¹ The prudential value of a life (or some part of a life) is a measure of how well it is going for the person living it. I will sometimes use the more familiar term ‘well-being’ to express the same evaluative notion. The question at issue in this article is which states of affairs have basic or non-derivative prudential value. I call these the basic constituents of prudential value.

² To say that person y’s desire for some state of affairs x is satisfied is just to say that y desires that x obtains and x does, in fact, obtain. Where the object of y’s desire does not obtain, I will say that the desire is frustrated. I am here assuming, for simplicity, an unrestricted actualist version of desire-satisfactionism. On this approach, the satisfaction of any of a person's actual desires is relevant to that person's well-being. The approach is actualist in that it is the desires a person has in the actual world that count, and unrestricted in that it imposes no constraints on which of these are prudentially relevant. The question of which of a person's desires ought to be accorded prudential relevance is of course of crucial importance, but we can afford to bracket it, as here the same issues arise for the object as for the combo view.

³ I borrow these names from Ben Bradley. See Bradley, B., Well-Being and Death (Oxford, 2009), pp. 25–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Bradley, B., ‘Objective Theories of Well-Being’, The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism, ed. Eggleston, B. and Miller, D. E. (Cambridge 2014), pp. 220–38Google Scholar. My own discussion of the object and combo views is much indebted to Bradley's. Wlodek Rabinowicz and Jan Osterberg call these views the object and satisfaction interpretations (Rabinowicz, W. and Osterberg, J., ‘Value Based on Preferences: On Two Interpretations of Preference Utilitarianism’, Economics and Philosophy 12.1 (1996), pp. 1–27)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. I prefer Bradley's terminology because it is less likely to encourage confusion between the satisfaction interpretation and the desire-satisfaction theory itself.

⁴ The first published discussion of this interpretative issue that I am aware of (and still the most thorough) is in Rabinowicz and Osterberg, ‘Preferences’. Rabinowicz there argues for the object view, while Osterberg defends the combo view. Although the stated focus of their dialogue is preference-utilitarianism, much of their discussion is also relevant to the issue of how best to understand the desire-satisfaction theory of prudential value. The two views are also discussed, under various names, in Dorsey, D., ‘Desire-Satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16.1 (2013), pp. 151–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dorsey, D., ‘Intrinsic Value and the Supervenience Principle’, Philosophical Studies 157.2 (2012), pp. 267–85, at 272CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Heathwood, C., ‘The Problem of Defective Desires’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83.4 (2005), pp. 487–504, at 491CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sarch, A., ‘Internalism About a Person's Good: Don't Believe It’, Philosophical Studies 154.2 (2011), pp. 161–84, at 179CrossRefGoogle Scholar. So far there has been no detailed, paper-length evaluation of the comparative merits of these views precisely as approaches to prudential value.

⁵ For our purposes, states of affairs are just those entities referred to by ‘that’-clauses. An example is the state of affairs that Francine is taking pleasure in a beautiful sunset.

⁶ Pettit, P. and Smith, M., ‘Backgrounding Desire’, Philosophical Review 99.4 (1990), pp. 565–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ Pettit and Smith, ‘Backgrounding’, p. 583.

⁸ Pettit and Smith, ‘Backgrounding’, pp. 583–4. Rabinowicz and Osterberg (‘Preferences’, p. 3) draw a similar contrast between the ‘participant’ and the ‘spectator’ models, in the context of the object and combo views. I return to this point in section IV below.

⁹ Schroeder, M., Slaves of the Passions (Oxford, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ Schroeder, Slaves, p. 23.

¹¹ The enumerative/explanatory distinction is introduced in Crisp, R., Reasons and the Good (Oxford, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Crisp employs this distinction, somewhat differently than I do, as a tool for classifying theories of prudential value. It is put to similar use in Fletcher, G., ‘A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being’, Utilitas 25.2 (2013), pp. 206–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Rice, C., ‘Defending the Objective List Theory of Well-Being’, Ratio 26.2 (2013), pp. 196–211CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹² There are, of course, views according to which part of what it is for a mental state to be a pleasure is that it is desired. See, for instance, Heathwood, C., ‘The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire’, Philosophical Studies 133.23 (2007), pp. 23–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar. If one combines the object view with a desire theory of pleasure, one thereby ensures that some of the basic constituents of Ronnie's well-being are at least partly constituted by mental states (assuming Ronnie's life contains at least some pleasures). However, I do not see any plausible way of securing the result that they all are, on the object view.

