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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 July 2016
In Act II, scene iv of Shakespeare's Henry VIII, Queen Catherine is confronted by the start of divorce proceedings against her. One of the two cardinals delegated as judges by the pope is Henry's faithful servant, Cardinal Wolsey, a man little likely to be an impartial judge of the legal merits of the famous case. And so the Queen says to him:
I do believe
Induced by potent circumstances, that You are mine enemy, and make my challenge You shall not be my judge.
Shakespeare does not today enjoy a wide reputation as a canonist, but he has here described with some correctness the canonical recusatio. This is the right, under certain circumstances, to challenge and remove a papal judge delegate for interest, prejudice, or unfitness for office.
1 I wish to thank Professor Noonan, John T. Jr. of the University of California Law School, Berkeley, for suggesting the general subject of this article and for several helpful comments in its preparation.Google Scholar
2 Note, , ‘Disqualification of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts,’ 79 Harvard Law Rev. (1965) 1435. It ought to be noted, however, that at the time of Henry VIII's divorce, the English Common Law courts did not admit recusation of judges. Before the nineteenth century, disqualification of a judge for bias or for any other reason than direct financial conflict of interest was not a part of English Law. Cf. Coke's Institutes II 156; Blackstone's Commentaries III 361. Richardson, H. G. Mr. has touched on the problem in his recent treatment of Bracton, showing that recusation was not possible in thirteenth-century English Law. Bracton: the Problem of his Text (London 1965) 89. But cf. Fleta 6.37, where it is said, ‘Persona iudicis ex sola suspitione recusari potest.’ Google Scholar
3 For a general treatment of the system of delegated papal jurisdiction, see Pavloff, George, Papal Judge Delegates at the Time of the Corpus Iuris Canonici (Washington 1963) and the useful and brief introduction to Papal Decretals relating to the Diocese of Lincoln in the Twelfth Century , eds. Holtzmann, Walter and Kemp, Eric (Lincoln Record Society 47 1954).Google Scholar
4 See the remarks of Pantin, W. A., ‘The Fourteenth Century,’ The English Church and the Papacy in the Middle Ages, ed. Lawrence, C. H. (New York 1965) 177. He suggests that the incidence of delegation, in England at least, declined after the thirteenth century because of the frequent delays and because of improvements in procedure at the papal court itself.Google Scholar
5 The right of the principal judge to subdelegate the hearing of the case to another cleric was well established (X 1.29.3, 27). The privilege was frequently exercised, and, to judge from the formularies for papal judges delegate which have survived from the thirteenth century, no excuse was required other than the general assertion that for urgent reasons the principal judge was unable to attend. Cf. Sayers, Jane, ‘A Judge Delegate Formulary from Canterbury,’ Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 35 (1962) 205–06.Google Scholar
6 E.g. of Drogheda, William, Summa Aurea (Quellen zur Geschichte des römisch-kanonischen Processes im Mittelalter, ed. Wahrmund, Ludwig [Innsbruck 1906–28] 2.2) 8; Bononiensis, Johannes, Summa Notaria , ed. Rockinger, L., Briefsteller und Formelbücher des elften bis vierzehnten Jahrhunderts (Munich 1863) II 607, 609; and see Archbishop Pecham's instructions to his proctors in Rome, ‘Mittimus vobis in quadam cedula praesentibus inclusa nomina locorum et judicum in quae debeatis, et non alia, convenire …’: Registrum Epistolarum Fratris Johannis Peckham, Archiepiscopi Cantuariensis , ed. Martin, C. T. (Rolls Series 77.1) 279.Google Scholar
