¹ Speculation on these questions and their interrelationships is certainly not novel. The modern study of international relations was inaugurated by late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century geopoliticians, most notably Mahan and Mackinder, and the critics of imperialism, such as Hobson and Lenin. Both schools of thought were responding to the structural changes that their authors were experiencing, most conspicuously, the decline of Britain and the ascent of Germany and the United States. Similarly, the contemporary revival of interest in questions of macrostructural change comes in response to another round of perceived power deconcentration. Some recent examples include Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wallerstein, Immanuel, The Politics of the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)Google Scholar; Modelski, George, Long Cycles in World Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987)Google Scholar; Thompson, William R., On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Goldstein, Joshua S., Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1989)Google Scholar; Kugler, Jacek and Organski, A. F. K., “The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation,” in Midlarsky, Manus, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1989)Google Scholar; Midlarsky, Manus, “Hierarchical Equilibria and the Long-Run Instability in Multipolar Systems,” in Midlarsky, ; Nye, Joseph S. Jr, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990)Google Scholar; Rapkin, David P., ed., World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990)Google Scholar; and Doran, Charles F., Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² See Modelski (fn. 1); Modelski, George and Thompson, William R., Seapower and Global Politics, 1494–1993 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Modelski, George and Modelski, Sylvia, Documenting Global Leadership (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Thompson (fn. 1).

³ Dehio, , The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle, trans. Fullman, Charles (New York: Vintage Books, 1962).Google Scholar

⁴ It might be argued that there is no need to outline what some scholars already regard as a classic analysis of international relations. It seems more realistic to assume, however, that familiarity with Dehio's specific arguments is actually quite uneven. And for all the citational homage Dehio's work may receive as an exemplar of the balance-of-power tradition, very few contemporary analyses actually adopt similar interpretations. One exception is Houweling, Henk and Siccama, Jan G., Studies of War (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 177–209.Google Scholar

⁵ See Modelski and Thompson (fn. 2); and Thompson, William R. and Rasier, Karen A., “War and Systemic Capability Reconcentration,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 32 (June 1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ Dehio (1888–1963) was a German historian, archivist, and archival administrator whose professional career spanned the period from the early 1920s to the mid-1950s. He developed his historical interpretation in response to mainstream German historians who he felt had seriously misread Germany's situation, especially prior to World War I, and thereby contributed to the German defeat in both wars. Very briefly, Dehio felt that the basic errror was the assumption that Germany could attempt to improve its relative standing as a world power without being seen as an acute threat by British decision makers. This assumption, Dehio argued, stemmed from a tendency to view world politics as if it functioned along the same lines as continental or regional balancing politics when, indeed, the two spheres operated on different principles. Dehio (fn. 3) attempted to spell out just what the rules of the world game had been in the 1494–1945 era. A second book requires some familiarity with the 1962 book and can be misleading because it focuses almost exclusively on late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century German foreign policy. Dehio did not view these policies as fully isomorphic with the activities of earlier aspirants to regional hegemony. The concerns of the second book also lead to an emphasis on the significance of the opposing maritime coalition at the expense of discussing the historical role of the eastern flank. See Dehio, , Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century, trans. Persner, Dieter (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967).Google Scholar

⁷ Dehio (fn. 3), 139.

⁸ Ibid., 139.

⁹ Ibid., 90.

¹⁰ See Modelski and Thompson (fn. 2).

¹¹ Levy, Jack S., War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495—1975 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 47.Google Scholar

¹² Tilly notes that this type of Eurocentric bias overlooks large and powerful armies in China, west Africa, Persia, India, Mexico, and South America, especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. He is certainly right, but the current emphasis on Europe as a regional system neutralizes the power of the criticism for this examination of Dehio's propositions. See Tilly, Charles, Coercion, Capital and European States, A.D. 1990–1990 (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 171.Google Scholar

¹³ Some data on comparative army sizes had been reported earlier in Rasier, Karen A. and Thompson, William R., War and State Making: The Shaping of the Global Powers (Boston, Mass.: Unwin and Hyman, 1989)Google Scholar; and it has been used in Thompson, William R., “The Size of War, Structural and Geopolitical Contexts, and Theory Building/Testing,” International Interactions 16, no. 2 (1990).CrossRefGoogle Scholar However, these data were extracted from other army size inventories, and the quality of some of the earlier information turned out to be lower than anticipated in that some army sizes were overinflated. The preliminary information base was also missing a great deal of data. The current army size data collection is based on information culled from some 150 sources. The data and the sources utilized are reported in Karen A. Rasier and William R. Thompson, “The Growth of Armies” (Manuscript in progress).

¹⁴ Modelski and Thompson (fn. 2).

¹⁵ The data on distribution of naval power reflect changes in indicator emphases keyed to pertinent technological changes. The focus between 1494 and 1654 is on state-owned, armed oceangoing vessels. Over the next two centuries, from 1655 to 1859, the focus is on the number of ships of the line that qualify as frontline fighting vessels, as defined by their carryingan (escalating) minimum number of guns. Firstclass battleships, also determined by increasing minimal size attributes (guns, armor, and so forth), are counted between 1860 and 1945. Another series on naval expenditures (1816–1945) is factored in to smooth some of the abrupt technological changes that occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After 1945 the criteria shift to incorporate attack aircraft carriers, nuclear attack submarines, and sea-based missile accuracy and megatonnage.

¹⁶ One anonymous reviewer has suggested that it is odd that alternating cycles should have been more conducive to European balancing than synchronous cycles in which one type of power would have been readily available to match or balance the other type. Although synchronization seems more logical, one's view of the European alternations depends on how one interprets the pattern. Thus, the pattern might better be labeled “synchronized alternation” if one emphasizes the tendency for declining sea power to encourage ascending land power, which, in turn, leads to a reconcentration of sea power in order to suppress the continental threat.

