¹ Why choose steelworkers, even though their work regime is not entirely similar to that of coal miners? As mentioned, they are located in the same regions and communities. Second, the two production processes are linked, since coking coal is a major component of steelmaking; steelworkers were thus directly affected by the coal strikes, as well as more generally by the economic downturn. More importantly, steelworkers, like miners, were at the core of the once privileged Soviet proletariat, comprising a major part of the country's coal and steel economy. If the miners were to form a “workers' movement,” as they professed to be doing, they understood that steelworkers had to play an integral role.

² For a particularly useful review of the literature, see Marshall, Gordon, “Some Remarks on the Study of Working Class Consciousness,” Polities and Society 12, no. 3 (1983Google Scholar).

³ Kerr, Clark and Siegel, Abraham, “The Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike,” in Kerr, , ed., Labor and Management in Industrial Society (Garden City, N.Y.:Anchor Books, 1964), 109Google Scholar, 111; Martin Lipset, Seymour, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, enlarged, ed. (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981Google Scholar); Lockwood, David, “Sources of Variation in Working-Class Images of Society,” Sociological Review 14 (November 1966CrossRefGoogle Scholar). This perspective has met with a good deal of criticism, for its highly structural nature, for its assumption that radicalism develops in isolation rather than in interaction with other perspectives and ideas, and for the fact that the interindustry propensity to strike has varied greatly over time. However, the Soviet case would seem to provide another example supporting the thesis of the isolated community. Edwards, Paul K., “A Critique of the Kerr-Siegel Hypothesis of Strikes and the Isolated Mass: A Study in the Falsification of Sociological Knowledge,” Sociological Review 25 (August 1977CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Shorter, Edward and Tilly, Charles, Strikes in France, 1830–1968 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1974), esp. 287Google Scholar—95; Cronin, James E., “Theories of Strikes: Why Can't They Explain the British Experience?” Journal of Social History 12, no. 2Google Scholar (1978–79); Kimmeldorf, Howard, Reds or Rackets? The Making of Radical and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1988), 13–15Google Scholar. For recent support of the isolated community thesis, see the discussion in Szymanski, Albert, The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class (Cambridge, Mass.:Winthrop, 1977Google Scholar), chap. 3.

⁴ Gurr, Ted Robert, Why Men Rebel (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1979Google Scholar).

⁵ Shorter, and Tilly, (fn. 3); Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.:Addison-Wesley, 1978Google Scholar).

⁶ Yarrow, Michael, The Labor Process in Coal Mining: The Struggle for Control,” in Zimbalist, Andrew, ed., Case Studies in the Labor Process (New York:Monthly Review Press, 1979Google Scholar), 187; see also Shorter and Tilly (fn. 3), 13.

⁷ Kerr and Siegel (fn. 3), 110.

⁸ Szymanski (fn. 3), 63; see also Lipset (fn. 3), 252. For Marx, see “Revolution and Counter Revolution in Germany,” in Selected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969Google Scholar). For some empirical support, see Hamilton, Richard F., Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1967), 205CrossRefGoogle Scholar–28.

⁹ Shorter and Tilly (fn. 3), 15. Hardin, Russell, Collective Action (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 222Google Scholar–23.

¹⁰ See the discussion of alternative views on Soviet industrial relations in Rutland, Peter, “Labor Unrest and Movements in 1989 and 1990,” Soviet Economy (December 1990), 193Google Scholar–95.

¹¹ Godson, Joseph and Shapiro, Leonard, eds., The Soviet Worker (London:MacMillan, 1981Google Scholar).