7 E.g. Durantis, Willielmus, Speculum Judiciale t. de recusatione § 5 (Lyons 1543) I 117r; Hostiensis, , Summa Aurea t. de officio et potestate iudicis delegati § 3 (Venice 1574) 283. Cf. X 2.1.18.Google Scholar
8 On this court and its procedure see Barraclough, Geoffrey, ‘Audientia Litterarum Contradictarum,’ DDC 1.1387; and Herde, Peter, Beiträge zum päpstlichen Kanzlei- und Urkundenwesen im dreizehnten Jahrhundert (2nd ed. Kallmünz 1968). The elaboration of procedure is also usefully discussed by Herde in ‘Papal Formularies for Letters of Justice (13th–16th Centuries),’ Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Medieval Canon Law (Monumenta iuris canonici, Subsidia 1; Vatican City 1965) 321. Relevant documents can be found in Michael Tangl, Die päpstlichen Kanzleiordnungen von 1200–1500 (Innsbruck 1894).Google Scholar
9 An interesting case, illustrating the possibility of one party's acting without the other despite the desire for equal representation, grew out of the dispute between Archbishop Hubert Walter and the monks of Christ Church, Canterbury, over a college the archbishop had built, allegedly in violation of the monks' rights. Both sides agreed to seek papal intervention, but covenanted not to seek it alteri parte inconsulta. The monks sent a proctor anyway and got initial support for their case. Epistolae Cantuarienses, ed. Stubbs, William (Rolls Series 38.2) xcvi.Google Scholar
10 ‘England and the Roman Curia under Innocent III,’ Journal of Ecclesiastical History 18 (1967) 184.Google Scholar
11 See the interesting discussion in Brentano, Robert, Two Churches, England and Italy in the Thirteenth Century (Princeton 1968) 25–52; Sayers, Jane, ‘Canterbury Proctors in the Court of the Audientia Litterarum Contradictarum,’ Traditio 22 (1966) 331.Google Scholar
12 Barraclough, , ‘Audientia’ 1390.Google Scholar
13 One example from the Constitutions known as Qui exacti from the reign of John XXII reads: ‘Quod procuratores in eadem audientia sine strepitu maneant, lecturam predictam bene pacifice attente atque modeste audiant sine rumoribus cachinationibus superfluis, ne lectura seu lectores prefati in executione ipsius lecture seu alii audientes ibidem in audiendo valeant quomodolibet impediri,’ Tangl, , op. cit. 118 n. 8. Archbishop Pecham was apparently thinking of the same thing when he wrote to his Roman proctors, urging them to vigilance ‘ne aliquae literae generales audientiam sub quacumque forma transeant sine contradictione, nec literae speciales sine convenientia judicum et locorum.’ Registrum Epistolarum I 320.Google Scholar
14 For discussion cf. Durant, , Spec. Iud. t. de rec. § 5; Glossa ordinaria ad X 1.29.25 s.v. postmodum; Johannes Andreae notes that the judge delegate can be removed though previously agreed to ‘superveniente inimicitia’; Novella Commentaria in libros Decretalium ad X 1.29.25 (Trent 1512) I 137. A more difficult problem was raised when the cause had existed all along, but it came to the attention of the aggrieved party only after he or his proctor had consented to the judges at the papal court or at trial after the litis contestatio. To allow recusation under these circumstances opened the door to particularly fraudulent delays, and as a result the canonists usually held that ignorance of the pre-existing impediment had to be proved as ‘probabilis.’ Cf. the discussion by Petrus de Ancharano, , Commentaria in quinque libros decretalium ad X 2.29.36 (Bologna 1581) 352.Google Scholar