¹³ It would be passing strange to claim that the source of the prudential value of such compounds is always some second-order desire that the first-order desire be satisfied. This would, after all, just be to endorse the object view at one remove. Moreover, I see no principled reason for thinking that only desires that have as their object instances of desire-satisfaction possess such value-conferring power. A vicious regress also threatens if one ventures down this path. If a higher-order desire that my lower-order desire is satisfied is required to explain the prudential value of ground-level desire-satisfaction, how then do we explain why it is good for this higher-order desire to be satisfied? It appears that we will need to keep adding new desiderative levels ad infinitum. This is a bizarre result. It also makes it hard to see how prudential value gets into the picture in the first place.

¹⁴ Bradley (‘Objective Theories’, p. 235) also highlights the apparent extensional equivalence of the object and combo view. A reviewer points out that even if the object and combo view agree about how much prudential value is realized at any time, they may still differ about the prudential value of prospects that are unrealized. Perhaps, then, I should not be so quick to grant that the theories are extensionally equivalent. The first thing to note is that establishing the extensional equivalence of the views is not part of my aim in this article. I concede this equivalence only for the purposes of arguing that even if the views are extensionally indistinguishable we have reason to prefer the object view. That said, if it turns out that the combo view is extensionally more plausible than the object view in cases involving unrealized prospects, this would provide a compelling counterweight to my own argument in favour of the object view (although it would not impact the argument itself). I consider this possibility in section V below, when I canvass potential reasons for preferring the combo view. However, I do not see any plausible route to such a conclusion.

¹⁵ Cf. Sobel, D., From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism (Oxford, 2016), p. 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar: ‘Subjectivism maintains that things have value because we value them. Caring about stuff makes stuff matter.’ This formulation, of course, leaves us with many unanswered questions (‘should subjectivists focus on desires or some other class of pro-attitudes?’, ‘if desires are the correct focus, which desires?’). This, however, is by design. It is important that we cast as broad a net as possible, since my argument is precisely that, even on the most ecumenical understanding of the subjectivist insight, the combo view doesn't adequately capture it.

¹⁶ I say ‘at least partially’ because it seems to me preferable that our taxonomy leave room for genuine hybrid theories (that is, theories that include both objectivist and subjectivist elements). This sets my proposal apart from those that would treat subjectivism and objectivism as exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories. In the present context, however, nothing much hangs on this difference.

¹⁷ Sumner, L. W., ‘The Subjectivity of Welfare’, Ethics 105.4 (1995), pp. 764–790CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Sumner, L. W., Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Oxford, 1996)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Sumner, ‘Subjectivity’, p. 768. Valerie Tiberius endorses more or less the same criterion: ‘Those defending subjective theories argue that a person's having a positive attitude (or a positive attitude under certain conditions) toward x is necessary for x to count as part of that person's well-being. Proponents of objective theories deny this claim’ (Tiberius, V., ‘Substance and Procedure in Theories of Prudential Value’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85.3 (2007), pp. 373–91, at 373)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ As expressed, for instance, in Dorsey, D., ‘Why Should Welfare “Fit”?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 67.269 (2017), pp. 685–708CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Railton, P., ‘Facts and Values’, Philosophical Topics 14.2 (1986), pp. 5–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rosati, C., ‘Internalism and the Good for a Person’, Ethics 106.2 (1996), pp. 297–326CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁰ The name is meant to evoke Dreier, J., ‘Meta-ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism’, Philosophical Perspectives 18.1 (2004), pp. 23–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This problem for the combo view is also raised by Bradley (‘Objective Theories’, pp. 234–6). As a reviewer helpfully points out, the same kind of concern has been raised about Humean theories of normative reasons (where these are understood in the way Schroeder is arguing against). On this last point, see Korsgaard, C., The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Hampton, J., The Authority of Reason (Cambridge, 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹ Rabinowicz and Osterberg, ‘Preferences’, p. 3.

