This article benefited from the comments of participants in Russian history workshops at the University of Maryland and the University of Chicago. Research and writing were supported by the International Research and Exchanges Board, the Mrs. Giles Whiting Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University. Thanks also to Steven Harris, Andrew Jenks, and Amir Weiner for their assistance. The epigraph is taken from Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I., The Gulag Archipelago, 1918–1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, trans. Whitney, Thomas P., 3 vols. (New York, 1991), 3:302–3.Google Scholar Solzhenitsyn identifies the quote's source as the notes of Aleksei Makeev, a fellow member of the prisoners’ commission. Although the quote is possibly inaccurate, it will become clear that the sentiment is consistent with everything we know about Kuznetsov.

1 Solzhenitsyn devoted an entire chapter of The Gulag Archipelago, the “Forty Days of Kengir,” to the uprising, which served as the narrative climax of his three-volume magnum opus. The Gulag Archipelago begins with the subject of arrest and the absence of resistance: “Yes, resistance should have begun right there, at the moment of the arrest itself. But it did not begin.” Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I., The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, trans. Whitney, Thomas P. (New York, 1991), 1:15.Google Scholar The volumes are then structured as a conversion story that reaches its climax when prisoners finally unite against their common enemy in a series of uprisings culminating with that at Kengir. Ibid., 3:285-331. Given that her volume offers essentially a slightly updated version of Solzhenitsyn, it is no surprise that Kengir plays a similar role in Applebaum, Anne, Gulag: A History (New York, 2003).Google Scholar

For the Ukrainian emigre community, the violent overturn of the Kengir uprising was celebrated as an instance of martyrdom in the face of Soviet oppression, this one gendered female due to the presence of large numbers of Ukrainian women in the uprising. See Halychyn, Stephania, ed., 500 Ukrainian Martyred Women (New York, 1956).Google Scholar

Numerous memoirists and correspondents have made the Kengir uprising a key element of their gulag stories. See Batoian, Vagarshak G., “Vosstanie v Kengire,” in Gurvich, Lev M., ed., Imet’ silu pomnit': Rasskazy tekh, kto proshel ad repressii (Moscow, 1991), 81–101;Google Scholar Bershadskaia, Liubov’, Rastoptannye zhizni: Rasskaz byvshei politzakliuchennoi (Paris, 1975);Google Scholar Fel'dman, Artem, Riadovoe delo (Moscow, 1993);Google Scholar Frants, V., “Vosstanie v Kengire,” Sotsialisticheskii vestnik 36 (1956): 104–10;Google Scholar and Kekushev, Nikolai L'vovich, Zveriada (Moscow, 1991).Google Scholar The Batoian memoir was published again as “Vospominaniia o Kengire,” in Semen S. Vilenskii, ed., Soprotivlenie v Gulage: Vospominaniia, pis'ma, dokumenty (Moscow, 1992), 187–203. All references will be to the earlier publication.

Even historical research and documentary publications have now become possible. The first, a model of the best prearchival research, was Graziosi, Andrea, “The Great Strikes of 1953 in Soviet Labor Camps in the Accounts of Their Participants: A Review,” Cahiers du Monde russe et sovietique 33, no. 4 (1992): 419–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For the best account using archives, see Craveri, Marta, “Krizis Gulaga: Kengirskoe vosstanie 1954 goda v dokumentakh MVD,” Cahiers du Monde russe 36, no. 3 (1995): 319–44.Google Scholar For a publication of key documents from the uprising, see “Vosstanie v Steplage,” Otechestvennye arkhivy, 1994, no. 4:33-81. Many documents cited herein have also been published in Kokurin, A. I. and Petrov, N. N., eds., Gulag (Glavnoe upravlenie lagerei), 1917-1960 (Moscow, 2000);Google Scholar and V. A. Kozlov, ed., Istoriia stalinskogo Gulaga: Konets 1920-kh-pervaia polovina 1950-kh godov, vol. 6, Vosstaniia, bunty i zabastovki zakliuchennykh (Moscow, 2004).

