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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
Is regional cooperation feasible within Southeast Asia? The idea continues to have vitality, although most of the attempts to make use of the concept in this area have so far met with little apparent success. The Colombo Plan, SEATO, and the Bandung Conference are reminders only of the most prominent efforts to apply "regionalism" to the area. As early as 1947, the Burmese nationalist, Aung San, urged greater cooperation among Southeast Asian states, but his ideas had no lasting effect. And despite the many more formal proposals made since 1947, the area continues to be Balkanized. Yet today regional proposals seem to be proliferating and, for this reason, it is important that the obstacles to regional cooperation in Southeast Asia should be well understood. In 1961, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was established, and the Malaysia plan, incorporating Malaya, Singapore, and the British Borneo territories, was put into effect in September 1963. In addition, and largely as a result of problems connected with the Malaysia proposals, "Maphilindo" was formed during June and July 1963. This is a loose consultative grouping of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia. On a wider scale, there have been some proposals to organize an Asian Common Market; and the United Nations, through its Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), seems to be urging certain forms of regional economic cooperation in Southeast Asia.1
1 See “The Scope for Regional Economic Co-operation”, in United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, XII (December 1961)Google Scholar; and United Nations, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, “Report of the Consultative Group of Experts on Regional Economic Co-operation in Asia”, December 1961, mimeo.
2 At least two additional categories could be constructed: (1) “traditional and historic enmities”, which implies the existence of national memories; and (2) tensions resulting from economic factors. On the latter, much study is needed in order to sharpen our knowledge of economic and trade patterns in the region, but it does seem clear that despite parallel production of many commodities there is at present little real “competition” for the same markets. Indeed, those who would favor working towards economic cooperation and integration in Southeast Asia, like Philippines Vice-President (and formerly Foreign Secretary) Pelaez, stress that Asian nations must cooperate soon. Otherwise, he feels, their economies will have begun to compete directly, as in Europe and perhaps Latin America. For some of the more basic aspects of this problem, see my “Economic Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia”, Asian Survey, 111 (May 1963). 235–44Google Scholar
3 A very useful presentation of the Borneo issue is Meadows, Martin, “The Philippine Claim to North Borneo”, Political Science Quarterly, LXXVII (September 1962), 321–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar. References to some excellent sources on the temple dispute can be found in Singh, L. P., “The Thai-Cambodian Temple Dispute”, Asian Survey, 11 (October 1962), 23–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 Singh, op.cit., relying on articles in the Bangkpk Post and the Bangkok World during late June 1962, cites several of these public manifestations.
5 A so-called “ban” on public demonstrations went noticeably unenforced.
6 Interview, Bangkok, August 17, 1962.
7 They have been called the “freest press in the world.” See Wurfel, David, in Kahin, George McT., ed., Government and Politics of Southeast Asia (Ithaca 1959), 459.Google Scholar
8 Interview, Department of State, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, June 1962.
9 Britain's failure to react with gravity to the claim may have offended the Philippines leadership, and was perhaps one more factor impelling President Macapagal to press the claim with vigor.
10 As one of many examples, see Salonga, Jovito R., “PI Should Define Its Stand”, Philippines Free Press, May 5, 1962; quoted in Larawan, Series VIII, No. 3, Embassy of the Philippines, Washington, D.C., November 19, 1962.Google Scholar
11 See transcript of press conference, Washington Post, February 15, 1963.
12 This notion received much currency. See, e.g., New York Times, October 1, 1962, 5. However, with the death in mid-1963 of N. Osmeña, who had represented the Sultan's heirs with great vigor and who reportedly was pressing for a settlement running into tens of millions of dollars, this aspect of the claim is likely to become less significant.
13 Interview, Manila, July 31, 1962.
14 The tri–partite Foreign Ministers' meeting which paved the way for “Maphilindo”, and which convened in Manila from June 7 to June n, 1963, dealt in part with the North Borneo dispute. The “Report” stated that the Philippines retained its right to pursue the claim “in accordance with international law and the principle of the pacific settlement of disputes.” But it was also made clear that the Philippines was preparing to accept the inclusion of North Borneo in Malaysia: “The Ministers agreed that in the event of North Borneo joining the proposed Federation of Malaysia the Government of the latter and … the Philippines should maintain and promote the harmony and the friendly relations…” (“Report and Recommendations of the Conference of Foreign Ministers”, Manila, June 11, 1963, 4, mimeo.).
15 New York Times, April 13, 1962. The Vietnamese names for these two islands are Phudu and Tianmoi. In Cambodian terminology, they are Koh Ses Ream and Koh Thmey.
16 Interview, Saigon, August 8, 1962. The Vietnamese government decided to dispute ownership of these islands, because—in the Minister's exact words—“To make such an extreme claim we would not be bothered by having to negotiate with Sihanouk for a long time.” See also Leifer, Michael, Cambodia and Neutrality (Canberra 1962), 25–26.Google Scholar
17 Again, excepting the Philippines.
18 Indonesia's dispute with Malaysia, focusing on the Borneo territories, is not a conflict over boundaries. It is much more complex, as we point out below.
