¹ The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford, 1971), pp. 47–8. Nagel uses ‘p’ for the agent variable, and ‘A’ for the act, event, or circumstance to be promoted. I have amended all schemas to remain consistent throughout this article.

² Notice that this constitutes a definition of a normative reason understood as a count noun (a non-normative fact or non-normative predicate) in terms of reason understood as a mass noun: that which explains the reason's prima facie normative attraction (Broome, Rationality Through Reasoning (Oxford, 2013), p. 63). In Nagel's principle-based sense, then, normative reasons are understood as both an explanation and a justification of action, i.e. a normative reason for x to promote φ is what explains why x ought to promote φ (Possibility, pp. 14–15). This differs from the now popular view known as non-reductive realism, which takes the notion of a normative reason to be primitive, and explicitly circular in definition. On the non-reductive view, a normative reason for action is simply a consideration (fact) which counts in favour of some act or attitude by providing a reason for it (see Scanlon, T. M., What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, 1998), p. 71Google Scholar; Parfit, Derek, On What Matters, vol. 1 (Oxford, 2011), p. 31CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni, Personal Value (Oxford, 2011), p. xiCrossRefGoogle Scholar; cf. Buckland, Jamie, ‘Normative Reasons qua Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy’, Philosophia 45 (2017), pp. 207–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar). Nagel's position is more complex than this; he envisages an intimate connection between the circumstances (or facts) that provide agents with reasons to act, and the way in which action is explained by reasons brought under the control of practical normative principles. For the moment, I will work explicitly with Nagel's concept of a normative reason. I will, however, explain how this relates to the non-reductive view in section VII.

³ Nagel, Possibility, p. 90. Nagel originally drew the distinction in terms of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ reasons for action, though he later adopted Parfit's agent-neutral/agent-relative terminology (see Parfit, , Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1984); Nagel, , The View from Nowhere (Oxford, 1986), p. 125Google Scholar).

⁴ Skorupski, , The Domain of Reasons (Oxford, 2011), p. 63Google Scholar.

⁵ It's important to stress that, for Skorupski, φ ranges over action-types open to x, and that types of action can be open to more than one agent, i.e. ‘in more than one agent's choice-situation’ (Skorupski, , ‘Neutral versus Relative: A Reply to Broome, and McNaughton and Rawling’, Utilitas 8 (1996), pp. 235–48, at 236CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

⁶ Skorupski, Domain, pp. 63–4. One objection to this approach is that it renders all reasons agent-relative reasons ‘for the simple fact that any reason for an agent to perform an act must appeal to some fact about the agent's performing that act’ (Portmore, Douglas W., ‘Agent-Relative vs. Agent-Neutral’, International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. LaFolette, Hugh (2013), p. 3Google Scholar). For example, Douglas Portmore has insisted that the fact that Jane is in need of some good cheer is an agent-neutral reason for him to throw her a surprise party. Yet, when this reason is fully specified in Nagelian terms, it emerges, incorrectly, as agent-relative:

However, the fact that any reason for an agent to perform an act must appeal to some fact about the agent's performing that act is a trivial feature of all reasons for action, and is not, therefore, an interesting mark of ‘agent-relativity’ (see Michael Ridge, ‘Reasons for Action: Neutral vs. Relative’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/reasons-agent/> (2017). Indeed, as I stressed at the end of section I, the significant mark of agent-relativity is whether or not the reason-defining predicate (not the act or event to be promoted) contains an essential reference to the agent for whom it is a reason.

⁷ Broome, , ‘Skorupski on Agent-Neutrality’, Utilitas 7 (1995), pp. 315–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 315. Broome's actual predicate reads: ‘that the act gives an expected benefit to an agent who does φ’. Again, I have amended the predicate to remain consistent.

⁸ Broome, ‘Skorupski’, p. 315.

⁹ Parfit, Reasons, p. 104.

¹⁰ Broome, ‘Skorupski’, p. 317.

¹¹ Skorupski, ‘Neutral Versus’, pp. 237–8.

¹² Skorupski, ‘Neutral Versus’, p. 237.

¹³ Nagel, Possibility, p. 90.