On the earlier uprisings at Vorkuta and Noril'sk, see Graziosi, “The Great Strikes“; and Craveri, Marta, “The Strikes in Norilsk and Vorkuta Camps and Their Role in the Breakdown of the Stalinist Forced Labour System,” in Brass, Tom and Linden, Marcel van der, eds., Free and Unfree Labour: TheDebate Continues (Bern, 1997), 363–78.Google Scholar

2 I will use this Soviet term, westerners, for ease and convenience to refer to the nationalists from those territories annexed by the Soviet Union after 1939.

3 From the voluminous literature on west Ukrainian and Baltic resistance movements, see especially Burds, Jeffrey, “Agentura: Soviet Informants’ Networks and the Ukrainian Rebel Underground in Galicia, 1944–1948,” East European Politics and Societies 11, no. 1 (1997): 89–130;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Burds, Jeffrey, TheEarly Cold WarinSoviet West Ukraine, 1944-1948 (Pittsburgh, 2001);Google Scholar Burds, Jeffrey, “Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944–1948,” Cahiers du Monde russe 42, nos. 2 – 4 (2001): 279–319;Google Scholar Daumantas, Juozas, Fighters for Freedom: Lithuanian Partisans versus the U.S.S.R. (1944–1947), trans. Harrison, E.J. (New York, 1975);Google Scholar Laar, Mart, War in the Woods: Estonia's Struggle for Survival, 1944–1956, trans. Ets, Tiina (Washington, D.C., 1992);Google Scholar Sannikov, Georgii, Bol'shaia okhota: Razgrom vooruzhennogo podpol'ia v Zapadnoi Ukraine (Moscow, 2002);Google Scholar and Taagepara, Rein, “Soviet Documentation on the Estonian Pro-Independence Guerrilla Movement, 1945–1952,” Journal of Baltic Studies 10, no. 2 (1979): 91–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 In particular, see Kozlov, Vladimir, Massovye besporiadki v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve, 1953-nachalo 1980–kh gg. (Novosibirsk, 1999).Google Scholar Unfortunately, the translators missed Kozlov's argument on this point when they translated the title. Instead of Mass Disorders, the translators chose the more heroic and less accurate Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years (Armonk, N.Y., 2002).

5 “Thinking Bolshevik” comes from Jochen Hellbeck's playful expansion of Stephen Kotkin's notion of “speaking Bolshevik.” See Hellbeck, Jochen, “Speaking Out: Languages of Affirmation and Dissent in Stalinist Russia,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 1, no. 1 (2000): 71–96;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Kotkin, Stephen, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley, 1995).Google Scholar

6 In addition to the published sources noted above, this article draws on two main source bases: the central Gulag administration's documentation of the uprising and the investigation after the uprising found in Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. 9414 (Main administration for places of detention under the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs), op. 1, d. 228 (Materials on the mass disobedience in the 3rd camp division of Steplag); and the individual prisoner file of Kapiton Kuznetsov found in Arkhivnyi otdel Tsentra pravovoi statistiki i informatsii pri prokurature Karagandinskoi oblasti (AOTsPSI), fond Karlaga, arkhivnoe lichnoe delo 470542 Kuznetsova, Kapitona Ivanovicha. Prisoner files of other major figures in the uprising could not be located in Karaganda. While each of the source bases—memoirs, prisoner appeals, official investigations, and Solzhenitsyn's typically uncited mixture of oral history and documentary research— requires careful and skeptical use, I have usually been able to confirm facts in multiple official and unofficial sources. Of particular note is the general accuracy of Solzhenitsyn's account (with a few exceptions as noted) despite the extremely difficult circumstances in which he was forced to complete his research.