19 An extremely well-informed Filipino Catholic priest, trained in the United States and with extensive experience in the Moslem areas, indicated that while the Church was getting nowhere among these peoples, there was also no detectable interest in ties with Indonesia. Yet, as the former Chief of Philippines Military Intelligence (Capt. Carlos J. Albert) pointed out, the Moslem peoples of the Philippines have been ignored by the government, and “an unfortunate chasm” exists between Christian and Islamic peoples in the Philippines South. As a result, “a well-organized propaganda campaign, emphasizing Indonesian affinities, magnifying differences and justified grievances of our Moslem Filipinos, stage-managed incidents, coupled with submarine-supplied arms and munitions, could create a most serious national security situation for the Philippines” (Manila Times, January 20, 1963).
20 Prince Sihanouk in a conversation with Jerrold Schecter of Time-Life, August 8, 1961 (from Schecter's notes). See also Leifer, 24.
21 Fall, Bernard, “Southeast Asia: The West at Bay”, Current History, XLIII (November 1962), 297n.Google Scholar
22 Steinberg, David J., et al, Cambodia (New Haven 1957), 34.Google Scholar
23 U.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the Economy of Cambodia (World Trade Information Service, Part i. No. 61–65), 3.
24 Prince Sihanouk, in conversation with Jerrold Schecter, August 8, 1961.
25 U.N. General Assembly, Special Political Committee (A/SPC/S.R. 332), October 22, 1962, 9.
26 An example is provided in Prince Sihanouk's speech at Samathy Ram Pagoda, November 3, 1962, broadcast by the Cambodian radio service. The vagueness of the threat itself (“one or two” actions, etc.), plus Sihanouk's anticipation of his opponent's next thrust, including references to Vietnam's control over the Mekong and the Port of Saigon and its consequent control over the Cambodian economy—all these indicate that Sihanouk has not wanted the affair to go too far or to get out of hand. Leifer, however, reports that in 1961 the Cambodian press carried “veiled threats” of retaliation against Vietnamese in Cambodia (p. 25).
27 New York Times, August 28, 1963. Cambodia explained the break in terms of both the alleged repression of Buddhists and additional border incursions from Vietnam.
28 The situation is perhaps not very different from the rumored tendency of the U.S. armed services to “find” greater Soviet military activity and build-up during March and April in some years—when the appropriations committees are considering the defense budget submissions.
29 The extent of Thai “identification” with the Shans and their movement can perhaps be exaggerated. For one thing, only half the population of the Shan states are Shans, and only they and one other group are Buddhists. The rest are largely Christians or some variety of animists. For another, it is not certain that Bangkok would wish to incorporate—all other things being equal—the Shan areas as part of Thailand. It might be an invitation to the same sort of dissension that Burma must now undergo.
30 Interview with the Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, August 15, 1962.
31 The Bangkok World, e.g., on March 9, 1962, reported that Sarit had pledged his intent to maintain excellent relations between Burma and Thailand. Denying any intention to become involved “on the question of the Shan states”, he repeated his view that the problem was “a strictly internal affair of Burma”.
32 One official expressed the understandable opinion that if South Vietnam were to apply for ASA membership, it would be difficult to refuse the request.
33 It is known that Thailand had been the “foot-dragging” member of the ASA group. She balked when it became clear that no more than three countries would comprise the new association, and even suggested holding off until at least a fourth could be found. In addition, the Thais were cool initially to the ASA capital-fund and permanent headquarters suggestions of the Tungku and Pelaez. Despite these differences, Thailand continues to support ASA and is beginning to believe that the organization is “here to stay.” Indeed, by early 1963, when relations were strained between the Philippines and Malaya, it was Thanat Khoman's task, as Thai Foreign Minister, to act almost as an intermediary between the two other members of ASA. In appreciation of his efforts, President Macapagal said jokingly that in the future he would think of Thanat as “the ASA Ambassador”.
34 Pauker, Guy J., “The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia”, Foreign Affairs, XL (July 1962), 625.Google Scholar
35 Yamin, Muhammad, “A Legal and Historical Review of Indonesia's Sovereignty over the Ages”, Dewan National (Djakarta), September 24, 1958, 19.Google Scholar
36 Pauker, 625.
37 Reported on Radio Indonesia, October 27, 1962.
38 This point is also made by Weatherbee, Donald E., “Indonesia and Malaysia: Confrontation in Southeast Asia”, Orbis, VII (Summer 1963), 342.Google Scholar Weatherbee's discussion appeared after the present article was essentially completed; our findings, however, are consistent.
39 New York Times, September 3, 1963.
40 In his speech of September 25, 1963, at an anti-Malaysia rally in Jogjakarta, President Sukarno explained at length why the U.N. mission to survey opinion in the Borneo territories had not convinced him that the residents there really favor Malaysia. He asked for a new survey: “Please reascertain the wishes of the Kalimantan Utara people. Do it over again. …” Sukarno promised that if a new survey, under the “procedures agreed upon in Manila”, prove that opinion favors Malaysia, “we shall say O.K.” But if those procedures are not followed, he warned, “the Indonesian people will devour any colonialist and imperialist [undertaking]”.