¹² Connor, Walter, The Accidental Proletariat (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1991CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Cook, Linda J., “Brezhnev's ‘Social Contract’ and Gorbachev's Reforms,” Soviet Studies 44, no. 1 (1992CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Ludlam, Janine, “Reform and the Redefinition of the Social Contract under Gorbachev,” World Politics 43 (January 1991CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Hauslohner, Peter, “Gorbachev's Social Contract,” Soviet Economy 3, no. 1 (1987Google Scholar); Breslauer, George, “On the Adaptability of Soviet Welfare-State Authoritarianism,” in Hoffman, Erik and Laird, Robin F., eds., The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era (New York Aldine, 1984Google Scholar); White, Stephen, “Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy,” World Politics 38 (April 1986CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

¹³ Beyond the fact that this was a contract that was never negotiated, let alone ratified, by the two parties, there is a deeper problem. Within this conception, there is no theory of the power of the social groups, such as workers, that could explain why they were the “winners” in this bargain, other than “the regime's de facto preference for certain groups’ interests over others.” Hauslohner (fn. 12), 59.

¹⁴ Rutland (fn. 10); Friedgut, Theodore and Siegelbaum, Lewis, “Perestroika from Below. The Soviet Miners’ Strike and Its Aftermath,” New Left Review, no. 181 (Summer 1990Google Scholar); Crowley, Stephen, “From Coal to Steel: The Formation of an Independent Workers’ Movement in the Soviet Union, 1989–1991” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1993Google Scholar).

¹⁵ See Burawoy, Michael and Krotov, Pavel, “The Soviet Transition from Socialism to Capitalism: Worker Control and Economic Bargaining in the Wood Industry,” American Sociological Review 57 (February 1992CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Burawoy, and Lukacs, Janos, The Radiant Past: Ideology and Reality in Hungary's Road to Capitalism (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1992Google Scholar); Burawoy, , The Politics of Production (London:Verso Press, 1985Google Scholar); Stark, David, “Organizational Innovation in Hungary's Emerging Mixed Economy,” in Stark, and Nee, Victor, eds., Remaking the Economic Institutions (Palo Alto, Calif.:Stanford University Press, 1989Google Scholar); idem, “Rethinking Internal Labor Markets: New Insights from a Comparative Perspective,” American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (1986), 492–504CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ Kornai, , The Economics of Shortage (Amsterdam:North Holland, 1980Google Scholar). See the summary of his work in David Stark and Victor Nee, “Toward an Institutional Analysis of State Socialism,” in Stark and Nee (fn. 15), 16–20.

¹⁷ Hirschman, Albert, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and states (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1970Google Scholar). For a slightly different application of this concept, see Stark and Nee (fn. 16); and Bergsten, George and Bova, Russell, “Worker Power under Communism: The Interplay of Exit and Voice,” Comparative Economic Studies 32 (Spring 1990Google Scholar).

¹⁸ Such paternalism is not unique to this particular time and place. The company town of American history and the currentJapanese enterprise are but two other examples. There are important differences, however. In the Japanese context, for instance, the employee has access, depending on the wage level, to a range of alternatives through consumer markets. Given the shortages in state socialist economies, such alternatives have been greatly limited. See also Walder, Andrew, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1986), 15—17Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Walder (fn. 18).

²⁰ See Walder, Andrew, “Factory and Manager in an Era of Reform,” China Quarterly, no. 118 (June 1989CrossRefGoogle Scholar), esp. 249—53. It should be noted, however, that because of continued unemployment rather than a labor shortage, Chinese workers have not been able to leave one job for another, a major strength of workers in the enterprises examined here. Thus, Chinese workers have had neither exit nor voice, though they have used what Scott calls “the weapons of the weak.” Scott, James C., Weapons of the Weak Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1985Google Scholar).

²¹ This mutual dependence is also suggested by the term “plan-fulfillment pact.” See Voskamp, Ulrich and Witkke, Volker, “Industrial Restructuring in the Former German Democratic Republic,” Politics and Society 19 (September 1991CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Burawoy and Krotov (fn. 15).

