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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 July 2017
It is difficult to deduce the Aristotelian scientific procedure — to take his abstract statement of the nature of science and to show that his actual method in a particular work is adequately explained by the initial definition. Yet Aristotle's actual method is worth getting at. It provides insight into Aristotle and into Greek thought, and it sheds light on the course of ideas during the centuries which have been scientifically Aristotelian. In the following pages, I have tried to discover and to describe the method at work in a particular scientific treatise. The unit chosen for study is the first book and a half of the De caelo. Here it is that Aristotle develops his highly influential science of the celestial bodies.
1 Phaedo 96A-98D.Google Scholar
2 Timaeus 49C-52D.Google Scholar
3 Ibid, especially 52A. See also Republic 476A-D.Google Scholar
4 See Richard McKeon, ‘Aristotle's Conception of the Development and. the Nature of Scientific Method,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 8 (1947) 3-44. This article, though interested primarily in distinguishing Aristotle's method from that of his predecessors — especially Plato and Democritus — also suggests the extent to which Aristotle was indebted to these same predecessors.Google Scholar
5 Posterior Analytics 1.2 (71b 8).Google Scholar
6 Metaphysics A 6 (988a 7-9).Google Scholar
7 Ibid. Ζ 7 (1032a 24); Η 4 (1044a 37). See Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., The Doctrine of Being in Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto 1951) 221, 225.Google Scholar
8 Met. Ζ 3 (1029a 20). Google Scholar
9 Ibid. 7 (1033a 24 – 1034a 8). Google Scholar
10 Categories 5 (2a 13).Google Scholar
11 Met. Ζ 7 (1033a 24 – 1034a 8).Google Scholar
12 Ibid. Η 6 (1045a 20 - b 23).Google Scholar
13 On this entire point, see Owens 220-25. Google Scholar
14 Owens 225: ‘So in terms of scientific knowledge, matter will ultimately be explained in terms of form.’ Compare Aquinas: ‘Quicquid igitur est in re quod non potest cognosci per cognitionem substantiae eius, oportet esse intellectui ignotum’: Summa contra Gentiles 3.56. Google Scholar
15 Post. Anal. 2.19 (100a 10; 100b 12). Google Scholar
16 Ibid. 1.28 (87a 38 - b4). Google Scholar
17 Post. Anal. 2.3 (90b 23-25). Google Scholar
18 Ibid. 1.2 (71b 9-23). Nicomachean Ethics 6.3 (1139b 18-35).Google Scholar
19 Met. Ζ 5 (1031a 12); Post. Anal. 2.3 (90b 16; 91a 1).Google Scholar
20 Post. Anal. 2.13 (96b 15-24).Google Scholar
21 For the philosophical issues involved, see Owens 210.Google Scholar
22 See Roland-Gosselin, M. D., O.P., ‘Les méthodes de définition chez Aristote,’ Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 6 (1912) 673.Google Scholar
23 De anima 1.1 (402a 11-19). Unless otherwise indicated, quotations are from the Oxford translations.Google Scholar
24 Roland-Gosselin 670.Google Scholar
25 For a classification of Aristotle's various techniques of definition, see Roland-Gosselin 660-65.Google Scholar
26 Topics 6 and 7.Google Scholar
27 Ibid. 1.1 (100b 19); De caelo 1.3 (270b 3).Google Scholar
28 For the shades of meaning of πίστις, see Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, s.v. (595b 8-59).Google Scholar
29 Topics 7.5 (155a 2-18).Google Scholar
30 Prior Anal. 1.30 (46a 18-22); Top. 1.2 (101a 36 - b 4).Google Scholar
30a For a discussion of the structure of the De caelo, especially the first two books, see P. Moraux, ‘Einige Bemerkungen über den Aufbau von Aristoteles’ Schrift De caelo,’ Museum Helveticum 6 (1949) 157-65; and in much greater detail Friedrich Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical World (Ithaca 1960) 253-318. This latter work contains an extensive analysis of certain sections of De caelo, but from a point of view different from that of the present study.Google Scholar