41 Washington Post, February 12, 1963.
42 Foreign Minister Subandrio, quoted in Christian Science Monitor, January 24, 1963.
43 This possibility is examined in detail in Gordon, B. K., “The Potential for Indonesian Expansionism”. Pacific Affairs, XXXVI (Winter 1963), forthcoming.Google Scholar
44 Weatherbee, 348–49.
45 A recent reference was made in the Cambodian weekly magazine, Nationalist. In the editorial of October 9, 1963, Prince Sihanouk reportedly claimed that Ngo Trong Hieu (formerly South Vietnamese Minister for Civic Action) and an American diplomat had helped a rebellion against the Cambodian government in 1959.
46 Interview, Saigon, August 9, 1962. Monireth is Sihanouk's uncle and President of the Crown Council; General Lon Nol is Cambodian Minister of Defense.
47 In the speech at Samathy Ram Pagoda, November 3, 1962.
48 Neak Cheat Niyum, December 24, 1961. (This is the official organ of Sihanouk's personal movement, the Sangkun Reaster Niyum.)
49 For example, in two very long conversations with Charles Meyer in Phnom Penh I was unable to detect any particular interest whatever in Malaya. Meyer, a former sergeant of Alsatian origin, is sometimes referred to as one of the two éminences grises. of the Cambodian regime. He is quite close to Sihanouk, prepares many of his public announcements, and apparently helps to run more than one government ministry.
50 Editorial in La Dépêche du Cambodge, October 24, 1962.
51 An example is the Prince's speech of October 6, 1963, at Vat Dan Tong, discussed on the Cambodian radio service on October 8. Characteristically, however, it was reported that when Prince Sihanouk visited India early in 1963, he made remarks about Thailand which the Thais thought more abusive than their mutual “truce” allowed for. Asked about this, Sihanouk is reported to have replied that “as far as he was concerned the truce had gone overboard“. (Far Eastern Economic Review, April 4, 1963, 9–)
52 It should also not be forgotten that just before the diplomatic break, Sihanouk and Sarit reportedly met in Tokyo. This report, in the October 8, 1961, Japan Times, has never been denied.
53 Ellsworth Bunker, former U.S. Ambassador to India, served as the United Nations mediator in the Indonesian-Dutch dispute over West New Guinea.
54 Washington Post, March 3, 1963.
55 Sadka, Emma, “Singapore and the Federation: Problems of Merger”, Asian Survey, 11 (January 1962), 21.Google Scholar
56 See, for example, Nathaniel Pfeffer's earlier comment that “there is not such a thing as Southeast Asia except for cartographic purposes. … it is a place on the globe where certain groups of people, holding little in common, live contiguous to one another.” (“Regional Security in Southeast Asia”, International Organization, August 1954, 311–15)
57 The area does not, of course, contain any Soviet satellites. There are nations that are clearly aligned with the U.S. (the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand); non-aligned “neutrals” (Cambodia, Burma, and Indonesia), which often seem to lean toward the Communist bloc; and one nation (Malaysia) that is a member of the Commonwealth and is clearly Western-oriented and anti-Communist. Laos is the only state in the region whose neutrality has been affirmed by international agreement.
58 The U.S. contribution is made through an AID agent.
59 EROPA's “Training Center” is in Delhi, and the APO Secretariat in Tokyo has a heavy infusion of Indian nationals—who, by the way, seem to cooperate most effectively with Pakistani colleagues.
60 Interview, Rangoon, September 1, 1962. This would certainly seem consistent with the findings of a U.N. study group on administration, which remarked on the inordinate delays involved in any communications with the government of Burma. They found that most letters had to proceed through several dozen steps before any reply was sent out. In this connection, one might think that Burma could benefit indeed from EROPA membership.
61 Interview, APO headquarters in Tokyo, July 22, 1962.
62 Interview with Leonard Overton of the Asia Foundation in Phnom Penh. He of course follows closely developments relating to education and training.
63 This might seem to ignore the fact that the Vietnamese, with at least as heavy a French tradition, have not been inhibited from becoming among the most enthusiastic of EROPA's members. On the other hand, there are many more English-speaking Vietnamese than Cambodians, and South Vietnam's administrative system has been considerably overhauled along American lines as a result of the Michigan State University contract.
64 One case was extreme. In a conversation with a senior foreign official assigned to one Southeast Asian capital, it became clear that he had never heard of either APO or EROPA. Without any but the briefest explanation of what the two organizations expected to accomplish, he was quite certain that they had little relevance to “his country.” This reaction was not, however, very typical. To many others both organizations seemed to be of considerable promise as a means of improving regional communication.
65 The British have a regional intelligence organization at Phoenix Park in Singapore, and the Australian High Commissioner in Malaysia appears to have area-wide responsibilities.
66 Interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta, July 1–5, 1963.
67 Reports that the Philippines was heading towards the recognition of Malaysia were corroborated by a statement of Foreign Secretary Lopez that he expected diplomatic relations to be restored “soon” (Voice of America broadcast, October 29, 1963).
68 Quoted by Acheson, Dean, “The President and the Secretary of State”, in Price, Don K., ed., The Secretary of State (New York 1960), 48.Google Scholar