²² Kalmyk, V. and Sil'chenko, T., “Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaia obuslovennost’ otnosheniiek mestu raboty,” in Antosenkov, E. and Kalmyk, V., eds., Otnosheniek Trudui Tekuchest’ Kadrov (Work attitudes and labor turnover) (Novosibirsk:Institut Ekonomikii Organizatsii Promyshlennoyo Proizvodstva, 1970Google Scholar).

²³ See Osterman, Paul, ed., Internal Labor Markets (Cambridge:MIT Press, 1984Google Scholar); Althauser, Robert and Kalleberg, Arne, “Firms, Occupations and the Structure of Labor Markets,” in Berg, Ivar, ed., Sociological Perspectives on Labor Markets (New York:Academic Press, 1981Google Scholar); Doeringer, Peter and Piroe, Michael J., Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis (Lexington, Mass.:Heath, 1971Google Scholar).

²⁴ Hardin (fn. 9); Taylor, Michael, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1987Google Scholar).

²⁵ Regarding workers’ collective action specifically, see Przeworski, Adam, “Marxism and Rational Choice,” Politics and Society 14, no. 4 (1985CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Offe, Claus and Wiesenthal, Helmut, Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational Forms,” in Zeitlin, Maurice, ed., Political Power and Social Theory, vol. 1 (Greenwich, Conn.:JAI Press, 1980Google Scholar); Johnson, James, “Symbolic Action and the Limits of Strategic Rationality: On the Logic of Working-Class Collective Action,” in Zeitlin, Maurice, ed., Political Power and Social Theory, vol. 7 (Greenwich, Conn.:JAI Press, 1986Google Scholar); Elster, Jon, Ulysses and the Sirens (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1984Google Scholar); Crouch, Colin, Trade Unions: The Logic of Collective Action (London:Fontana, 1982Google Scholar).

²⁶ Indeed, the stakes are quite high on both sides. Even as the miners clearly gained through their strikes, managers did not lose profits; they did lose their jobs, however, as the miners often removed the old bosses and elected their own.

²⁷ Connor (fn. 12), 137.

²⁸ Friedgut, Theodore, Iuzovka and Revolution, vol. 1 (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1989CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

²⁹ While open-hearth furnaces produced only 7 percent of the steel in the United States in 1985 and none were being used in Japan and West Germany, the Soviet Union continued to rely on them for more than half of its steel production. Rumer, Boris, Soviet Steel: The Challenge of Industrial Modernization in the USSR (Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 1989), 64Google Scholar.

³⁰ Rumer (fn. 29), 54.

³¹ For instance, the workers’ council of the Donetskii plant wrote to ask the miners to return to work because “the working class of steelworkers” would otherwise lose their pay and privileges. Kuzbass, July 18,1989.

³² In a chapter entitled “New Cities: The Politics of Company Towns,” William Taubman refers to the more than one thousand cities built in the Soviet Union since the 1917 revolution, most of which “have been born and raised as Soviet-style company towns, in the shadow of one industrial establishment or with several establishments dividing responsibility or competing for control.” These enterprises provide “housing and whatever meager services” there are. See Taubman, , Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic Politics and Urban Development in the USSR (New York:Praeger, 1973), 54Google Scholar.

³³ Metallurg, August 19, 1989.

³⁴ Director Sledenev was subsequently elected to the higher legislative body, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

³⁵ Metallurg Zapsiba, July 11, 1989.

³⁶ Burawoy and Krotov (fn. 15) provide evidence of shops being pitted against each other in the wood industry (pp. 25–28).

³⁷ Metallurgy July 26, 1989.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Metallurg Zapsiba, October 11,1989.

⁴⁰ Ibid., November 23,1989; author interview with AR and BM, deputy chairs of the trade union committee at Donetskii, Donetsk, July 2, 1992. Why did workers at West Siberian, where management had more resources, succeed in establishing a single line while those at Donetskii failed? Managers may have had more resources, but workers had greater countervailing resources as well. First, the labor shortage was more severe in Siberia than in Ukraine. And second, West Siberian was potentially profitable on the market, giving workers a positive incentive to organize, whereas at Donetskii everyone realized that the plant was going to remain dependent on state subsidies.

