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Conditionality in Public Policy Targeted to the Poor: Promoting Resilience?*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2009

Francesca Bastagli
Francesca Bastagli*
Affiliation:
Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London School of Economics E-mail: f.a.bastagli@lse.ac.uk
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Abstract

This paper explores the role of conditionality in policies targeting the poor. By requiring beneficiaries to send their children to school and to undertake regular health visits, proponents argue, conditionalities improve human capital outcomes, promoting resilience. This widespread perception has led to the adoption of conditional cash transfers in many countries. Yet policy debate on conditionality does not always reflect a full appreciation of how behavioural, administrative and political economy variables influence outcomes. This paper identifies the multiple channels through which conditionality determines human capital outcomes and reviews the evidence on linkages between conditionality and processes of resilience.

Type
Themed Section on Resilience and Social Exclusion
Information
Social Policy and Society , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , January 2009 , pp. 127 - 140
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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