Last updated 09/07/24: Online ordering is currently unavailable due to technical issues. We apologise for any delays responding to customers while we resolve this. For further updates please visit our website: https://www.cambridge.org/news-and-insights/technical-incident
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2009
Third-party intervention has been the focus of recent debate in self-defense theory. When is it permissible for third-parties to intervene on behalf of an innocent victim facing an unjustified attack or threat? In line with recent self-defense theory, if an attacker is morally responsible for their actions and does not have an acceptable excuse then it is permissible for third-parties to use proportionate violence against them.
1 This argument is influenced by the discussion of normative incompetence outlined in Formosa, Paul, ‘Moral Responsibility for Banal Evil’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 37(2006), pp. 501-520CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Mark Rowlands, Animals Like Us (London: Verso, 2002), p. 195.