15 ‘Quia periculosum est, coram suspecto iudice litigare, idcirco ego M. intendens vestrum declinare examen, excipiendo propono, quod vos habeo suspectum in causa, quam mihi coram vobis F. movere intendit, cum ipse F. sit vester consanguineus vel vester familiaris vel quia estis dominus eius, propter quod vos tamquam suspectum recuso. Et hoc me offero probaturum coram arbitris ad hoc eligendis, quem pro parte mea eligo in continenti dominum G. canonicum Bononiensem.’ This is taken from Aegidius de Fuscarariis, Ordo Iudiciarius (Wahrmund, Quellen 3.1) 42. And see the case printed in the appendix. Use of the formula was not apparently necessary. In a French case from 1372, for example, the party simply objected: ‘Vos non teneo pro judice meo pro certo’; Registre de l'officialité de Cerisy , ed. Dupont, M. G., Memoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie (3rd Series 10.470).Google Scholar
16 X 1.29.39; X 2.28.61; Sext. 1.14.4.Google Scholar
17 This clause was generally ineffective as a weapon against obstructionist appeals, since there were many exceptions to it. As remarked in the glossa ordinaria ad X 2.28.53 s.v. expresse: ‘Multa exempla posses assignare in quibus recipitur appellatio licet sit remota in rescripto.’ And see Cheney, C. R., From Becket to Langton (Manchester 1956) 64.Google Scholar
18 ‘Si autem ex iuxta causa fuerit appellatio vel recusatio, est admittenda non obstante predicta clausula: appellatione remota vel recusatione’: Summa Aurea 381–82.Google Scholar
19 Gl. ord. ad X 2.28.61 s.v. de recusatoris assensu ; Durantis, , Spec. Iud. t. de rec. §5.Google Scholar
20 Durantis, , ibid. suggested that the arbiter should take over the recused judge's place, but he admitted that the majority view was against him: ‘Alii autem fere omnes, ut Vincentius, Tancredus, Joannes, et Bernardus dicunt quod secundum canones probata suspitione evanescit jurisdictio delegati, … necesse est aliud de novo impetrari rescriptum.’ Google Scholar
21 This argument assumes, of course, that litigants were in the later Middle Ages interested in settling their disputes by judicial decision rather than by exhausting their opponents with trouble and expense. This is perhaps a dangerous assumption. But still it ought to give at least a moment's pause before accepting the argument that parties always sought prejudiced judges. The question is, of course, impossible to prove one way or the other, as there is no way of taking a statistical sample, and even where there was recusation of a judge delegate, we cannot usually find out whether it was justified. The comment in the glossa ordinaria seems to me to cut in both directions: ad X 2.28.61 s.v. de recusatoris: ‘… nam pro modica causa quandoque traheret eum ad Papam, ut illum fatigaret laboribus et expensis et sic posset saepe contingere quod potius renunciaret liti quam vellet taliter laborare.’ Google Scholar
22 Hostiensis, , Summa t. de off. et pot. iud. del. §3; Ordo judiciarius ‘Scientiam’ (Wahrmund, Quellen 2.1) 34–35; Drogheda, , Summa 400–403; Durantis, , Spec. Iud. t. de iudice delegato §7.Google Scholar
23 With the exception of William of Drogheda, who contrives to argue out several of them.Google Scholar
24 X 2.1.2; Tangl, , op. cit. 56.Google Scholar
25 Gl. ord. ad X 2.1.2 s.v. non praesumant. Google Scholar
26 Marginal gloss to gl. ord. ibid. s.v. possunt. Google Scholar
27 For discussion see Hostiensis, , Summa t. de off. et pot. iud. del. §3; ‘Hodie etiam requiritur, quod delegatus a sede Apostolica sit in dignitate constitutus, vel ad minus canonieus cathedralis, vel alterius collegiatae ecclesiae.’ This rule would seem to exclude most regular clergy, but as Hostiensis observed, if it did, it was not followed, since ‘… de facto tamen committitur religiosis causae cognitio tota die.’ Google Scholar