¹⁴ Nagel is explicitly clear that he has this kind of existential quantification in mind (Possibility, p. 92).

¹⁵ Nagel, Possibility, pp. 91, 93.

¹⁶ Nagel, Possibility, pp. vii–viii, pp. 96–7. The original claim was that all agent-relative reasons had to be subsumed under their agent-neutral counterparts, although Nagel eventually abandoned this idea in light of objections raised by Sturgeon, Nicholas (‘Altruism, Solipsism, and the Objectivity of Reasons’, Philosophical Review 83 (1974), pp. 374–402CrossRefGoogle Scholar) and Darwall, Stephen (‘Nagel's Argument for Altruism’, Philosophical Studies 25 (1974), pp. 125–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Impartial Reason (Ithaca, 1983)). The idea was that the agent who acknowledges only agent-relative reasons is committed to a practical version of solipsism called dissociation: an ‘inability to make practical judgements about other persons in the same sense in which one can make them in one's own case’ (Possibility, p. 107). Unless another agent's reasons have motivational content for yourself from an impersonal (agent-neutral) standpoint, then you cannot recognize them as a practical agent in the same sense that you recognize yourself as a practical agent. Moreover, because you're simply a mere agent amongst others, you would also be unable to recognize your own reality from that impersonal standpoint. Understood in this way, the requirement of agent-neutrality is functioning as a formalized version of Rawls's veil of ignorance, accompanied by a Sidgwickian conception of objectivity (Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, rev edn. (Harvard, 1999), pp. 118–22Google Scholar; Sidgwick, Henry, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis, 1874/1981), pp. xxGoogle Scholar, 82, 420; Tollefsen, Christopher, ‘Sidgwickian Objectivity and Ordinary Morality’, The Journal of Value Enquiry 33 (1999), pp. 57–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thomas, Alan, Thomas Nagel (Acumen, 2009), pp. 126–8Google Scholar). Again, if you take yourself to have agent-relative reasons to do anything at all, then you must be able to understand these reasons as not, essentially, your own. From the ‘Point of View of the Universe’, you must also recognize an agent-neutral reason for anyone (including yourself) to promote what the reason applies to (Possibility, pp. 16–17).

¹⁷ This includes doing nothing. If an agent is not in a position to do anything to promote the occurrence of the event in question, then they should, at least, desire that the event occur (Possibility, p. 91).

¹⁸ An obvious objection to this point is that the agent-neutral counterpart reason generated by (9) can, in fact, be satisfactorily defined in terms of reason to do an act. Compare:

Nevertheless, in so far as (12) directs a given agent to perform some unspecified action-type which promotes y’s doing φ (the specified action-type), the requirement of the reason cannot be satisfactorily defined in terms of giving an agent reason to directly perform the action-type in question. Again, if the reason were characterized in such a way, then the counterpart would not reflect the possibility of altruism. Recall:

I thank the anonymous reviewer for raising this concern.

¹⁹ It's worth reiterating that the dissociation argument was eventually abandoned (Possibility, p. vii; View, p. 159). I emphasize this because it reveals that the distinction was originally designed to undertake some substantive theoretical work, i.e. it formed the essential part of Nagel's argument for altruism. Within the latter context of The View from Nowhere, the idea that agent-relative reasons have to be subsumed under their agent-neutral counterparts is not explored. Indeed, the distinction is introduced simply as a distinction between the way reasons can vary in their relativity to the agent, where both agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons are characterized, symmetrically, in terms of reasons for anyone to do or want something (View, pp. 152–3).

²⁰ Nagel, View, p. 175.

²¹ Nagel, Possibility, p. 45, n. 1.

²² McNaughton, David and Rawling, Piers, ‘Agent-Relativity and the Doing–Happening Distinction’, Philosophical Studies 63 (1992), pp. 167–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘Value and Agent-Relative Reasons’, Utilitas 7 (1995), pp. 31–47; ‘Agent-Relativity and Terminological Inexactitudes’, Utilitas 7 (1995), pp. 319–25; ‘Deontology’, The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, ed. David Copp (Oxford, 2009), ch. 15; Portmore, Douglas W., ‘Agent-Centred Restrictions’, International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. LaFolette, Hugh (2013)Google Scholar).

