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Elia del Medigo: An Archetype of the Halachic Man?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 July 2016
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“And the person who urged me to this point is the noble master, Pico della Mirandola, who is given to speculation of the highest sciences, is a very intelligent man, a worthy philosopher, a lover of truth, of whose like I have not seen in these times.” Thus wrote Elia del Medigo in the introduction to his commentary on Averroes' De substantia orbis written at the behest of the famous count of Mirandola as a result of their discussions in 1485. In late 1486, Pico, then in Rome, presented his Conclusiones in which he was able to couple the philosophy of Averroes with statements such as: “Averroes and Avicenna cannot disagree fundamentally on whether the physicist receives composite bodies from the metaphysician, even if they differ in their words,” or: “If there is any nature immediate to us that is either simply rational, or at least exists for the most part rationally, it has magic in its summit, and through its participation in men can be more perfect.” Conclusions like these could only have deeply frustrated someone like Elia del Medigo, who had devoted much time and effort to persuading the count of the superiority of peripatetic philosophy as interpreted by Averroes and may have caused him to revise somewhat his favorable statements about Pico. His last known contact with Pico was in December of the same year, in the form of a letter with two accompanying treatises, a last-ditch effort to make Pico aware of the superiority of Aristotelian-Averroistic cosmology.
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References
1 “Et quod cogit me ad hoc est dominus nobilis Joannes de Mirandula qui se dedit in speculatione scientiarum altissimarum, homo valde intelligens, philosophus honorabilis, diligens veritatem, cui similem vere non vidi in hac aetate.” del Medigo, Elia, Expositio Averrois de substantia orbis, Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MS Codex Vat. Lat. 4553, fol. 1v, cited in Mahoney, E. P., “Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Elia del Medigo, Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo,” in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Convegno internazionale di studi nel cinquecentesimo anniversario della morte (1494–1994), ed. Garfagnini, G. C. (Rome, 1997), 1:132.Google Scholar
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3 See Geffen, D., “Faith and Reason in Elijah del Medigo's Behinat ha-Da'at” (Ph.D. diss. Columbia University, 1970) and his “Insights into the Life and Thought of Elijah Delmedigo Based on His Published and Unpublished Works,” Proceedings of the American Academy of Jewish Research 41–42 (1975): 79–84. See also Guttman, J., “Elias del Medigos Verhältnis zu Averroes in seinem Bechinat ha-Dat” in Jewish Studies in Memory of Israel Abrahams (New York, 1927), 192–208; Hubsch, A., “Elia Delmedigo's Bechinat ha-Dath und Ibn Roschd's Façl ul-maqal” Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums 31 (1882): 552–63; 32 (1883): 28–48; Schweid, E., History of Jewish Philosophy from the Late Middle Ages to Modern Times (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 1971), 108–9; and Sirat, C., A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1985), 405–7.Google Scholar
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6 Scholars have differed on the level of hostility shown by Elia towards Kabbalah, but not on the main point of Elia's negative criticism. See Graetz, H., History of the Jews (Philadelphia, 1967), 4:290–93; Cassutto, U., Ha-Yehudim be-Firenzi be-Tekufat ha-Renaissance (Hebrew translation of Gli Ebrei a Firenze nell'età del Rinascimento) (Jerusalem, 1967), 232–33; Geffen, D., Faith and Reason in Elijah del Medigo's Behinat ha-Da'at; Ruderman, D., The World of a Renaissance Jew: The Life and Thought of Abraham ben Mordecai Farissol (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1981), 54–56, and his “The Italian Renaissance and Jewish Thought,” in Renaissance Humanism , ed. Rabil, A. (Philadelphia, 1988), 1:387; Idel, M., “Major Currents in Italian Kabbalah between 1560–1660,” Italia Judaica (Rome, 1986), 243–44 and his Kabbalah: New Perspectives (New Haven, Conn., 1988), 3–4; Tirosh-Rothschild, H., Between Worlds: The Life and Thought of Rabbi David ben Judah Messer Leon (Albany, N.Y., 1991), 41–43; and Ross, J., The Behinat ha-Dat of Rabbi Eliah Delmedigo of Candia (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv, 1984), 38–43.Google Scholar
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9 See Saul ben Ashkenazi, Moshe Cohen, “Letter,” in Examen Religionis, R. Elias del Medigo, ed. Reggio, I. S. (Vienna, 1833, repr. Jerusalem, 1970), 80–83 in which he praises Elia del Medigo and refers to himself as his disciple. Both protagonists wrote about the exchange and both accounts are in manuscripts in the Vatican. For bibliographical details, see Ravitsky, , “The Soles of the Kabbalists are on the Heads of the Philosophers,'” 453.Google Scholar