28 Two qualifications should be made to this rule. First, there are some instances in the twelfth century of cases delegated to men styled simply as magister, and even a few from the thirteenth, when the rule, on the whole, seems to have been better followed. Salter, H. E., Cartulary of Oseney Abbey (Oxford 1936) III 338, where the editor has listed the names of the judges delegate that appear in the cartulary. And see Herde, , ‘Papal Formularies’ 331 n. 45. Second, cases were probably more often subdelegated to clerics who held no dignity. It does not appear to have been possible to challenge a judge delegate for this reason.Google Scholar
29 ‘… oportet enim quod is cui committuntur iura canonum non ignoret’: Hostiensis, Summa t. de off. et pot. iud. del. §3; Drogheda, , Summa 182. It is true, however, that a significant portion of these dignitaries would have had some experience and training in canon law, and often in secular law as well. Cf. Cheney, , From Becket to Langton 24.Google Scholar
30 E.g. Hostiensis, , Summa t. de iudiciis §5: ‘Iudex minor maiorem iudicare non debet.’ It was not, however, apparently required that the judges delegate hold a dignity superior to the parties. Cf. for example Decius, Philippus, Commentaria in Decretales ad X 2.1.18 (Venice 1577, fol. 124r): ‘Secundo nota honestum esse ut causa committatur iudicibus non habentibus dignitatem inferiorem ipsis partibus, non tamen necessarium est.’ Google Scholar
31 ‘Nondum transierant vii. menses post electionem suam, et ecce offerebantur ei litere domini pape constituentes eum iudicem de causis cognoscendis, ad que exequenda rudis fuit et inexercitatus …’: The Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond, ed. Butler, H. E. (London 1962) 33. St. Hugh of Lincoln was another frequent judge delegate unversed in the law (quasi legum nescius). Magna Vita Sancti Hugonis , eds. Douie, Decima and Farmer, Hugh (London 1962) II 150.Google Scholar
32 Hostiensis, , Summa t. de recusatione iudicis delegati §3; Drogheda, , Summa 374; Spec. Iud. t. de iud. delegato §7. Durantis was bested, however, by the fifteenth-century canonist Philippus Francus, who listed forty grounds for recusation, marg. gloss to gl. ord. ad X 2.28.36 s.v. septimum. Google Scholar
33 Gl. ord. ad X 1.29.17 s.v. dominus ; Innocent, IV, Apparatus ad libros decretalium ad X 1.27.17 (Cambrai 1525) fol. 49r .Google Scholar
34 Commentaria ad idem. Google Scholar
35 Summa t. de rec. iud. del. §3.Google Scholar
36 Ordo Iudiciarius, t. 6 §6 in Pilii, Tancredi, Gratiae Libri de Iudiciorum Ordine , ed. Bergmann, Friedrich (Göttingen 1842) 148. Cf. also gl. ord. ad X 2.6.2 s.v. accedens: ‘Nota quod iudex subditus actoris, potest legitime recusari.’ Google Scholar
37 Commentaria in quinque decretalium libros ad X 1.29.17 (Lyons 1578) I 91.Google Scholar
38 Hostiensis, , Summa Aurea, t. de rec. iud. del. §3; gl. ord. ad X 2.6.2 s.v. subesse. Google Scholar
39 Novella Commentaria on the Liber Sextus ad 2.15.2 (Trent 1512) fol. 66r .Google Scholar
40 Spec. Iud. t. de iud. del. §7.Google Scholar
41 Apparatus ad X 1.29.25. The canonists are not very clear on how real a family relationship there had to be, and perhaps kinship of a lord without actual social connection was not enough. At any rate, the point could be debated. Petrus de Ancharano (Commentaria ad X 2.29.61) suggests, for example, that the outcome should depend on mores regionis, as family affection is stronger in some areas than others.Google Scholar