¹⁷ Goldstein (fn. 1), 127, briefly hints that the two perspectives can be combined. However, some less direct integration of perspectives had already taken place. For example, Dehio's arguments strongly influenced the arguments about global warfare advanced in Thompson, William R., “Succession Crises in the Global Political System: A Test of the Transitional Model,” in Bergesen, Albert, ed., Crises in the World-System (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983).Google Scholar

¹⁸ This point is developed further in Thompson, William R., “Long Waves, Technological Innovation and Relative Decline,” International Organization 44 (Spring 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, “Systemic Leadership and Economic Growth Waves in the Long Run,” International Studies Quarterly 36 (March 1992); and Modelski, George and Thompson, William R., “K-Waves in International Relations: Structural Change in the Global Economy and World Politics” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Ga., April 1992).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Modelski and Thompson (fn. 2) express appreciation for the role of critical sea battles; and Rasier and Thompson (fn. 13) demonstrate a strong interest in the maritime/continental power distinction. On the other hand, there is some divergence on the interpretation of Portugal's role. Dehio recognized Portugal's assumption of the role of Eurasian intermediary in the sixteenth century but argued that the lack of insularity prevented Portugal from enjoying much autonomy from its Iberian neighbor, Spain. This position is difficult to sustain. If it had been true prior to 1580, it is doubtful that the clear distinction between Portuguese and Spanish territorial acquisitions in Asia and America would have persisted throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as well as during the sixty-year Spanish absorption of Portugal. Spain's difficulties in breaking into the Asian spice trade in the sixteenth century are also difficult to explain if one regards Portugal as subordinated to Spain prior to 1580. There is agreement, however, that Portugal failed to assume the western flanking role.

²⁰ This type of observation is commonly encountered in such critiques as Zolberg, Aristide R., “‘World’ and ‘System’: A Misalliance,” in Thompson, William R., ed., Contending Approaches to World System Analysis (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983)Google Scholar; Levy, Jack S., “Theories of General War,” World Politics 37 (April 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, “Long Cycles, Hegemonic Transitions and the Long Peace,” in Kegley, Charles W. Jr, ed., The Long Postwar Peace (Glenview, III.: Scott Foresman, 1991)Google Scholar; Rosecrance, Richard, “Long Cycle Theory and International Relations,” International Organization 41 (Spring 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Doran, Charles F., “Power Cycle Theory of Systems Structure and Stability: Commonalities and Complementarities,” in Midlarsky (fn. 1)Google Scholar; Nye, Joseph S. Jr, “The Changing Nature of World Powers,” Political Science Quarterly 105 (Summer 1990).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²¹ See Levy (fn. 20, 1985); and Thompson and Rasler (fn. 5).

²² For strong appreciations of the historical and theoretical significance of the Thirty Years' War in international relations, see, among others, Doran, Charles F., The Politics of Assimihtion: Hegemony and Its Aftermath (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971)Google Scholar; Gilpin (fn. 1); Wallerstein (fn. 1); Goldstein (fn. 1); and Midlarsky (fn. 1).

²³ The five periods of global war highlighted in leadership long-cycle theory are 1494–1516, 1585–1608, 1688–1713, 1792–1815, and 1914–45.

²⁴ The question of how and why maritime leaders experience relative decline has been addressed in Thompson, William R. and Zuk, Gary, “World Power and the Strategic Trap of Territorial Commitments,” International Studies Quarterly 30 (September 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rasier, Karen A. and Thompson, William R., “Longitudinal Change in Defense Burdens, Capital For mation and Economic Growth: The Systemic Leader Case,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 32 (March 1988)Google Scholar; Rasier, Karen A., “Spending, Deficits and Welfare Investment Tradeoffs: Cause or Effect of Leadership Decline?” in Rapkin, David P., ed., World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990)Google Scholar; George Modelski, “Global Leadership: End Game Scenarios,” in Rapkin, ; Rasier, Karen A. and Thompson, William R., “Technological Innovation, Capability Positional Shifts, and Systemic War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (September 1991)Google Scholar; idem, “Relative Decline and the Overconsumption-Underinvestment Hypothesis,” International Studies Quarterly 35 (September 1991); idem, “Political-Economic Tradeoffs and British Relative Decline,” in Chan, Steve and Mintz, Alex, eds., Defense, Welfare and Growth (London: Routledge, 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thompson (fn. 18). A more comprehensive statement is currently in progress. However, the basic contention is that the relative decline of continental and maritime powers must be explained differently. As Dehio observed, continental powers exhaust themselves on the battlefield. Maritime powers may exhaust themselves militarily, too, but the roots of their relative decline have much more to do with failing to maintain their lead in technological innovation. This approach may appear to disagree with Kennedy's (fn. 1) well-known emphasis on imperial overstretch as a generic explanation of great power decline. But in a 1990 letter to the author Kennedy acknowledges that a state's capacities and obligations logically can become imbalanced either by increasing its ends (as in intensive war participation) or by experiencing shrinking means (as in the loss of economic competitiveness) or both. He referred to the first type as the German variantand to the second type as the British variant. Thus, the amount of overlap in the two approaches to relative decline is in fact greater than might otherwise appear.

²⁵ The asserted ascendancy of land power over sea power after World War II is another issue on which leadership long-cycle analysis is not in agreement with the Dehio interpretation. This question has of course been debated in the geopolitics literature since at least Mackinder's requiem for the Columbian epoch. See Mackinder, Halford J., “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Geographical Journal 23 (1904).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁶ The wobbling metaphor for hybrid powers is taken from Padfield, Peter, Tide of Empires: Decisive Naval Campaigns in the Rise of the West, 1481–1654 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).Google Scholar