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Where does the Moral Force of the Concept of Needs Reside and When?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2006

David Braybrooke
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Extract

My point of departure in the book Meeting Needs was the conviction that the concept of needs has moral force, but the force has been dissipated and anyway made hard to see by multiple complications including but not confined to multiple abuses. I now think that is only half the problem.

Type
Research Article
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 57: The Philosophy of Need , December 2005 , pp. 209 - 228
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2005

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