10 See Ruderman, , The World of a Renaissance Jew, 40–43.Google Scholar
11 Much has been written on Flavius Mithridates. For a select bibliography, see Wirszubski, C., ed., Flavius Mithridates, Sermo de Passione Domini (Jerusalem, 1963), 12 n. 2. See also Secret, F., “Nouvelles precisions sur Flavius Mithridates maitre de Pic de la Mirandole et traducteur de commentaires de Kabbale,” in L'Opera e il Pensiero di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (Florence, 1965) 2:169–87 and Ijsewijn, J., “Flavius Guillelmus Raymundus Mithridates,” Humanistica Lovaniensia 26 (1977): 236–38. For his knowledge of Kabbalah and a discussion of the translations he prepared for Pico, see Wirszubski, C., Pico della Mirandola's Encounter with Jewish Mysticism (Cambridge, Mass., 1989).Google Scholar
12 See Ruderman, , The World of a Renaissance Jew, 109–18. Without doubt, Elia would probably have disagreed with Farissol over many issues, but probably not when facing a common adversary.Google Scholar
13 Cited in Cassutto, , Ha-Yehudim be-Firenzi be-Tekufat ha-Renaissance, 369, and translated in Ruderman, , The World of a Renaissance Jew, 40–41.Google Scholar
14 In the introduction to the Hebrew translation of his Latin commentary to Averroes' De substantia orbis. See BNF MS hebr. 968, fol. 3v and Geffen, , Faith and Reason, 19–20.Google Scholar
15 BNF hebr. 968, fol. 177r.Google Scholar
16 See ibid., fol. 79r, 150r respectively. See also Geffen, , Faith and Reason, 14–15.Google Scholar
17 See Bland, K. P., “Elijah del Medigo, Unicity of Intellect, and Immortality of Soul,” Proceedings of the American Academy of Jewish Research 61 (1995): 16–17. In my opinion, Bland, in the continuation of the aformentioned article, misses the point about what view Elia really holds regarding reason and faith, and which is clearly set out in Behinat ha-Dat Google Scholar
18 “Quod ego non verifico totum quod est scriptum, sed dico quod illud quod scripsi est conveniens opinionibus philosophorum et fundamentis eorum. Illum autem quod est contra fidem veram nullo modo credo neque affirmo, sed locutus sum secundum viam eorum sicut est consuetudo exponentium, et adeo quero veniam et iuvamen in vita humana et in felicitate …” (Bartòla, A., “Eliyahu del Medigo e Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: La Testimonianza dei Codici Vaticani,” Rinascimento 33 [1993]: 272).Google Scholar
19 Elia is not the only one to define his Judaism in relationship to Christianity. See Yuval, Y., ”Two Nations in Your Womb”: Perceptions of Jews and Christians (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 2000), 16–45, who suggests that Christianity influenced Judaism to a large degree in the Middle Ages, even in the realms of religious symbols and ritual.Google Scholar
20 It is of interest to note that Michael Balbo exhibited many of the humanist characteristics that so annoyed Elia. The former tried, as did people like Pico, to harmonize different types of philosophy, and philosophy and Kabbalah. See Ravitsky, , “The Soles of the Kabbalists are on the Heads of the Philosophers,'” 457–62.Google Scholar
21 See Ross, , Behinat ha-Dat, 82–83. Indeed, David Ruderman has suggested that Elia's critique of Kabbalah in Behinat ha-Dat was mainly directed against Pico della Mirandola's appropriation of that lore. See Ruderman, , The World of a Renaissance Jew, 52–56. In another study, Ruderman suggests that although Elia did not hold with the veracity of Kabbalah, he was prepared to explain some of its elements to Pico, because, as with his philosophical teachings, Elia did not have to accept as true the ideas he elucidated. See Ruderman, , “Italian Renaissance and Jewish Thought,” 387.Google Scholar
22 Elia sent two more treatises with the letter: the Question on Being, Essence, and Unity and a translation of parts of Averroes' Commentary on the Prior Analytics. The former, along with Pico's De ente et uno, was written as a result of discussions between them during 1486 in Perugia. Pico's De ente et uno is, unlike Elia's work, inspired also by Pseudo-Dionysius and Kabbalah, both an anathema for Elia. See Schmitt, C. B. and Skinner, Q., eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge, 1988), 69. See also Idel, M., “Jewish Kabbalah and Platonism in the Middle Ages and Renaissance,” in Neoplatonism and Jewish Thought , ed. Goodman, L. E. (New York, 1992), 331–32.Google Scholar
23 BNF MS Lat. 6508, fol. 75r. See Kieszkowski, , “Les rapports entre Elie del Medigo et Pic de la Mirandole,” Rinascimento 55 (1964): 72. See also Bland, , “Elijah del Medigo's Averroist Response to the Kabbalahs of Fifteenth-Century Jewry and Pico della Mirandola,” 37–42.Google Scholar