⁴¹ Metallurg Zapsiba, July 13, 1990.

⁴² Ibid., February 10, 1990.

⁴³ Interview with AR and BM (fn. 40); Metallurg Zapsiba, September 4, 1993. Walder (fn. 20) notes that managers in China have behaved in the same fashion, increasing rather than decreasing their efforts to provide benefits to their workforce in the face of market forces (pp. 249—53).

⁴⁴ Metallurg, August 5, 1989.

⁴⁵ Ibid., October 25, 1989.

⁴⁶ Ibid., for how another delegate to the same conference put it:

Frankly speaking, it pains me that you have organized this conference as if it were ten to fifteen years ago. We don't talk about the sore points here. We won't revolt, if we find out that apartments are being given to Afghan war invalids ahead of the line, that a vacation trip in short supply [defitsitnaya] is being given to a steel founder, a furnace worker or a rolling mill operator. But we demand the just distribution of social goods. We need glasnost here, so that all will know, who obtained what. ... I think we've ruined this conference.

⁴⁷ Metallurg Zapsiba, October 10,1990. The Central Council of the once official steelworkers union has since declared itself independent from the central trade union confederation (FNPR) and has allied itself with the independent miners union. Koval'skaya, Galina, Svobodnie Profsoyuzi Rossii (Free trade unions of Russia) (Moscow:Allegro Press, 1993), 8–12Google Scholar. But this was a decision made by the top union leadership in Moscow, on the level of the enterprise, little has changed.

⁴⁸ Were the miners actually better off after striking, or were steelworkers actually smart to avoid striking, with all its attendant problems? While the miners’ successes were certainly uneven, they clearly gained from their strikes in several fundamental ways. First, they gained greater control over their workplace. Second, they gained greater political and economic changes, first in the Soviet Union and later in the newly independent states. Other workers have been represented by the former state trade unions or management. Finally, the material position of miners, while hardly ideal, has improved, at least relative to that of other workers. In addition to greater control over intraenterprise benefits, wage increases have outpaced even the astronomical rates of inflation in Russia and Ukraine, so much so that subsidies to the coal industry alone (before recent efforts to raise coal prices in Russia) were absorbing 20 percent of Russian state revenues and accounted for nearly 33 percent of the state budget in Ukraine. Izvestiia, May 8, 1993, cited in RFE/RL Daily Report, May 11, 1993; Moscow News, June 18,1993.

⁴⁹ He continued, “Perestroika, you say? I have a family, children, grandchildren. They want to go away for the summer. What can you say? Daddy told the boss he didn't like how he was being treated, so this year and for the next couple of years no one is going anywhere.” Kotkin, Stephen, Steeltown, USSR (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1991), 28–30Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Travma, “Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, no. 7 (1989), 17.

⁵¹ Kuzbass, July 13, 1989; Argumentyi Fakty, no. 30 (1989).

⁵² Kostyukovskii, Viktor, Kuzbass: Zharkoe leto 89-ogo (The Kuzbass: The hot summer of 1989) (Moscow: Sovremmenik, 1990), 26Google Scholar. Subsidies to the branch in 1988 were reportedly 5.4 billion rubles and in 1989 a billion more.

⁵³ Reflecting on this very question, Burawoy produces a complex argument to explain why steelworkers did not follow the example of coal miners. First, as basic goods producers in a supply-constrained economy, miners had been privileged by the state but lost their privileged position with pere-stroika. Second, steelworkers were able to avoid a similar decline by shifting their product profile, thus experienced an exaggerated form of “workers’ control” over production, which contrasted more sharply with their exploitation by the state. Burawoy, , “The End of Sovietology and the Renaissance of Modernization Theory,” Contemporary Sociology 21 (November 1992), 780–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This argument breaks down on each point, however: the steel industry in the former Soviet Union has suffered dramatically during the overall decline in production; changing one's product profile is no longer valid given the lack of state orders and the glut on the steel market; and the miners’ political militancy toward the state was a product of their strike activity and subsequent organization rather than a precursor to it. On this last point, see Crowley (fn. 14).

