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Sovereignty and Freedom: Some Pauline Compatibilisms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 February 2009

P. W. Gooch
P. W. Gooch
Affiliation:
Centre for Religious Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1AI, Canada
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Extract

How divine sovereignty and human freedom are to be related is a question of importance to the believer. It is something about which St Paul has several things to say: but while his contributions may be necessary for Christian faith, they are not sufficient for the understanding which faith seeks. We also need the help of philosophical reflection. That at least is the burden of this paper. It begins with Paul's assumptions about freedom in order to reject a harsh view of sovereignty. Then, after sketching three ways of reconciling freedom and sovereignty, we examine Paul's concept of God's sovereignty in Romans 9–11 in order to conclude that there is only one kind of compatibilism which holds promise for faith and understanding.

Type
Research Article
Information
Scottish Journal of Theology , Volume 40 , Issue 4 , November 1987 , pp. 531 - 542
Copyright
Copyright © Scottish Journal of Theology Ltd 1987

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References

1 I have not cited New Testament scholarship on Paul in this paper. For one thing, the literature is vast, and careful exegesis (especially of Romans 9–11) would require a study beyond the natural limits of an article. For another, my primary concern is to sketch philosophical options for interpreting Paul, a framework within which the nits and grits of exegesis can be sorted and sifted. For an example of how more detailed philosophical work on a specific passage dealing with a different topic might proceed, see my ‘Authority and Justification in Theological Ethics: A Study in I Corinthians 7’, Journal of Religious Ethics 11 (1983), pp. 62–74Google Scholar – a study which explains more fully some of the claims in the present sections of this paper.

2 Lest my examples be thought facetious, a note on ‘hardening’ is in order. I maintain that from what Paul actually says it does not follow that hearts other than Pharaoh's have in fact been hardened by God. But what about other biblical evidence?

The active verb is used more than thirty times in the OT (its occurrences in the NT are in citations of OT texts); eighteen of these refer to human agents who harden or stiffen their own hearts or necks. Ten references are connected with Pharaoh and are attributed to God. But not to God alone: three times Pharaoh is the agent of his own hardening, and in I Sam. 6.6 the responsibility for hardening is again laid on Pharaoh and the Egyptians (though by Philistine priests and diviners, whose theological trustworthiness some may want to doubt!). Only twice does God's action of hardening appear outside this context, and both times the subjects are the enemies of Israel on their journey to or conquest of the promised land (Deut. 2.30; Josh. 11.20). And that is the evidence, since I think it unwise to extract philosophical doctrine from the despairing question of Isa. 63.17. The conclusion seems to be twofold: (i) God does not appear to have exercised his heart-hardening power very often at all – only in connection with his purposes in the Exodus; and (ii) even then his activity apparently does require the heart's co-operation.