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Metaphysical (Im)mortality and Philosophical Transcendence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 December 2009
Extract
There is a lapidary saying owing to Etienne Gilson, that is often misquoted or adapted – with ‘metaphysics’ taking the place of ‘philosophy’ – and which is invariably reproduced in isolation. It is that ‘Philosophy always buries its undertakers’. Understanding this remark as Gilson intended it is relevant to the issues of the nature of philosophy, and of what conception of it may be most appropriate or fruitful for us to pursue. The question of the mortality or otherwise of philosophy in general, and of metaphysics in particular, is a significant one for ongoing intellectual enquiry, and it is also relevant to the current position of academic philosophy in Great Britain and in the English-speaking world.
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References
1 Gilson, Etienne, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (London: Sheed & Ward, 1938)Google Scholar.
2 See Haldane, John, ‘Has Philosophy made a difference and could it be expected to?’ in O'Hear, Anthony (ed.) Philosophy at the New Millennium (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)Google Scholar; also published as Philosophy Supplement 48.
3 On the matter of privatory causes, and on the analogicality of the idea of ‘cause’ and the suggestion that this has more than four analogates (efficient, formal, material and final) see, respectively, Haldane, John, ‘Privatory Causality’, Analysis, Vol. 67, July 2007CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and ‘Gravitas, Social Efficacy and Moral Causes’, Analysis, Vol. 68, January 2008.
4 Summa Theologiae, Vol 2. Existence and the Nature of God, trans. Timothy McDermott (London: Eyre and Spottiswode, 1964), 15.
5 ST Ia, q. 1, 1, sed contra; op. cit. 5.
6 See Rorty, Richard, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1992)Google Scholar, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesotta Press, 1982) and Truth and Progress (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). For a late statement of his views particularly in relation to the ‘scientific’ aspirations of analytical philosophy see ‘How many grains make a heap?’ London Review of Books, 20 January 2005. This is a review of Scott Soames two volume history of analytical philosophy Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
7 See Putnam, Hilary, Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992)Google Scholar and ‘Is Analytic philosophy a good thing?’ unpublished.
8 Quine himself was happy to say that philosophy is not just continuous with science but is even part of it. For an engaging and accessible discussion of Quine's views on the nature of philosophy see his interview with Magee, Brian ‘The Ideas of Quine’ in Magee, (ed.) Men of Ideas: Some Creators of Contemporary Philosophy (London: BBC, 1978)Google Scholar.
9 See John Haldane, ‘Has Philosophy made a difference and could it be expected to?’ op. cit.
10 Churchland, P., ‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’ Journal of Philosophy, 1981, 73–5Google Scholar.
11 For the full text of the letter (in English translation) see The Galilean Library: Manuscripts at http://www.galilean-library.org/bellarmine1.html
12 Summa Theologiae, Ia, q.75, a 5.
13 The analysis of cognition in terms of the reception and exercise of species becomes particularly intricate in the writings of later Thomists, often involving additions to and changes of terminology. The best account of the subject as it is treated by St Thomas himself is Lonergan, Bernard, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas (ed.) Burrell, David (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1968)Google Scholar, and for Aquinas and later Thomism more generally see Peifer, JohnThe Concept in Thomism (New York, NY.: Record Press, 1952)Google Scholar reprinted as Volume 3 of Modern Writings on Thomism, selected and introduced by John Haldane (London: Thoemmes Continuum, 2004). Piefer's book is unduly neglected and rewards study.
14 Here one may recall the affinity argument for the immateriality of the soul presented by Socrates in Phaedo, 78–80.
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