⁵⁴ Kostyukovskii (fn. 51), 62. Mines were doubly disadvantaged in terms of social infrastructure. First, a mine has a definite life span. Unlike an industrial factory that theoretically can be continually modernized, there is less incentive to sink capital into permanent infrastructure such as housing or cultural and educational facilities in a mining settlement. Second, many mining communities are indeed isolated, and while this in itself does not breed radicalism as the isolated community thesis maintains, it does mean there is less social infrastructure than in a larger city. Indeed, the differences in the living conditions for miners and steelworkers in the Donbass were evident from its initial industrialization over a hundred years ago. See Friedgut (fn. 28).

⁵⁵ The numbers are even worse for Donetsk when the number of marriages and thus presumably the number of new housing applicants is compared with the number of new housing units built; then Donetsk was twenty-fifth. Morton, Henry, “The Contemporary Soviet City,” in Morton, and Stuart, Robert, eds., The Contemporary Soviet City (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁶ Metallurg Zapsiba, November 7, 1989.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Westergaard, John H., “The Rediscovery of the Cash Nexus,” The Socialist Register 1970 (London: Merlin Press, 1970), esp. 120—21Google Scholar. Thus miners in Vorkuta, of Russia's Far North, were drawn from other parts of the Soviet Union in the hope that savings from high wages would allow them to buy a home and retire in Russia's temperate South. Inflation immediately wiped out those plans. See “In Russia's Far North, Inflation Destroys a Dream,” Moscow Times, March 3,1993Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Connor (fn. 12), 172.

⁵⁹ Thus, although important, wages represented only one component of an overall compensation package. Both steelworkers and miners demanded wage increases. The Hungarian experience suggests that the preference for wages versus in-kind benefits varies with the scope of the consumer market. In Hungary many years of economic reform created a more advanced market for consumer goods and services, and consequently wages were valued above enterprise emoluments. See Stark (fn. 15, 1986); Burawoy and Lukacs (fn. 15). Given prices out of the reach of many consumers, this has not yet occurred in Russia.

⁶⁰ Eldridge, John E. T., Industrial Disputes: Essays in the Sociology of Industrial Relations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968)Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Stone, , “The Origin of Job Structures in the Steel Industry,” Review of Radical Political Economics 6 (Summer 1974), 156Google Scholar.

⁶² On the creation of a ripple effect as a way out of the collective action problem, see Chamberlin, John, “Provisions of Collective Goods as a Function of Group Size,” American Political Science Review 68 (June 1974), 707–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶³ Author interview with Oleg Semyenov, Novokuznetsk, May 3, 1991.

⁶⁴ In this last category, some mines provided coal to local metallurgical and power plants. The phrase that some mines were working “with the blessing of the strike committee” may have been a way for both the particular mines and the strike committee to save face given the less than full participation in the strike.

⁶⁵ For more on the Zasiad'ko mine, see Stephen Crowley and Lewis Siegelbaum, “Survival Strategies: The Miners of Donetsk in the Post-Soviet Era” (Manuscript, 1993). The following paragraph is largely drawn from that paper.

⁶⁶ Verchernyi Donetsk, April 17, 1991Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ Ibid. A Siberian mine with a similar history and paternalistic scope is described by Biziukov, Petr and Clarke, Simon, “Privatization in Russia: The Road to a People's Capitalism?” Monthly Review (November 1992)Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ Author interview with Yurii Gerol'd, Moscow, February 27, 1991; Nasha Gazeta, February 20, 1990.