²³ Nagel, View, p. 187.

²⁴ Indeed, Nagel once declared: ‘[T]he principle of agent-neutrality does not automatically yield a species of utilitarianism, or some other counterintuitive principle as the method for deciding interpersonal conflicts. The requirement of agent-neutrality demands that full weight be accorded to the distinction between persons and to the irreducible significance of lives’ (Possibility, p. 41). There may well be utilitarians who insist there is simply one agent-neutral reason for anyone and everyone to do what has a propensity to maximize aggregate utility. But the plausibility of such a position will need to be argued for independently – perhaps via the idea that practical rationality is instrumental and maximizing. Utilitarianism is not a corollary of the formal condition of agent-neutrality, nor is it an inherent feature of any kind of reason for action. Although Nagel is guilty of encouraging this reading by insisting in later works that agent-neutrality is inherently tied to the utilitarian's minimizing/maximizing rationale: ‘Agent-neutral values are the values of certain occurrences or states of affairs which give everyone a reason to promote or prevent them. If murder is bad in an agent-neutral sense, for example, it means everyone has a reason to try and minimize the overall number of murders, independent of who commits them – and this might in some circumstances mean murdering a few people to prevent the murder of a large number. But if, on the other hand, murder is wrong in an agent-relative sense, this means each agent is required not to commit murder himself, and nothing is directly implied about what he must do to prevent murders by others’ (‘Personal Rights and Public Space’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 24 (1995), pp. 83–107, at 87–8). But, again, like agent-neutral reasons, there's nothing inherently utilitarian about agent-neutral value. Utilitarianism is found only in how one is disposed or required to respond to value. The idea that a value, itself, could be utilitarian is an odd one to say the least.

²⁵ Skorupski, , Ethical Explorations (Oxford, 1999), p. 53Google Scholar.

²⁶ McNaughton and Rawling (and Portmore) formulate an alternative version of the distinction specifically to accommodate the putative notion of author agent-relative constraints and utilitarianized agent-neutral reasons. In fact, the purpose of their reformulation is an attempt to demonstrate that Nagel (and Philip Pettit) cannot accommodate author agent-relativity. My own view is that author-relative reasons are not agent-relative reasons. Granted, one may wish to defend an author-relative rationale for the existence of constraints, but this will not align meaningfully with a non-utilitarianized (pre-theoretical) notion of an agent-neutral reason. There is already a distinction between deontological and utilitarian reasons, and it is just that.

²⁷ Nagel, View, p. 187.

²⁸ Nagel, View, p. 179. Notice that the doctrine of double effect encompasses a different agency rationale than the (author) agent-relative account. The central feature of the author agent-relative account is that the requirement that one not violate a deontological constraint is more stringent than a demand to prevent violations. The significance of agency associated to the doctrine of double effect, however, is that it is impermissible for an agent to intentionally violate a constraint in order to secure some greater good. As it stands, the author agent-relative account of agency makes no appeal to intention (see Brooke, Richard, ‘Agency and Morality’, The Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991), pp. 190–212CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

²⁹ Nagel, View, p. 184.

³⁰ See Mack, Eric, ‘Deontological Restrictions Are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions’, Social Philosophy & Policy 15 (1998), pp. 61–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³¹ Nagel, ‘Personal Rights’, p. 89; cf. McNaughton, David and Rawling, Piers, ‘On Defending Deontology’, Ratio 11 (1998), pp. 37–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³² This may be to avoid the so-called ‘paradox of deontology’: the idea that one is not permitted to violate a restriction even when its violation prevents further violations of the same type by others (or oneself). But this idea is paradoxical only if the advocate of deontic constraints accepts that the disvalue or objectionable property of their violation is to be minimized in the first place.

³³ Skorupski, Explorations, p. 52.

³⁴ Skorupski, Explorations, p. 52.

³⁵ Skorupski, ‘Neutral Versus’, p. 241, n. 6.

³⁶ Skorupski, Explorations, p. 60, n. 23.

³⁷ Skorupski, Domain, p. 64.