7 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain; Hellbeck, “Speaking Out“; and Hellbeck, Jochen, “Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi, 1931-9,” in Fitzpatrick, Sheila, ed., Stalinism: New Directions (London, 2000);Google Scholar Viola, Lynne, ed., Contending xuith Stalinism: Soviet Power and Popular Resistance in the 1930s (Ithaca, 2002).Google Scholar

8 On the impact of the war on the Soviet regime and population, see Weiner, Amir, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton, 2001).Google Scholar On the war's impact in the gulag, see Barnes, Steven A., “All for the Front! All for Victory! The Mobilization of Forced Labor in the Soviet Union during World War Two,” International Labor and Working Class History, no. 58 (2000): 239–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 On earlier incidents of resistance, see Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga“; and Vilenskii, Soprotivlenie v Gulage. Resistance, in these accounts, exists but is remarkable for its rarity until Stalin's death. For an extended consideration of one early uprising during the war, see Barnes, “All for the Front!“

10 Gulag authorities described their exposure for a long period of time to “bourgeois ideology” as one of the reasons leading to the Kengir rebellion. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 286.

11 On the changed mindset of veterans after the war, see Weiner, Making Sense of War; and Zubkova, Elena, Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions and Disappointments, 1945- 1957 (Armonk, N.Y., 1998).Google Scholar

12 Kengir prisoner Vagarshak Batoian wrote that the contingent of prisoners who had been arrested before the war were “more careful, more restrained,” while it was the former prisoners of war and other groups arrested after the war who were the decisive elements in the uprising. See Batoian, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 91. The centrality of these new prisoner contingents in all of the post-Stalin gulag uprisings is shown by Graziosi, “Great Strikes of 1953,” 422–24; and Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga,” 320.

13 On the formation of katorga divisions, see Barnes, “All for the Front!“

14 None of this means that special camp prisoners were viewed as completely irredeemable. Release into permanent exile was still a form of release. Survival until release given the long sentences and harsh confinement was, of course, much more difficult in a special camp. Furthermore, although it was a subject of some argument among Soviet secret police organs, education activities continued in the special camps. On the formation of special camps, see Steven A. Barnes, “Soviet Society Confined: The Gulag in the Karaganda Region of Kazakhstan, 1930s–1950s” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2003), chapter 3.

15 On the changing postwar relationship of “thieves” and politicals, see Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:231–32, 238. On the delineation of and relationship between political and nonpolitical prisoners in the gulag, see Barnes, “Soviet Society Confined,” especially chapter 1.

16 Although recent historiography has reevaluated Beriia and clearly demonstrated his role as initiator of the gulag's dismantling, gulag prisoners at the time viewed him as the ultimate criminal. As is shown below, prisoners used Beriia's name as an epithet in the wake of his arrest and execution.

17 From GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1398, 11. 14–22, as published in Kiseleva, A. F. and Shchagina, E. M., eds., Khrestomatiia po otechestvennoi istorii 1946-1995 gg. (Moscow, 1996), 50–54.Google Scholar

18 On this atmosphere, see Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:289; Alexander Dolgun with Patrick Watson, Alexander Dolgun's Story: An American in the Gulag (New York, 1975), 261–83; Fel'dman, Riadovoedelo, 43–44; Kekushev, Zveriada, 126; Frants, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 104; AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, sv. 35, d. 527,11. 137–47; and Barnes, “Soviet Society Confined,” chapter 4. 19. Frants, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 104; Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:293; Batoian, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 82; Iakovenko, Dmitrii, “Osuzhden po 58-i,” Zvezda Vostoka 57, no. 4 (1989): 66.Google Scholar

20 ‘Vosstanie v Steplage,” 78; GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 270. Of course, it is always possible that a significant number of gulag prisoners were completely innocent of the charges against them. Thus, we will never know how many of these prisoners were really members of nationalist organizations.