⁶⁹ There were no cases that I found, in the central, regional, or local press, or during fieldwork, where miners broke such a significant contract arrangement to strike.

⁷⁰ Linda Cook, “Labor's Response to the Soviet Post-Communist Transition” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1992).

⁷¹ Regarding a different social consequence of the shortage economy, see Verdery, Katherine, “Nationalism and Nationalist Sentiment in Post-socialist Romania,” Slavic Review 52 (Summer 1993), 182—83CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Trade unions in Bulgaria and Romania have been transformed from above, without widespread collective action (outside mining and a few other sectors) from below.

⁷² A full accounting of the rise of Solidarity is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Among the other factors present in Poland and not in the Soviet Union were nationalism and the experience of previous worker uprisings; all contributed not only to workers uniting but also to workers uniting with other classes. See Laba, Roman, The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working-Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Kennedy, Michael, Professionals, Power Solidarity in Poland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In Hungary, where little collective worker activity occurred even as shortages decreased as a result of market reform, workers continued to pursue individual strategies in seeking to take advantage of the consumer market—a reminder that the market also presents obstacles to workers’ collective action.

⁷³ One clear analogy with the steel enterprises discussed here are the company towns of early capitalism. Ironically, however, whereas enterprise dependence in the former Soviet Union appears to be a case of a bloated welfare state, it was the establishment of the welfare state in capitalist societies that finally ended the worker's near total dependence on the employer. By guaranteeing a minimum standard of living regardless of one's work performance, the welfare state ended the employer's direct control over the reproduction of the labor force. See Burawoy (fn. 15), 125—26.

⁷⁴ To call such items “selective incentives” is misleading in at least two respects: they were originally intended not to retain members in the trade union, but rather to keep workers in the enterprise, and they have become the primary service these organizations provide. On the term “selective incentives” as applied to trade union membership, see Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977)Google Scholar; and the critical discussion in Crouch (fn. 25).

⁷⁵ On the corporatist bent of these trade unions, see Cook (fn. 70).

⁷⁶ According to the official trade union chair at one Donbass mine, “At first the NPG . . . pushed aside health issues, daily life concerns, and all the rest. But now the NPG takes care of everything up to trade and the distribution of foodstuffs, that is, those things for which the NPG leaders always cursed us.” Pozitsiia, May 6–12, 1992, p. 1Google Scholar. The same appears to be true in Vorkuta. See Burawoy, Michael and Krotov, Pavel, “The Economic Basis of Russia's Political Crisis,” New Left Review, no. 198 (March-April 1993), 60–64Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ This was certainly the case in Donetsk in the summer of 1992 and Novokuznetsk in the fall of 1993. This is especially so since the barter economy provides workers in privileged sectors with scarce consumer goods rather than high wages. See Crowley and Siegelbaum (fn. 65).

⁷⁸ Walder (fn. 20), esp. 249–53.

⁷⁹ As of this writing it is too early to tell whether the latest Russian elections have sent fewer enterprise managers to parliament. Preliminary analysis by the author suggests that managers have indeed used their resources to elect, if not themselves, then at least like-minded representatives.

⁸⁰ Interview with AR and BM (fn. 40). The director of the Zasiad'ko mine mentioned above first used his economic position to be elected a member of the Ukrainian parliament, was later elected mayor of Donetsk, and from there was appointed prime minister of Ukraine.

⁸¹ Clarke, Simon, “Privatization and the Development of Capitalism in Russia,” New Left Review, no. 196 (November-December 1992)Google Scholar.

⁸² Indeed, as the miners’ experience shows, the ability of managers to control such institutions is not absolute. Thus managers must carefully balance a paternalism that on the one hand ensures their continued control and on the other hand does not provoke concerted action by workers that could remove them from office.

⁸³ The work of economic historian Douglass North makes one cautious about predicting the rapid demise of such institutions, no matter how revolutionary the change in economic structures or even property rights. See North, , Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.