42 ‘… cum remaneat affectio, potest recusari usque ad illum gradum in quo posset ei succedere. Nam familiaritatis affectio veritatem impedire solet…’: gl. ord. ad X 2.28.36 s.v. consanguineus. Google Scholar
43 Ibid.: ‘… sed certe honestius reputo, quod in superioribus adhuc repellatur, quia semper affectio et dilectio prima remanent.’ Google Scholar
44 Hostiensis, , Summa t. de rec. iud. del. §3; Tancred, , Ordo 148. Here Drogheda makes an argument, though he admits opinion is against it: ‘Et illud est dictum Aristotelis: quod semel est verum, semper erit verum’: Summa 386.Google Scholar
45 ‘Hoc est quod dicebat frater Gin. hospitaliorum procurator contra peregrinum subdelegatum domini V. Ebrudunen. archiepiscopi …’: Summa loc. cit. Google Scholar
46 X 2.1.18; Durantis, , Spec. Iud. t. de iud. del. §7; gl. ord. ad X 2.1.18 s.v. similis paene. Google Scholar
47 An illustrative case, apparently involving this situation, is the litigation over the right of the bishop of Worcester to visit the Abbey of Evesham, in 1202–03. Three abbots were appointed judges delegate, and the bishop successfully challenged them, but perhaps only because all three were black monks. Chronicon Abbatiae de Evesham, ed Macray, W. D. (Rolls Series 29) 123. A similar problem occurs in the course of Grosseteste's attempt to visit the chapter of Lincoln, Roberti Grosseteste Epistolae , ed. Luard, H. R. (Rolls Series 25) 253.Google Scholar
48 Gl. ord. loc. cit.: ‘Non tamen extendas hanc similitudinem ad omnes causas nam si iudex habeat causam decimarum et alia causa, puta iurispatronatus vel electionis ei committatur, illud ei non nocet.’ Google Scholar
49 Apparatus ad X 2.1.18; Novella Commentaria ad idem. Google Scholar
50 Cheney, , From Becket to Langton 72ff. Google Scholar
51 ‘… quia per eum corruptus est, pecunia interveniente.’ Hostiensis, Summa t. de recusationibus §1; Durantis, , Spec. Iud. t. de rec. §5.Google Scholar
52 ‘Et intelligatis de magnis exhenniis, nam de parvis non obstat …’: Summa 378.Google Scholar
53 Cheney, , ‘So-called Statutes of John Pecham and Robert Winchelsey,’ Journal of Ecclesiastical History 12 (1961) 21.Google Scholar
54 ‘… exceptis duntaxat donariis vel exenniis, quae nec juris prohibitionem offendant, nec scandalum generent quoquo modo’: Wilkins, Concilia II 212. There is also an interesting passage in Bracton on the subject, which Maitland believed came from a canonical source, though he did not suggest which. See Bracton and Azo, Selden Society 8 (1894) 198. A large part of it comes ultimately from the Digest (Dig. 1.16.6.3), which serves here to interpret a scriptural text. The passage, fol. 106b, reads: ‘Beatus qui excutit manus suas ab omni munere [Isai. 33.15]. Ab omni munere non est abstinendum, quia licet ab omnibus et passim avarissimum sit accipere et vilissimum, a nemine tamen accipere erit inhumanum, ut si amicus recipíat ab amico solo intuitu amicitiae et amoris.’ An interesting comment on the medieval attitude is also to be found in two English statutes. 8 Ric. II c.3 enacted that justices might not take any ‘robe fee pension gift or reward’ of any but the king. The next year 9 Ric. II c.1 in effect nullified that statute ‘because it is very hard and needeth declaration.’ Google Scholar
55 Summa 389–90.Google Scholar
56 ‘Consuevit etiam livor invidiae regnare inter indigenas et alienigenas, … ad decorem haec causa et quaedam aliae fecerunt me Angliam elongare’: Summa t. de rec. iud. del. §3, Hostiensis mentions that this was not in general use, but cf. X 2.6.4. And Durantis, Spec. Iud. t. de iud. del. §3, remarks in support: ‘Puta in scolaribus vel mercatoribus qui se diligunt velut fratres.’ Google Scholar
57 C.3 q.5 c.15; Drogheda Summa 389–90; gl. ord. ad X 2.6.2. s.v. nimis favens ; Tancred, , Ordo 149.Google Scholar