21 The National Archives of the UK (TNA), Public Records Office (PRO) FO 371/ 122936, N SI 551/6, p. 4, an interview with Karl Riewe, German national and former inmate of Steplag; Batoian, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 82; Dr. Fedir Varkony, “The Revolt in Kingir,” in Halychyn, 500 Ukrainian Martyred Women, 22-24; Iakovenko, “Osuzhden po 58- i,” 68-69. Iakovenko, a member of the militarized guard at Kengir at the time of the uprising, testified that such murders did occur and were covered up. Alexander Dolgun, an American prisoner at a different Steplag subdivision, noted that the local authorities would help cover up illegal shootings by throwing corpses into the firing corridor prior to taking pictures. Dolgun, AlexanderDolgun's Story, 244.

22 For one such example, see the comments of a prisoner named Popov at a 6 June 1954 production meeting in Steplag's first camp subdivision—a subdivision not involved in the uprising. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 168.

23 Official documents admit to shootings in May 1953 and February 1954. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,11. 109-10. See also Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga,” 324; Varkony, “The Revolt in Kingir,” 22; Frants, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 104; Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:285–86. Solzhenitsyn argues that the shoodngs were an intentional act on the part of camp authorities, who sought to provoke disturbances to stave off budgetary and staff cuts in the wake of Beriia's arrest. Solzhenitsyn's assertion, though plausible, is not easily proved or disproved.

24 Frants, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 104; Varkony, “The Revolt in Kingir,” 22; Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:286–89.

25 Frants, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 105; Varkony, “The Revolt in Kingir,” 23; Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:290–92; Batoian, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 85; Riewe speaks of sixty rather than six hundred common criminals. TNA, PRO FO 371/122936, N S1551/6, p. 16. The transfer of common criminals to Kengir is confirmed in official documents at “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 78. Frants also asserts that prisoners from the uprising at Vorkuta arrived at Kengir in 1954 and played a role in the uprising. Frants, “Vosstanie v Kengire,“ 104. I have found no official document that confirms this transfer, but as we will see in the aftermath of Kengir, the transfer of prisoners to different camps in the wake of uprisings was a common practice.

26 Their goal in these actions is disputed. Solzhenitsyn wrote that the common criminals, in agreement with the political prisoners, specifically sought to provoke a confrontation with authorities. They entered the service yard with the goal of seizing control of the camp's food stores. Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:293-96. This account accords with the 1956 testimony of Varkony. Varkony, “The Revolt in Kingir,” 23–24. Official documents consistently maintained that the criminals were seeking access to the women's zone in order to engage in mass rape of the female prisoners. See, for example, GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228, 1. 271. While on the face of it, the official version seems more likely considering the long history of rape in the gulag, Liubov’ Bershadskaia, a prisoner in the women's section at Kengir during the uprising, confirmed that the criminals all behaved themselves, and many female prisoners even hid the men from authorities. Bershadskaia, Rastoptannye zhizni, 83.

27 The events are described in GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,11. 270–72; Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:293–300; Frants, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 105; Varkony, “The Revolt in Kingir,” 23-24; Bershadskaia, Rastoptannye zhizni, 83–85; TNA, PRO FO 371/122936, N S1551/6, p. 16; ‘Vosstanie v Steplage,” 37–38; Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga,” 325. Craveri, based on GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 272, found slightly different figures—thirteen prisoners dead, forty-three prisoners wounded. Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga,” 325. The numbers in “Vosstanie v Steplage” seem to be more complete. Witnesses placed the total dead far higher. Bershadskaia estimated more than one hundred wounded and one hundred killed, while Frants wrote that guards killed sixty to seventy prisoners and wounded many others. The rumors that reached Karl Riewe bespoke about 150 total dead and wounded.

28 Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:299–300; AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, II. 116, 117, 121; Frants, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 106.

29 “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 37.

30 Many of the telegrams to and from Kruglov and Rudenko have been published in ibid., 36–81.

31 See Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga,” 325-26; “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 38-39; Frants, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 105–6; Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:298–99; GARF, f. 9414, op. l,d. 228,1.273.

32 “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 44-45. The authorities also cut off electric power to the zone. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 226.