³⁸ Only recently has Skorupski identified the fact-based distinction and the predicate-based distinction as ‘equivalent’ alternatives (Domain, pp. 61, 63). In earlier works, the predicate-based distinction and the fact-based distinction are not explicitly distinguished (‘Neutral Versus’, pp. 244–8; Explorations, ch. 3).

³⁹ Skorupski, Domain, pp. 60–1. The ontological status of these facts needn't concern us, though we can note that Skorupski subscribes to a ‘nominal’ conception of reason-giving facts, taking them to be sui generis, abstract entities standing in a ‘one–one’ relation to true propositions, rather than ontologically substantive entities qua obtaining states of affairs (Domain, pp. 61–3; cf. Rønnow-Rasmussen, Personal, ch. 9; ‘Reasons and Two Kinds of Fact’, Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (2012), pp. 95–113; cf. Buckland, ‘Normative Reasons’).

⁴⁰ Skorupski, Domain, p. 62. Philip Pettit draws the distinction in a similar way. The idea is that agent-relative reasons are propositions that essentially involve pronominal back-reference to the agent for whom they are reasons. In each instance, the motivating consideration (the reason-giving fact or principle) involves essential reference to him or his (‘Universalizability without Utilitarianism’, Mind 96 (1987), pp. 74–82, at 75; ‘The Paradox of Loyalty’, American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1988), pp. 163–171, at 165).

⁴¹ The same is applicable in third-person cases.

⁴² Skorupski, Explorations, p. 60, n. 23.

⁴³ Skorupski, Explorations, p. 60.

⁴⁴ I've not discussed McNaughton and Rawling's version of the distinction in great detail here (nor Portmore's). However, I will say that any reason one might have for favouring their version of the distinction over the distinction I have outlined above will be circular: in order to give preference to their version of the distinction you must first accept that the rationale for deontic constraints is both author agent-relative and agent-focused. In this sense, their distinction amounts to a theoretically loaded distinction between author agent-relativity and utilitarian agent-neutrality. And, as we've already seen, author agent-relativity is a controversial notion in itself, and there is nothing inherently utilitarian about agent-neutrality.

⁴⁵ Skorupski, ‘Neutral Versus’, p. 242; Explorations, p. 56; cf. McNaughton and Rawling, ‘Inexactitudes’; Portmore, , Commonsense Consequentialism (Oxford, 2013)Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Notice that this goes against the traditional view that agent-neutral theories give agents shared aims, whereas agent-relative theories give agents distinct aims. In both cases, our reasons may vary; after all, what maximizes my utility may not maximize yours. Nevertheless, qua egoists we both share the same substantive and ultimate agent-relative aim of maximizing our own utility.

⁴⁷ Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Beck, Lewis White (New York, 1956), p. 65Google Scholar; Skorupski, Explorations, p. 55.

⁴⁸ Cf. Ridge, ‘Neutral vs. Relative’; cf. Huckfelt, Vaughn, ‘Categorical and Agent-Neutral Reasons in Kantian Justifications of Morality’, Philosophia 35 (2007), pp. 23–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁹ Skorupski has suggested that the categorical imperative is an agent-neutral principle because the end it posits is rational nature (‘Autonomy and Impartiality: Groundwork III’, Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, ed. Jens Timmerman (Cambridge, 2009), ch. 9, p. 176). Now, we might agree that each agent's end is rational nature. However, as far as Kant is concerned, it's necessary to stress that the agent is specifically concerned with acting in accordance with those maxims which she can will to become universal laws. In this instance, such reference to the agent's willing is far from trivial – it is the object of moral concern. Kant's concern is with the autonomy of the practical agent, and their ability to act on those reasons which they, qua particular individual, have first-personally endorsed. However, we should also note the fact that a maxim can be willed as a universal law just means it is permissible, and, intuitively, the fact that something is permissible entails only the absence of a reason – that there is no decisive moral reason to refrain from performing it. Moral permissibility alone entails no positive reason to perform the action.

⁵⁰ I am grateful to Richard Rowland and the two anonymous referees for Utilitas for extremely helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. Additionally, thanks are owed to Jonathan Dancy, Brad Hooker, Max de Gaynesford, Philip Stratton-Lake and Alan Thomas for helpful discussion on work from which this article was derived.