 Secretary Anderson, ibid., 315–316.

62 Congressional Record, op. cit., Vol. 93, Part 8, 11752. At this point, the President estimated ERP costs at 6.8 billion dollars in the first fifteen months, and 17 billion dollars for the whole four year period. Ibid., 11751.

63 Senate Hearings, European Recovery, 57–60Google Scholar.

64 Idem.

65 Ibid., 248 ff.

66 Ibid., 303–313.

67 Ibid., 319–324. In an interview with the writer in Washington, February 1, 1963, Anderson said that after he finished his testimony on the question of United States capability to provide agricultural aid to Europe, Vandenberg told him in an aside that Anderson's testimony “finished it up,” that is, he had convinced Vandenberg. Vandenberg then called President Truman and told him that Anderson had “settled the issue.” Anderson also told the writer that Vandenberg subsequently was very helpful in gaining Farm Bureau support.

68 Ibid., 356–368.

69 Ibid., 75–76.

70 Hearings, House, European Recovery, 75Google Scholar.

71 Ibid., 77.

72 Idem. Italics mine.

73 Senate Hearings, European Recovery, 354Google Scholar.

74 Ibid., 248.

75 Idem.

76 Hearings, House, Emergency Foreign Aid, 6Google Scholar.

77 Senate Hearings, European Recovery, 12–16Google Scholar.

78 Ibid., 80 ff.

79 Ibid., 249–250.

80 Hearings, House, European Recovery, 56–57Google Scholar.

81 Ibid., 57.

82 New York Times, July 12, 1947, p. 1.

83 Senate Hearings, European Recovery, 2Google Scholar.

84 Ibid., 68–70.

85 Hearings, House, Emergency Foreign Aid, 7Google Scholar.

86 Senate Hearings, European Recovery, 41Google Scholar.

87 Idem.

88 Idem.

89 Hearings, House, European Recovery, 79Google Scholar.

90 Ibid., 79–80.

91 Senate Hearings, European Recovery, 1Google Scholar.

92 In an interview with the writer in Washington on February 1, 1963, Clinton Anderson stated that Lovett was extremely valuable in working with recalcitrant Congressmen, especially Republicans. According to Anderson, Lovett never attempted to bulldoze or run roughshod over critics and opposition. Rather, Anderson said, Lovett would painlessly “de-fang” them.

93 Vandenberg, Arthur H. Jr, (ed.), The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, 1952), p. 383Google Scholar.

94 New York Times, January 16, 1948, p. 8.

95 See Vandenberg, , op. cit., pp. 376, 383–388Google Scholar, for a full description of these suggestions.

96 See Senate Hearings, European Recovery, pp. 55–57Google Scholar, in which is reproduced correspondence between Vandenberg and the State Department.

97 Senate Hearings, European Recovery, 354Google Scholar.

98 In a letter to the writer, March 5, 1963.

99 Vandenberg, , op. cit., p. 380.Google Scholar At that stage (November, 1947), Vandenberg had only seen the beginning. After the Congressional Hearings began the Administration practically inundated Congress with documentation. A prime example involved Vandenberg. He said to Ambassador Douglas that he would appreciate seeing a list of the Administration personnel who had worked in preparing the ERP proposal. Vandenberg said that he could have a better grasp of the proposal if he knew who had drawn it up. Senate Hearings, European Recovery, p. 100Google Scholar. Douglas' response to this simple request was the insertion in the record of a twelve-page, single-spaced detailingof not only the people involved, but how precisely the various offices and agencies of the Administration were set up for the task, and integrated and correlated for it. Ibid., 101–112.

100 In a letter to the writer, March 5, 1963.

101 In an interview with the writer in Washington, February 1, 1963. The perils of ill-preparation were illustrated for the writer by Senator Anderson. He described an incident late in 1962, when a high State Department witness, who must go unnamed, testified before the Senate Space Committee in a rather nonchalant and poorly prepared manner. According to Anderson, the late Senator Robert Kerr, Chairman of the Committee at the time, proceeded to “undress” the witness on the spot.

102 Interview with the writer, February 1, 1963.