33 “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 54.

34 Ibid., 55.

35 Ibid., 56.

36 From Kuznetsov's declaration three days after the end of the uprising. “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 64–65. Early in the course of the uprising, Soviet officials believed that former OUN members were leading the events. “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 40–41.

37 Kuznetsov asserted that the departments were created by the conspiracy center and without his agreement. “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 66. An elaborate organization chart of all the departments and subdepartments among the prisoners was prepared during the course of the MVD's investigation of the uprising. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 18.

38 Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga,” 328; AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 11. 115, 117; Iakovenko, “Osuzhden po 58-i,” 71; Kekushev, Zveriada, 133; “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 56, 71. There is no evidence that the prisoners were actually successful at laying minefields.

39 AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 1. 117.

40 “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 67. Karl Riewe reported that it was informers and all of the recently arrived criminals who were placed in an internal prison during the uprising. TNA, PRO FO 371/122936, N S1551/6, p. 17. Solzhenitsyn stated that only four prisoners were arrested and placed in the internal prison. Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:315. It seems unlikely that the number was so low. The Kazakh Supreme Court verdict asserted that “more than forty” were arrested. The verdict includes a partial list of family names of the arrested (fewer than forty, but more than four), who presumably provided evidentiary testimony of their arrest and beating. AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 11. 114–15, 117. A similar list can be found at GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 34. While such testimony could certainly have been falsified, neither Solzhenitsyn nor Kuznetsov denied the existence of the prison.

41 “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 62.

42 For accounts of the assault, see Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga,” 333; Iakovenko, “Osuzhden po 58–i,” 71–72; Bershadskaia, Rastoptannye zhizni, 94–97; Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:326-29; Varkony, “The Revolt in Kingir,” 22-29; GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,11. 21–35, 277–78; AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 1. 116. Official documents only noted two female prisoners run over by tanks, and they blamed the incident on other prisoners who allegedly pushed the women in front of the tanks. The volume 500 Ukrainian Martyred Women asserts some five hundred Ukrainian women were run over by tanks, even though the volume's eyewitness source Dr. Varkony makes no such claim, speaking rather of over five hundred total victims of the assault. Other than the issue of total victims of the assault, all accounts of these events (eyewitness and official) agree with only minor discrepancies in details. With regard to total deaths, the variance is significant. While official documents admitted to forty-six prisoner deaths, with five of the victims allegedly killed by other prisoners (AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 1. 116; GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 278), the memoirists all placed the number far higher. Iakovenko wrote that four hundred prisoners were either killed or seriously wounded. Bershadskaia stated that over five hundred lives were lost. Solzhenitsyn claimed to have found an official Steplag document that recorded over seven hundred deaths. I have located no official documents with figures in that range.

43 Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:316–17.

44 Treating prisoners as an integral part of Soviet society was a common practice throughout the history of the gulag. See Barnes, “Soviet Society Confined.” But it is somewhat surprising given the ferocity of the anti-Soviet actions of these particular prisoners. Still, this was not mere ritual incantation, but evidence of the confidence of Gulag officials that they could break even the fiercest resisters and bend them toward compliance with Soviet norms.

45 Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:316–17. Many of the radio appeals have been preserved in GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228, and a number of excerpts are published in Craven, “Krizis Gulaga,” 331–32.

46 “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 44–45. On the prisoners’ demands, see below.

47 GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,11. 113–14.

48 Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:306. Emphasis removed.

49 GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,11. 60–61.

50 I thank my anonymous reviewer for suggesting this line of interpretation.

51 GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 71.

52 Ibid., 1.136.

53 Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga,” 331; Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:322; “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 48; GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,11. 63, 72–74; Frants, ‘Vosstanie v Kengire,” 105; Batoian, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 98; Kekushev, Zveriada, 133. Here again, numbers vary widely. Solzhenitsyn wrote that only “about a dozen” prisoners exited the camp during the uprising, while Frants testified that some 160 prisoners who did not want to join the uprising were sent out of the camp during the rebellion's first days. Batoian wrote of “several hundred” who left the camp, while Kekushev stated that it was only the camp “aristocracy“ who fled the zone during the uprising.