31 De caelo 1.2 (268b 15).Google Scholar
32 Ibid. (b 14).Google Scholar
33 Physics 2.1 (192b 18).Google Scholar
34 Ibid. (193b 3-7).Google Scholar
35 Ibid. 5.4 (228b 19-25).Google Scholar
36 De caelo 1.2 (268b 17-20); see Phys. 8.8 (261b 2): ibid. 9 (265a 14).Google Scholar
37 De caelo 1.2 (268b 21-24).Google Scholar
38 Ibid. (269a 2-7). Is this argument simply a saltus from the geometrical to the physical order? Perhaps, but it seems not. At least such is not the only interpretation possible. The argument seems to be rather from the fact of bodies moving in a circle-like way to the conclusion that there is some real body to which such motion belongs by nature. That the fact of such motion was assumed is clear from De caelo 1.5 (272a 5-9). See also Duhem, Pierre, Le système du monde (Paris 1954) I 9.Google Scholar
39 It is to be noted, even if only in passing, that Aristotle's science does take its start from experience, though this ambient fund of experience may be but vaguely. defined. This experience, however, is not the ‘purified’ experience of later sciences. For Aristotle, experience includes the ‘natural’ interpretation which the intelligent, observant man puts upon the events and things of our world. Thus, it is experience for Aristotle that certain bodies fall down, and the the ‘down’ is as integral a part of experience as the body itself. The entire question of the nature and functions of experience in Aristotle deserves more extended treatment than is possible here.Google Scholar
40 De caelo 1.2 (268b 15-16). Italics as in the Oxford translation, though it is questionable whether the Greek warrants them.Google Scholar
41 Jaeger, Werner, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development, tr. Robinson, Richard (2nd ed. Oxford 1948) 300, points out the note of triumph with which Aristotle exploits the idea of natural motion.Google Scholar
42 De caelo 1.8 (276b 4-10).Google Scholar
43 Ibid. 1.7 (274a 30-34). The last sentence in the Greek reads δτι μεν τοίννν ούχ οίον τε εξ άπειρων, φανερόν, ει τις ήμΐν εάσει μένειν τάς υποθέσεις.Google Scholar
44 Ibid. 1.8 (277a 9-13, Loeb translation), ως άναγκαΐον ή κινείν τας υποθέσεις, ή τό μέσον εν είναι και τό εσχατον. Τούτου δ δντος ανάγκη και τον οϋρανον ενα μόνον και πλείους, τοις αύτοΐς τεκμηρίοις τούτοις και ταίς αυταϊς άνάγκαις. I have used the Loeb translation here and in the following passages because it renders the Greek somewhat more exactly. Google Scholar
45 Ibid. 1.3 (270b 1-4). Διότι μεν οϋν άίδιον και οϋτ’ αϋξησιν εχον οϋτε φθίσιν, αλλ’ άγήρατον και άναλλοίωτον και άπαθές εστι τό πρώτον των σωμάτων, εΐ τις τοις ύποκει- μένοις πιστεύει, φανερόν εκ των είρημένων εστίν. Google Scholar
46 Ibid‥ 2.13 (294b 30-295a 2). όλως ôè πρός γε τους οϋτω λέγοντας περί της κινήσεως ού περί μερών εστίν η άμφισβήσις, άλλά περί δλου τινός και παντός, εξ αρχής γαρ διοριστεόν πότερον εστί τις τοις σώμασι φύσει κίνησις ή ουδεμία, και πότερον φύσει μεν ουκ εστι, βία δ’ εστίν, επεί δε περί τούτων διώρισται πρότερον όσα κατά την παροϋσαν δύναμιν εϊχομεν, χρηστέον ώς ύπάρχουσιν.Google Scholar
47 Ibid. 3.1 (299a 1-6).Google Scholar
48 De partibus aiiimalium 1.5 (644b 23 – 645a 7, Loeb translation). Jaeger, p. 337, sees in this text a sharp change from an earlier attitude toward science and a program for a new kind of study. There certainly is a change, but it seems rather a change in emphasis than a fundamentally new conception of science. The difference is perhaps this: Aristotle here takes more seriously the limitations on human knowing which he had earlier experienced and described in the De caelo. On the early dating of De caelo, see Moraux (η. 30a supra) 165.Google Scholar