²² The combo view could seemingly satisfy the anti-alienation constraint only by requiring that Evangeline have a higher-order desire that her desire for x is satisfied. Whereas the view discussed in footnote 13 would allow the presence of a higher-order desire to confer value upon instances of desire-satisfaction, this view would allow the absence of such a desire to revoke their value. It is implausible for similar reasons.

²³ Dorsey (‘Intrinsic Value’, pp. 272–5) also highlights the fact that the combo view fails to preserve resonance, and argues that we should prefer the object view on these grounds.

²⁴ E.g. Arneson, R., ‘Human Flourishing Versus Desire-Satisfaction’, Social Philosophy and Policy 16.1 (1999), pp. 113–42, at 124CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Keller, S., ‘Welfare as Success’, Noûs 43.4 (2009), pp. 656–83, at 659CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rice, ‘Objective List’, p. 6.

²⁵ Fletcher, ‘Fresh Start’.

²⁶ An anonymous reviewer notes that at this point ‘it is very natural to wonder why there shouldn't be more than one thing on the basic list of goods’. Desire-satisfactionism, on the combo view, thus comes out looking like one idiosyncratic and not especially plausible version of an objective list theory. Again, this mirrors certain Kantian criticisms of Humean approaches to reasons (as the same reviewer helpfully reminds me).

²⁷ See Fletcher, G., ‘The Locative Account of Good For Formulated and Defended’, Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 6.1 (2012), pp. 1–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁸ Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica (Cambridge, 1903), p. 99Google Scholar. One can also read Moore as a thoroughgoing sceptic about prudential value. It does not matter here which reading is historically correct.

²⁹ Moore, Principia, p. 179.

³⁰ Regan, D., ‘Why Am I My Brother's Keeper?’, Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, ed. Wallace, R. J., Pettit, P., Scheffler, S. and Smith, M. (Oxford, 2004), pp. 202–30Google Scholar.

³¹ For desire-satisfactionists who favour the combo view, see Heathwood, ‘Defective Desires’, p. 491; Lukas, M., ‘Desire Satisfactionism and the Problem of Irrelevant Desires’, Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 4.2 (2010), pp. 1–24, at 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rabinowicz and Osterberg, ‘Preferences’. For opponents of the theory who favour this interpretation, see Bradley, Well-Being, pp. 25–30, and Sarch, ‘Internalism’, pp. 179–81.

³² Sarch, ‘Internalism’, p. 180. Cf. Rabinowicz and Osterberg, ‘Preferences’, p. 17; Lukas, ‘Irrelevant Desires’, p. 9.

³³ See Dorsey, ‘Intrinsic Value’, for further elaboration and defence of this point.

³⁴ Again, I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.

³⁵ The example is borrowed from Bradley, B., ‘Well-Being at a Time’, Philosophic Exchange 45.1 (2016), pp. 1–12, at 4Google Scholar.

³⁶ A further question that arises on this sort of view is ‘when is it good for Elon’? There have been several proposed answers to this question (see Bradley, ‘Time’, and Dorsey, ‘Desire-Satisfaction’). I can remain agnostic. What is important to note here is that the choice between the object and combo view does not settle this issue.

³⁷ E.g. Heathwood, ‘Defective Desires’, p. 490.

³⁸ E.g. Lukas, ‘Irrelevant Desires’, pp. 18–21.

³⁹ It seems to me that a similar story should be told about those cases where person y presently lacks a desire for state of affairs x but will come to acquire such a desire. What the object and combo views, respectively, imply about such cases will depend on whether a concurrence requirement is built in. This decision is independent of which of the two formulations we adopt.

⁴⁰ I wish to thank David Enoch, Iwao Hirose, Andrew Reisner and Sarah Stroud for extremely helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. I am also grateful to audiences at McGill University's Philosophy Workshop Series and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem's Centre for Moral and Political Philosophy for valuable feedback. Finally, I am indebted to two anonymous referees for this journal, whose detailed and perceptive comments resulted in significant improvements to the article.