24 This detail is reminiscent of Ramon Marti in Tunis several hundred years earlier, who was prepared to disprove Islam using philosophical reasoning but was not prepared to prove the doctrines of Christianity using the same criteria. See Hames, H., The Art of Conversion: Christianity and Kabbalah in the Thirteenth Century (Leiden, 2000), 111–12, and Colomer, E., El pensament als països Catalans durant l' Edat Mitjana i el Renaixement (Barcelona, 1997), 31–34, 216–38.Google Scholar
25 See Geffen, , Faith and Reason, 31–33. Although not intimately connected, the translation into Hebrew of Ramon Llull's Ars brevis, carried out in Senegallia in 1474, which was used by Jews in such a positive way and by such figures as Johanan Alemanno, who became Pico's teacher in 1488, also indicates Jewish syncretistic attempts. Pico's connection between Abulafia and Llull truly sounded the death knell for Elia's attempts to promote Averroism. See Hames, H., “Jewish Magic with a Christian Text: A Hebrew Translation of Ramon Llull's Ars brevis,” Traditio 54 (1999): 283–300.Google Scholar
26 Ross, , Behinat ha-Dat 77.Google Scholar
27 See Puig Montada, J., “Elia del Medigo and his Physical Quaestiones” in Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? ed. Aersten, J. A. and Speer, A. (Berlin, 1998), 929–35, who gives an example of Elia's speculation on the first principle based on Aristotle and Averroes. See also his “Continuidad medieval en el Renacimento: El caso de Elia del Medigo,” Ciudad de Dios 206 (1993): 47–64.Google Scholar
28 It is interesting to compare this attitude with that of Ramon Llull (1232–1316), who also suggested that there was no point in having debates between members of the various faiths if there was no common ground and method of argumentation. See my “Approaches to Conversion in the Late 13th-Century Church,” Studia Lulliana 35 (1995): 75–84.Google Scholar
29 Ross, , Behinat ha-Dat, 82.Google Scholar
30 Ibid., 83.Google Scholar
31 Ibid., 83–84.Google Scholar
32 Ibid., 84. Elia admits that he too is guilty of sometimes going down the same path taken by Maimonides: “And I have allocated space in other treatises to speak against the philosophers and those like them. And sometimes, I have found myself arguing according to their methods, even though I disagree with it entirely.” It is quite probable that Elia is referring here to his disputations with Christians at Pico's house, or possibly to arguments with Jewish colleagues.Google Scholar
33 In the other places in his oeuvre where Elia discusses Kabbalah, this parity, which precludes the Kabbalah from being ancient and, therefore, perhaps as a way to truth, is reiterated. See BNF MS hebr. 968, fol. 138v (the Hebrew version of Elia's Treatises on Intellect and Conjunction written in 1482), and 41v (in the Hebrew version of Elia's commentary to Averroes' De substantia orbis). When seen in the larger context of Christian appropriation of Kabbalah as prisca theologia, this is understandable. See also text around n. 14 above for Elia's opinion of Plato.Google Scholar
34 For slightly different reasons, David Ruderman suggests that Elia's kabbalistic critique is against the Christian use of Kabbalah. See his The World of a Renaissance Jew, 55–56.Google Scholar
35 Ross, , Behinat ha-Dat, 97. Slightly further on, Elia reiterates this: “And it is important that you know that one of the great principles of our Torah is performance [of the commandments], not just belief and intention.” See ibid., 100.Google Scholar
36 Ibid., 99. Compare this with Maimonides, who suggests that the commandments are for educational purposes, in order to remove obstacles on the path to knowledge of God, emendation of the body so that one can turn to emendation of the soul. See Maimonides, , The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Pines, S. (Chicago and London, 1963) vol. 2, III: 26–49. See also Leibowitz, Y., The Faith of Maimonides (Tel Aviv, 1989), 101–7, and Leaman, O., Moses Maimonides (London and New York, 1990), 129–61.Google Scholar
37 See Rakefet-Rotcoff, A., “A Biography of Rabbi Joseph Dov Soloveitchik,” in Faith in Changing Times: On the Teachings of Rabbi Joseph Dov Soloveitchik (in Hebrew), ed. Sagi, A. (Jerusalem, 1996), 17–41. In the same volume, see Turner, Y., “The Religious Act according to Rabbi Soloveitchik: A Divine Command or Human Creation” (in Hebrew), 383–402.Google Scholar
38 Soloveitchik, Rabbi J. B., Halachic Man (Philadelphia, 1983), 44–46.Google Scholar
39 See his introduction to one of his Averroist treatises, in BNF MS hebr. 968 fol. 79r, where he deals with the issues of soul, intellect, and immortality: “Added to these are the troubles due to speaking about and debating these profound, amazing, and difficult problems regarding which philosophers from the time of Plato till our own day have not ceased raising difficulties, the chief of the philosophers never having completed his investigation of them.” Translated in Bland, K. P., “Elijah del Medigo, Unicity of Intellect, and Immortality of Soul,” 2.Google Scholar