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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
The two studies under review were issued in the series of the Library of Policy Sciences, edited by Harold D. Lasswell and Saul K. Padover, and are concerned with different areas of knowledge about communications. Sykewar presents the first detailed description of the activities and operations of the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF. The evaluations may not be definitive, but Dr. Lerner, a former intelligence officer in PWD, has made an important contribution toward codifying the lessons learned in this policy field.
1 Among the accounts written by former participants which were intended as, or have value for, analytical evaluation are the following: Becker, Howard, “Nature and Consequences of Black Propaganda,” American Sociological Review, XIV, No. 2 (April 1949)Google Scholar; Carroll, Wallace, Persuade or Perish, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1948Google ScholarPubMed; Doob, Leonard W., “The Utilization of Social Scientists in the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information,” American Political Science Review, XLI, No. 4 (August 1947)Google Scholar; Gurfein, Murray I. and Janowitz, Morris, “Trends in Wehrmacht Morale,” Public Opinion Quarterly, X, No. 1 (Spring 1946)Google Scholar; Herz, Martin F., “Some Psychological Lessons from Leaflet Propaganda in World War II,” Public Opinion Quarterly, XIII, No. 3 (Fall 1949)Google Scholar; Kris, Ernst and Leites, Nathan, “Trends in Twentieth Century Propaganda,” in Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences, Vol. I, ed. by Róheim, Géza, New York, International Universities Press, 1947Google Scholar (reprinted in Reader in Public Opinion and Communication, ed. by Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz, Glencoe, 111., Free Press, 1950); Leighton, Alexander L., Human Relations in a Changing World, New York, Dutton, 1949Google Scholar; Linebarger, Paul M. A., Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Infantry Journal Press, 1948Google Scholar; Bruce Lockhart, R. H., Comes the Reckoning, London, Putnam, 1947Google Scholar; Padover, Saul K., Experiment in Germany, New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946Google Scholar; Shils, Edward A. and Janowitz, Morris, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” Public Opinion Quarterly, XII, No. 2 (Summer 1948)Google Scholar; Speier, Hans, “The Future of Psychological Warfare,” Public Opinion Quarterly, XII, No. 1 (Spring 1948)Google Scholar; Speier, Hans, “War Aims in Political Warfare,” Social Research, XII, No. 2 (May 1945)Google Scholar; Thomson, C. A. H., Overseas Information Service of the United States Government, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1948Google Scholar; Zacharias, Ellis M., Secret Missions, New York, Putnam, 1946.Google Scholar See also forthcoming books by Henry V. Dicks, Love, Money and War; Arthur T. Hadley, Battle Propaganda; and a volume by Cedric Belfrage.
2 See Lerner, pp. 213, 291, and 340; cf. also the account by Martin F. Herz (loc. cit.), who was instrumental in developing the Passierschein.
3 Lerner relies heavily upon the account supplied by Arthur T. Hadley, a leading PWD specialist in this field, whose forthcoming book, Battle Propaganda, promises to be illuminating.
4 Cf. Shils and Janowitz, loc. cit.
5 Cf. also Lerner's remarks on techniques of “indirection” and “logical argument,” pp. 200–203, 210–11.
6 Wallace Carroll's Persuade or Perish, cited above, is more illuminating in this respect with reference to OWI's operations.
7 The papers in Part II were contributed by Raymond Fadner, Joseph M. Goldsen, Alan Grey, Irving L. Janis, Abraham Kaplan, David Kaplan, Harold D. Lasswell, and Alexander Mintz.
8 Such an appraisal is provided in part in the excellent note, “Content Analysis: A New Evidentiary Technique,” University of Chicago Laiv Review, XV, No. 4 (Summer 1948), pp. 910–25.
9 A possible exception to this is the “parallel test” used in the Pelley case (pp. 180–92); it is not clear from materials cited whether an inference was made or whether the Nazi propaganda themes were used simply as standards for evaluating Pelley's performance.
10 University of Chicago Law Review, XV, 925.
11 The results of the “distortion test” were not presented in court; cf. p. 393 n.
12 Smith, , Lasswell, , and Casey, , Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1946, p. 76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
13 A. Geller, D. Kaplan, and H. D. Lasswell, “The Differential Use of Flexible and Rigid Procedures of Content Analysis,” Document 12, March 1, 1943, pp. 1–2.
14 The considerable methodological difficulties encountered in attempting to describe semantical meanings are not minimized by Janis. The validity of the content descriptive results can be indirectly tested, according to Janis, by attempting to establish relationships between content descriptive results and the conditions of content (or between different content characteristics). The greater the number and degree of such relationships, the greater the indirect evidence of validity of description. Disturbing in this recommendation, however, is the implication that investigation of relationships is to be regarded merely as a convenient means of getting a valid description of semantical meanings (cf. p. 78). The emphasis should surely be reversed. It is rather only the investigation of relationships which ought to justify content description. As Janis’ solution itself implies, a valid and significant description of the semantical component of language is possible only in the context of a study of relationships. The lesson—that precise hypotheses about relationships should precede and guide content description—is often overlooked, and with unfortunate results, in quantitative studies which attempt to describe first and analyze later.