49 i.e. the passages cited above.Google Scholar
50 Robinson, Richard, Plato's Earlier Dialectic (2nd ed. Oxford 1953) 77–89, 108. Gf. Gorgias 506c-507c; Sophist 259A; Statesman 260B; Theactetus 171D.Google Scholar
51 Met. Ζ 17 (1041a 33 - b 5).Google Scholar
52 De caelo 1.10.Google Scholar
53 Ibid. 1.7 (275b 30-32).Google Scholar
54 Phaedo 97B-98D.Google Scholar
55 De caelo 2.5 (287b 27-31).Google Scholar
56 Ibid. 1.6 (271b 18-25); 1.7 (274a 30). Aristotle attempts a more general solution to the problem, one that will go beyond the strict limits of the De caelo, in 1.7. He clearly recognizes this as something of an extended footnote.Google Scholar
57 Ibid. 1.6 (274a 25-29).Google Scholar
58 Ambiguity? Zürcher, Aristoteles’ Geist und Werk (Paderborn 1952) 134-35, takes a harsher view: ‘ Dass das reine Sophisterei ist, muss jedermann zugeben.’Google Scholar
59 On natural place as form, see De caelo 4.3 (310b 10).Google Scholar
60 De caelo 1.3 (270a 33-35).Google Scholar
61 For the meaning of the eternal in Aristotle, see Bonitz s.v. άίδιος (14b 15-25).Google Scholar
62 De caelo 1.9 (279a 12-18).Google Scholar
63 Ibid. 2.4 (287a 11-23).Google Scholar
64 Ibid. 2.3 (286a 11-12).Google Scholar
65 Ibid. (20).Google Scholar
66 Ibid. (23-24).Google Scholar
67 Ibid. (28).Google Scholar
68 Ibid. (286b 1-4). W. D. Ross c?lls this entire chapter, ‘one of his boldest essays in a priori construction’: Aristotle (3rd ed. Oxford 1937) 95.Google Scholar
69 The Greek for this last phrase is πώς εχων τώ πιστεύειν, πότερον άνθρωπινώς ή καρτερικώτερον. Some more recent editors take this last word to be καρτερώτερον. Google Scholar
70 De caelo 2.5 (287b23-288a 2). The Greek ends with νϋν ôê τό φαινόμενον ρητέον. Google Scholar
71 cc. 4-5 (705a 27-706b 17).Google Scholar
72 De caelo 2.5 (288a 2-11).Google Scholar
73 Ibid. 2 (284b 32).Google Scholar
74 In 1.9, for example, he tries to prove on the basis of matter and form what he has just proved on the «.basis of natural motion.Google Scholar
75 De caelo 1.3.Google Scholar
76 Regulae ad directionem animae, in Œuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam et Paul Tannery (Paris 1908) 10.368.Google Scholar
77 Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and his System of the World, tr. Andrew Motte, revised by Florian Cajori (Berkeley 1947) 400.Google Scholar
78 This statement is certainly simpliste, yet it does express something of the spirit with which Aristotle approaches science.Google Scholar
79 Cf. De caelo 2.5 (287b 30); Post. Anal. 1.9 (76a 26-30).Google Scholar
80 It is worth noting that we are not generalizing for the entire Aristotelian corpus, but only for the De caelo. The empirical observation systematized in the biological works is significantly different from that in the De caelo. Perhaps the most obvious difference is the much greater attention given to the accumulation of factual detail in certain of the biological works. See, for example, Historia animalium 9.40 (623b 3 – 627b 22).Google Scholar
81 De caelo 1.3 (270b 4-12). See also 1.9 (279a 22-30); 2.1 (284a 11-14).Google Scholar
82 Ibid. 1.3 (270b 13-17). See also 1.8 (277a 28 - b 3); 2.4 (287a 11); 2.6 (289a 7-8).Google Scholar
83 Ibid. 3.7 (306a 14-18). See also 2.13 (293a 25-28).Google Scholar
84 Top. 7.5 (155a 2-3).Google Scholar
85 Ibid. 1.11 (104b 13-18).Google Scholar
87 Prior Anal. 1.30 (46a 17-22); Nie. Ein. 6.8 (1142a 12-18). For further references see Bonitz s.v. εμπειρία (242a 59 - b 10). Google Scholar