54 A more detailed explication of the significance of these categories, including a consideration of their shifting meanings and importance over time, can be found in Barnes, “Soviet Society Confined.“

55 GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 75.

56 Ibid., 11. 82–83. The comparison of the commission to the Gestapo is echoed in another prisoner's radio address. Ibid., 1. 137.

57 “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 52.

58 Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:294.

59 GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 100.

60 Ibid., 1. 166

61 From Kuznetsov's testimony. “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 69. Solzhenitsyn confirms Kuznetsov's account, writing that Sluchenkov told others he had been urged “to provoke a racial bloodbath” to provide an excuse for liquidating the uprising by force. Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:314.

62 AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 1. 65.

63 GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,11. 146–47. The speech is transcribed in Russian. It is not clear whether the speaker delivered the speech in Russian or Ukrainian.

64 “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 44–45.

65 See, for example, ibid., 37–38.

66 Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:306.

67 GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,11. 102–6. Ellipses mine.

68 On such rapes, see Burds, “Gender and Policing.” I thank my anonymous reviewer for suggesting the significance of this bitter irony.

69 Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:318n6.

70 Ibid., 3:306n5. Emphasis in the original. On the post-uprising investigations, see Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga,” 324; and for the report of a female Kengir prisoner, see Bershadskaia, Rasloptannye zhizni, 83.

71 TNA, PRO FO 371/122936, N S1551/6, p. 18.

72 “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 52.

73 AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 1. 114; “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 60, 73.

74 Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga,” 330; AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 11. 114–15; Kekushev, Zveriada, 132–34; Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:316–17, 319; “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 53, 73; GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228, 1. 31. It appears that the radio transmitter was never successfully built.

75 “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 73.

76 A list of demands can be found in “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 42. With few exceptions, the list is confirmed at Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga,” 326; Iakovenko, “Osuzhden po 58–i,” 71; Frants, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 105; “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 39; Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:311–12.

77 Graziosi's study of the uprisings in Vorkuta and Noril'sk showed that the prisoners' political programs were generally of a socialist orientation. He found this orientation not too surprising, given that the Gulag authorities consistently treated their prisoners as workers, particularly after the inUoducdon of wages for prisoners in 1950. Graziosi, “Great Strikes of 1953,” 428.

78 Their faith also recalls long Russian traditions of resistance, not against the tsar, but in the name of the tsar. This is particularly intriguing given the absence of such traditions among the nationalists. I thank my anonymous reviewer for suggesting the latter point.

79 Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:297. For similar accounts, see Bershadskaia, Rasloptannye zhizni, 86; and TNA, PRO FO 371/122936, N S1551/6, p. 17.

80 Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:302-3. Solzhenitsyn identifies the quote's source as the notes of Makeev, a fellow member of the prisoners’ commission. As the next section on Kuznetsov will demonstrate, the sentiment is consistent with everything we know about Kuznetsov.

81 Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:303. The sign greeting the Soviet constitution is confirmed at GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 136. See also Kekushev, Zveriada, 134.

82 GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,11. 194–95. A similar transcript from 24June can be found at ibid., 11. 209–12. The range of the broadcast signal is unclear, but the transcript is filled with ellipses, apparently designating points at which the reception was so weak or the volume so low that die MVD transcribers could not decode what was being said.

83 Solzhenitsyn, 3:301, 313. Liubov'Bershadskaia wrote that the prisoners had been allowed to remove their numbers earlier in 1954. Bershadskaia, Rastoptannye zhizni, 80. On religious services in camp during the uprising, see GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 280.

84 According to the testimony of Bershadskaia, Rastoptannye zhizni, 91–92. One wonders whether the Russian prisoners truly sang the Ukrainian hymn.