58 Durantis, , Spec. Iud. t. de iud. del. §3 (‘Item, non habet Deum pre oculis’); Drogheda, , Summa 377 (‘si fraterna caritate diligatur’); Durantis, , ibid. (‘quod non est in eo iustitia, unde nec iudex vocari meret’).Google Scholar
59 ‘Hae causae et consimiles, quas diligens lector per se recolligere poterit, possunt proponi contra iudices delegatos.’ Summa t. de rec. iud. del. §3. Panormitanus later wrote of possible reasons for recusation (Commentaria ad X 2.28.61): ‘… non sunt omnes in iure expressa, nec possunt de facili exprimi.’ Google Scholar
60 For an interesting article on this subject see Rodes, Robert E. Jr., ‘The Canon Law as a Legal System — Function, Obligation, and Sanction,’ Natural Law Forum 9 (1964) 45.Google Scholar
61 Cod. 3.1.16, 18.Google Scholar
62 Spec. Iud. t. de rec. § 5; Dig. 26.10.3.Google Scholar
63 Summa, 377; Dig. 28.5.58. For Hostiensis cf. supra n. 56.Google Scholar
64 Ordo jud. ‘Scientiam’ 35; Cod. 2.13.6.Google Scholar
65 Ibid.; Cod. 3.28.28.Google Scholar
66 Gloss ad Cod. 3.1.16 s.v. recusare and marg. gl. s.v. sufficit: ‘De iure civili sufficit allegare suspicionem, tametsi non exprimatur causa suspicionis.’ Or cf. gloss ad Dig. 36.1.4 s.v. neque illud ; Azo, , Summa Codicis t. de iudiciis (Venice 1596) 162: ‘Non est necesse probare causam suspicionis’: Cino da Pistoia, Lectura super Codice ad Cod. 3.1.16 (Strasburg 1475).Google Scholar
67 The most extensive discussion of the differences between Roman and canon law on recusation I have seen is Panormitanus, Commentaria ad X 2.2.4. He explained the necessity of showing cause in the church courts as arising from the need to avoid the all too frequent delays (‘cum saepe fraudulenter et causa dilatandi talis recusatio fiat’).Google Scholar
68 Summa 376; gl. ord. ad X 2.6.2 s.v. subesse. Google Scholar
69 Gl. ord. ad X 2.28.61 s.v. cum speciali: ‘Et est capitulum multum allegiabile et quotidianum.’ Google Scholar
70 Summa 88: ‘Si malam, differat eam et intendat componi…. Si contingat quod non possit in pace profiscere, ut habeat cum amicis suis colloquium. Et item mittat ad curiam Romanam super litterarum revocatoriarum impetratione, et hoc ad removendos iudices plus iusto favorabiles, ob aliquam causam optimam a iure approbatam.’ Or, at p. 89, he advises his reader with a weak case: ‘proponat dilationes et cavillationes et recusationes.’ Matthew of Paris' comment, in connection with a case delegated to the bishops of Salisbury and Ely, says much the same: ‘Quibus perlectis et intellectis, surrexerunt clerici Dunelmensis episcopi, quasdam recusationes frivolas et fallaces allegantes contra executores praedictos atque, ne procederent in inquisitione praedicta, praesentiam domini Papae appellarunt.’ Chronica majora ed. Luard, H. R. (Rolls Series 57.3) 63. And Johannes Andreae, Commentaria ad Sext. 2.15.2, ‘… reus enim qui tendit ad subterfugiam proponeret recusationem probabilem sed falsam, electis arbitris, appellabit et … sic impediet principalem.’ Google Scholar
71 Cf. Brentano, , Two Churches 150.Google Scholar
72 E.g. Cartulary of Oseney Abbey II 532–33; The Records of Merton Priory, ed. Heales, Alfred (London 1898) 74; Codice Diplomatico Barese (Commissione provinciale di Archeologia e Storia patria, Bari 1899) II 34–38.Google Scholar
73 E.g. ‘Pacis compositioni semper debet intendere …’: Drogheda, , Summa 181.Google Scholar
1 Hostiensis, , Summa t. de rec. iud. del. §3 Google Scholar
2 MS add. causo underscored Google Scholar
3 MS coram coram Google Scholar
4 MS vel Google Scholar
5 MS et Google Scholar
6 MS add. affectio underscored Google Scholar
7 MS pro eo quod mittatur Google Scholar