88 L.-M. Régis, O.P., L'opinion selon Aristote (Paris 1935) 138-139. Google Scholar
89 292b 11-13. Google Scholar
90 This viewpoint could be illustrated abundantly from late medieval Aristotelian natural philosophers. For example, Thomas of Wylton, an English ‘Averroist’ writing early in the fourteenth century, distinguishes two levels of rational cogency in science: ‘An ista simul stent, quod motus sit aeternaliter a Deo productus, cum hoc, quod Deus sic produxit mundum libere quod potuit ipsum non produxisse … dico distinguendo de demonstratione. Sunt enim quaedam demonstrationes, quae procedunt ex propositionibus immediatis et per se notis ex terminis sicut in mathematicis, quas demonstrationes dicit Commentator in primo ordine certitudinis; et in talibus non sunt opiniones contrariae, ut patet de ista conclusione: omnis triangulus habet très angulos aequales duobus rectis, vel quod omre totum est maius sua parte. Alio modo dicuntur demonstrationes omnes illae rationes, quae arctant et firmant intellectum ad adhaerendum uni parti tollendo omnem formidinem ad illam partem, quantumcumque magni aliam partem teneant propter rationes probabiles et difficiles pro alia parte. Et isto secundo modo solum rationes, per quas Aristoteles in- vestigat veritatem circa principia naturae et numerum principiorum et universaliter pro- prietates movenLium et mobilium, de moventibus et mobilibus, de rebus naturalibus in scientia naturali sunt demonstrationes.’ Quoted by A. Maier, ‘Das Prinzip der doppelten Wahrheit,’ in her Metaphysische Hintergründe des spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie (Rome 1955) 7 η. 8. Google Scholar
91 Post. Anal. 2.10 (93b 29). Google Scholar
92 Phys. 1.1 (184a 18). Google Scholar
93 Ibid. (19-22). Google Scholar
94 This static conception of science is likewise reiterated, by the late Latin Aristotelians. Thus Zabarella (1533–1589), though he occasionally seems willing to grant that science may advance beyond Aristotle, seems to maintain the same static view of science (natural philosophy) as had his master: ‘[Averroes et Olympiodorus] putant esse omnino ne- cessarium particularem, atque distinctam tractationcm de mineris praeter illam generalem, quae habetur in ultimo capite tertii Meteorologici; nunquid autem de mineris scripserit Aristoteles praeter ultimum illud caput tertii Meteorologici, incertum est; … Ego quidem etsi dubito necessarias omnino esse libros de mineris ad liuius scientiae perfectionein, credo tarnen potuisse contingere, ut eos numquam Aristoteles scripserit; non sum enim in eo com- muni errore, ut putem necesse esse Aristotelem ita perfectam tradidisse naturalem philoso- phiam, ut nihil quod ab humano ingenio inveniri, aut cognosci queat, praetermissum ab eo esse potuerit; illud quidem puto esse confilendum, Aristotelem ita artificiose huius scientiae fabricam, quam in praesentia declarandum suscepimus, construxisse, & confecisse, ut quamvis rebus ipsis, ac materiae (ut ita dicam) addi aliquid possit, artificio tamen, & formae nihil; ipsam enim scientiam in omnes suas partes distribuit, easque optime disposuit, ita ut facile cuique sit, si quid in aliqua parte desit, addere, et addita in suis quaeque locis collocare.’ Iacobus Zabarella, De rebus naturalibus libri XXX 1.30 (Coloniae 1597, p. 84A-E). It is of interest to note that he indicates quite clearly that the gaps which Aristotle had left had long since been filled by Theophrastus and Albert the Great. Google Scholar
95 Meteorologica 1.3 (339b 27); De caelo 1.3 (270b 20); Met. Λ 8 (1074b 12); Politics 7.10 (1329b 25). See Plato, Timaeus 21D, 25E; Jaeger, Aristotle 130-37. Google Scholar
96 Pol. 2.5 (1264a 2-5). Google Scholar