85 Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:312. Ellipses mine.

86 AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 11. 4–5b, 13–16.

87 AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 11. 60–61. Applebaum, then, is quite wrong when she writes of Kuznetsov, “If these accusations are true, they help explain his behavior during the strike. Having played the part of turncoat once, he would have been well prepared to play a double role once again.” She, like Solzhenitsyn, is quite unable to accept that a prisoner could have been pro-Soviet but also a leader of the uprising. Applebaum, Gulag, 498.

88 AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 11. 20, 42. The file contains information neither on his time at Dubrovlag nor on the reason for his transfer to Steplag.

89 Frants, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 105. No other witnesses and no documents in Kuznetsov's file speak of the reason for his incarceration in the camp's internal prison, yet the fact that he was in the internal prison when the uprising began is indicated by several witnesses and confirmed by authorities in numerous documents.

90 Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:302.

91 For a similar statement made by a prisoner at a different Steplag subdivision, see GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 162.

92 Kekushev, Zveriada, 136.

93 A caveat is in order here. In his appeals and declarations to Soviet authorities, Kuznetsov certainly had significant incentive to downplay his role in the uprising as much as possible. Nonetheless, as we shall see, many different sources place the true power of the uprising in the hands of the criminals and nationalists rather than with Kuznetsov.

94 “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 52.

95 Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga,” 328.

96 AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 11. 116, 122.

97 Ibid., 1. 114.

98 AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 1. 114; Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:313-14.

99 Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:309. Ellipses mine. This may seem to be an exaggeration by Solzhenitsyn, placing his own words in the mouth of his story's hero, but a very similar statement made by a prisoner in a different Steplag subdivision during the same period of time is recorded at GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228, 1. 168. Furthermore, the statement fits with Sluchenkov's radical, outspoken nature, which emerges from other sources.

100 GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 166.

101 AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 1. 118.

102 Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:304.

103 AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 11. 148b, 178-80.

104 Ibid., 11. 149, 208-9.

105 Ibid., 1. 209b. Kuznetsov never made this claim before 1959.

106 AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 11. 149, 208-9. Kuznetsov's version is supported by Craveri's oral interviews with two former prisoners and Batoian's memoirs. Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga,” 326; Batoian, “Vosstanie v Kengire,” 87-88.

107 “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 66; Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga,” 327; Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 3:313.

108 GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 131.

109 AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 11. 212-15. Kuznetsov attached these excerpts from Sluchenkov's appeal to his own appeal against his sentence. How he gained access to this material is not clear, although he did state that he had not seen it before 1958.

110 AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 1. 210.

111 Weiner suggestively offers the idea of a “community of blood, a fighting family, that overpowers ethnic and ideologically imposed divisions” to bring together fighting men, regardless of their side in the war. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 378. Interestingly, Sluchenkov and Keller sometimes referred to Kuznetsov, perhaps sarcastically, as “tovarishch voennyi” (comrade serviceman). “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 72.

112 It is no accident that the prisoners’ military department created subdivisions modeled on the practices of UPA. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,1. 279.

113 GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 228,11. 9, 33.

114 AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 11. 122–23.

115 Ibid., 11. 124,131.

116 “Vosstanie v Steplage,” 43w4; Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga,” 334.

117 AOTsPSI, f. Karlaga, d. Kuznetsova, 11. 130, 132–35, 141, 147, 160.

118 Ibid., 11. 263–64, 272.

119 For a complete review of the changes made after the Kengir uprising, see Craveri, “Krizis Gulaga.“

120 Iakovenko, “Osuzhden po 58-i,” 71.

121 See Amir Weiner, “The Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East European Rebellions, and Soviet Frontier Politics,” forthcoming in Journal of Modern History 78, no. 2 (2006).

122 It is worth recalling that Kotkin's notion of speaking Bolshevik did not demand that Soviet citizens believe, just that they “participate as if [they] believed.” Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 220.