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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2017
When this study was originally prepared nearly thirty years ago, it was part of a larger government memorandum. As such it was written within a framework of exploring problems of economic relations with the USSR after the war, with the expectation of a large and mutually beneficial trade in mind. At the time, I presented a general analysis of these problems in a longish pamphlet. I was unable, however, in that publication to touch upon the problem of Soviet policies on, and relations with, international cartels, because the government document in question was classified as “secret,” as was the information I had obtained in the course of preparing it. The recent declassification of that document by both the Department of State and the Department of Justice (from whose Antitrust Division a large body of valuable information had been received) has caused me to consider publication of the material on the four case studies of Soviet participation in international cartels—to wit, the cases concerning matches, phosphates, potash, and platinum. I feel that such publication is warranted essentially for two reasons.
1. Alexander, Gerschenkron, Economic Relations with the U.S.SJi. (New York, 1945)Google Scholar.
2. For my elaboration of this view see primarily Alexander, Gerschenkron, “Realism and Utopia in Russian Economic Thought,” Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 188–97Google Scholar; “Reflections on Ideology as a Methodological and Historical Problem” and “The Stability of Dictatorships,” Continuity in History and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp. 57-73 and 313-43; and “Ideology as a System Determinant” in Alexander Eckstein, ed., Comparison of Economic Systems (Berkeley, 1971), pp. 269-89 and 297-99.
3. U.S. Tariff Commission, Confidential report by J. A. Bergen, “Matches, Match Boxes, and Match Box Skillets,” August 1943.
4. Treasury Decision no. 44037.
5. Treasury Decision no. 46853.
6. Foreign governments and traders have occasionally announced voluntary restrictions on exports to the United States. Cotton goods and red pencils from Japan, shingles from Canada, and avocados from Cuba could be cited as examples. But in no case had there been a simultaneous and obviously coordinated announcement by producers in several countries.
7. Hearings before the Committee on Patents, Subcommittee on Phosphate Rock Process Patents, House of Representatives, H.R. 7851, May 5, 1938. 8. Economist (London), Mar. 24, 1934, p. 681. 9. Economist, May 25, 1935, p. 1231. 10. Economist, May 9, 1936, p. 347. 11. Economist, June 6, 1936, p. 589. 12. Turrentine, J. W., Potash in North America (New York, 1943), p. 1943 Google Scholar.
13. Laurence, Ballande, Essai d'etude monographique et statistique sur les ententes econotniques internationales (Paris, 1936), p. 206 Google Scholar.
14. Eugene, Staley, Raw Materials in Peace and War (New York, 1937)Google Scholar.
15. Wirtschajtsdienst (Hamburg), Dec 4, 1931, p. 1978.
16. Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung (Essen), Mar. 24, 1944.
17. Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, Mar. 24, 1944.
18. Mishustin, D. D., Vneshniaia torgovlia i industrializatsiia SSSR (Moscow, 1938), p. 110 Google Scholar.
19. In some cases they actually were quite high. As far as asbestos was concerned, the Soviet share in the value of world trade in some years of the thirties even exceeded 20 percent, although the share of quantities exported was smaller, because the Soviets did not export the low-priced, nonspinning asbestos.
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