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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2009
Accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason.
It is a tribute to the perspicacity of Lessing and Kierkegaard that their way of investigating the problem of the role of historical investigation in the task of theological construction has set the tone of subsequent discussion. The centrality of their problem in our time is shown up by the way Diem depicts Lessing's question and Kierkegaard's answer as the starting-point of the contemporary theological debate.1 Diem's analysis here is penetrating, even if it only shows up the need for that starting-point to be critically examined.
In this article, after an examination of Kierkegaard's general position, what I wish to suggest is (1) that the problem as Lessing has posed it is insoluble, and thus Kierkegaard's paradoxical solution is no solution; (2) that nevertheless, despite his clear dependence on Lessing, Kierkegaard has restated the problem in the only way which shows any promise for a Christian theology; and (3) that the pursuit of this solution requires that faith be not sealed off from ‘natural inquiry’, and consequently, a serious grappling with ordinary historical problems is unavoidable in Christian theology—which is the opposite conclusion to that which Kierkegaard himself drew (and which is widely accepted at the present time).
There does seem some truth in saying that any large-scale endeavour to work through a comprehensive programme of thought produces the radical critic who proclaims, after the manner of a prophet, that the programme is wrong-headed and misconceived, and who himself works through the programme for just one reason—to show, once and for all, that the only thing to do is to abandon an impossible investigation. Søren Kierkegaard was such a critic.
page 35 note 1 Cf. Hermann Diem: Dogmatics. See also the role this problem plays in J. M. Robinson: A New Quest of the Historical Jesus for one example.
page 37 note 1 Ph. Fr., p. 5.
page 37 note 2 Ph. Fr., p. 6.
page 37 note 3 Ph. Fr., pp. 6–8.
page 37 note 4 Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, pp. 58–59.
page 38 note 1 In line with this he disclaims any intention to be putting forward an opinion which he hopes others will adopt. Cf. Preface, p. 3.
page 38 note 2 Ph. Fr., p. 9.
page 38 note 3 Ph. Fr., p. 12.
page 39 note 1 Ph. Fr., p. 25.
page 39 note 2 Cf. Ph. Fr., p. 25. It is interesting to note that this is defended by an argument which only holds if there be a direct analogy between human love and the divine.
page 39 note 3 Ph. Fr., p. 37.
page 39 note 4 Cf. Ph. Fr., p. 92.
page 39 note 5 Diem, , Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, p. 81. Cf. his Dogmatics, p. 20.Google Scholar
page 40 note 1 Ph. Fr., p. 47.
page 40 note 2 Ph. Fr., p. 87.
page 40 note 3 For a full and brilliant analysis of his position, cf. Barth: From Rousseau to Ritschl, ch. 3. This article, however, should be read in the light of the criticisms I make of Lessing's position, criticisms more radical than those Barth himself makes. Indeed it can be suggested that Barth's willingness to follow Lessing's setting of the issues as much as he does is an instance of how Lessing's approach to the problem has dominated modern theology.
page 41 note 1 Theological Writings, IV, 169 quoted in Barth, op. cit., p. 129.
page 41 note 2 Cf. Barth's citations from Lessing's Theological Writings, p. 134 and ‘On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power’ in Lessing's Theological Writings, trans. H. Chadwick.
page 41 note 3 ‘On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power’, trans. Chadwick, op. cit.
page 42 note 1 ibid.
page 42 note 2 ibid.
page 43 note 1 ibid.
page 43 note 2 ibid.
page 44 note 1 ibid.
page 44 note 2 ibid.
page 44 note 3 This indeed is Diem's concern. Cf. his Dogmatics.
page 45 note 1 op. cit.
page 46 note 1 ‘On the Origin of Revealed Religion’, sect. 5, in Lessing's Theological Writings, trans. H. Chadwick.
page 46 note 2 ibid., sect. 6.
page 47 note 1 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 88.
page 47 note 2 That the distinction between quality and quantity is an absolute one is often taken for granted, despite this fact, and especially by theologians. The discussion by Hegel of this matter is much sounder. Cf. his discussion under ‘Measure’: Lesser Logic 98–99.
page 48 note 1 Ph. Fr., p. 47.
page 48 note 2 ibid., p. 67.
page 49 note 1 Ph. Fr., p. 69.
page 49 note 2 Cf. e.g. John Knox, Faith and Criticism and R. Niebuhr, Faith and History.
page 50 note 1 Con. Unsc. Post., p. 286f.
page 50 note 2 Ph. Fr., p. 72.
page 50 note 3 Ph. Fr., p. 72.
page 50 note 4 Ph. Fr., pp. 71–72.
page 51 note 1 K.'s Dialectic of Existence, p. 89.
page 51 note 2 Ph. Fr., p. 84.
page 51 note 3 ibid., p. 86.
page 52 note 1 Concl. Unsc. Post., p. 31.
page 53 note 1 Concl. Unsc. Post., p. 31.
