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Liberalism and Liberty: the Fragility of a Tradition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Keith Graham
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Extract

My discussion in this lecture is structured as follows. In section 1 I consider the nature of philosophical enquiry and its affinity to liberalism. In section 2 I lay out some of the basic components of liberal theory and explore their interrelations. In section 3 I discuss two challenges to liberalism: one concerning the conception of liberty which it involves and one concerning the way in which it introduces the idea of legitimate political authority. In section 4 I suggest that these problems, to do with the values of liberalism, arise on the basis of a prior conception of individuals which is in need of modification. In a brief concluding section 5 I indicate the need for a post-liberal political theory.

Type
Research Article
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 24 , March 1988 , pp. 207 - 223
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1988

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