As the history of the Cold War continues to expand, especially with a look beyond the superpowers, new approaches at explaining the role of Yugoslavia are gaining ground. The traditional idea of Yugoslavia as in the middle of the superpowers or playing both sides merely for the sake of survival is becoming more nuanced and scholars are beginning to appreciate the influence of smaller powers. Part of this fresh gaze at Yugoslav foreign policy seeks to understand better the way that policy might have been driven with clarity and foresight; one of the core concepts where this manifested was in the role that Yugoslav leaders thought they could play in aiding international peace. Milorad Lazić's monograph is a welcome addition to contemplating what that concept looked like from the late 1960s until 1980.

Lazić centers his exploration on Yugoslavia's response to a superpower-led move towards détente. He argues that the foreign and domestic policy objectives of Josip Broz Tito's government required that it disrupt détente because any superpower arrangement stood as a threat to it and other minor powers. As a result, Yugoslav commentary on global conflict sought to undermine the superpowers. Some examples that highlight Yugoslavia's role include reactions to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, whereby Tito reduced the conflict to simply the Soviets exerting influence through coercion. That event, as Tito told Emir Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah of Kuwait, was the “strongest blow to nonaligned states” (211). Similarly, the Yugoslav leaders recognized that they would be in “a permanent conflict” with Moscow because “it was obvious that the Soviet leadership sees everything through their interests as a big power” (220). On the one hand, it seems obvious that Tito would react to any violence in the world with hyperbolic negativity; this was, after all, how Yugoslav foreign policy gained stature and matured since the Korean War. The idea of a permanent crisis mode kept Yugoslavia relevant and so overreacting to events in Indochina, the Horn of Africa, or in the Middle East made sense (as did the idea that the Soviets acted in their own interests). Yet, on the other hand, emphasizing this perspective reduces Yugoslav leaders to simply reading their lines and aping behavior in the most simplistic manner. This reviewer has little doubt that at times Yugoslav foreign policy was reactive but it was also clear that Tito and his top advisors developed an articulate outlook on global conflict and peace. A number of scholars—Zvonimir Stopić and Jovan Čavoški, to name just two—have shown how interactions with other small powers were nuanced and how Yugoslav policy added value to terms such as coexistence. That heavy lifting was done in the 1950s and early 1960s; by 1968, it was certainly clear that the Yugoslavs failed to adapt their approach to global affairs.

Understanding that a lack of innovation after 1968 could have been a fear of what détente might mean for Belgrade—the “new Yalta” as Lazić puts it (xvii)—is valid, but Belgrade's policy could have well been the result of earlier success. In other words, the rhetoric that would influence nonalignment in the early 1960s took shape thanks to the perilous nuclear tensions that shook the world until the Cuban Missile Crisis. Tito made a voice for himself in that environment and partnered with likeminded leaders who saw the language of peace, sovereignty, and nonaggression as key to lessening tensions that would threaten global war. Despite ongoing conflicts around the world in and after 1968, the threat of a nuclear war between the superpowers dramatically lessened. If Tito and the rhetoric of nonalignment had in fact moved the needle and influenced global affairs then détente could have been the result of earlier success. Perhaps the story is how the Yugoslavs failed to understand how to capitalize on their gains.

The book stands on solid archival source materials, is well-written, and is exhaustive in its coverage of key events in the twelve-year period under consideration. The introduction sets an ambitious agenda, talking about the Belgrade-Moscow-Beijing triangle and the Yugoslav-Cuban struggle for the Global South; Lazić delivers on these points but not as exhaustively as the introduction suggests. To that end, the book would have to be much longer and would likely then lose focus. As is, this is a valuable contribution to studies of Yugoslavia but also the Cold War more broadly. It will help scholars immensely as they navigate events of the 1970s, including taking into account the value of small countries.