¹ See Janis, I. L., Air War and Emotional Stress, New York, 1951Google Scholar, passim.

² This, of course, is not the worst conceivable disaster. We may anticipate that a potential enemy might some day, perhaps comparatively soon, be able to deliver on the order of thousands of such bombs. It appears that, in the absence of radical preparatory measures on our part, survival from such a disaster will be so low that analysis of the post-bombing era may be of little interest.

³ Our hundred largest cities contained, in 1950, 29 per cent of the nation's population.The hundred largest Census metropolitan areas contained 51 per cent of the total population. Very roughly, we may think of the former as the population vulnerable to the physical effects of the bombing, and the latter as inclusive of those directly linked economically with the vulnerable area. These statements should be interpreted only as a broad indication of magnitude; for example, some of the population outside the cities will be physically vulnerable, while some of those inside may not. We shall also generally assume that a substantial fraction of the vulnerable population escapes or survives the disaster.

⁴ While this might seem to be a fairly obvious development among uprooted populations fleeing into areas which have suffered relatively less or not at all, there is no evidence of any serious criminal problem in the evacuations associated with actual or threatened World War II bombings. Janis mentions increases in looting, thefts, and juvenile delinquency in the bombed areas after a raid (op. cit., pp. 147–49), but crime in reception areas is not even mentioned in any of the standard reports. By way of contrast, a high rate of criminal activity was encountered among displaced persons and other refugees in occupied Germany shortly after the war ended.

⁵ Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, II, pp. 574–76.

^′ It is believed that the mutual attrition of strategic forces will preclude the mounting of additional attacks of anywhere like die magnitude of die original blow.

⁷ AEC release of February 15, 1955. Full text available in U.S. News and World Report (February 25, 1955), pp. 128–34.

⁸ The Bikini explosion has been widely reported to have the force of about 15 million tons of TNT (compared widi 20,000 tons for die nominal atomic bomb). If so, this might be a rather large average bomb-size for a 100-city attack. There will, however, be additional fallout hazard from bombs aimed at non-city targets (e.g., air bases). In addition, die cumulative fallout of many bombs may lead to serious-to-lethal radioactivity in large areas not so heavily affected by any single weapon.

^′ 'See his “Radioactive Fallout III,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, xi (June 1955), p. 207.

¹⁰ A recent study of disaster situations has concluded that generosity and self-sacrifice in the period immediately after the crisis are an almost universal pattern of reaction. See F. C. Ikle and H. V. Kincaid, “Social Aspects of Wartime Evacuation in the United States,” Committee on Disaster Studies, National Academy of Sciences, September 1954.

¹¹ Recent news reports have indicated that the national government has begun to undertake appropriate precautions to this end. See New Yor/Times, November 21, 1954, p. 1, “President in Bomb Shelter Leads Drill for Atom Raid.” The story describes the manning of alternative command posts outside Washington, with functioning communication channels, under a plan designed to cope with the bombing emergency.

¹² Our huge farm price-support stockpiles may come in handy here.

¹³ This phenomenon is described in Janis, , op. cit., pp. 124–52.Google Scholar

¹⁴ The Strategic Bombing Survey reported a positive association between degree of bombing and opposition to die regime in Germany, as evidenced by subversive incidents as well as various measures of morale. The effect, however, was neither large nor clear, being partially confounded with other phenomena such as the growth of general war-weariness and the tendency of die heavily bombed large cities to contain more opposi-tional elements even without any bombing. See USSBS, “The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale,” I, especially pp. 22–23, 94–103. Rather similar results are reported for Japan in “The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale.”

¹⁵ USSBS, “German Morale,” I, p. I.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁷ The succession presently provided by law is as follows: Vice-President, Speaker of the House, President pro tem of the Senate, following whom are die Cabinet officers in order of rank: State, Treasury, Defense, Attorney-General, Postmaster-General, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Health, Education and Welfare. There remains a certain probability, perhaps small but not negligible, that all of these officers may be killed. While Congress may elect a new Speaker of the House or President pro tern of the Senate, this may be a slow process if the session is out—and if Congress is in session, diere are likely to be quorum difficulties. Legislation is now being prepared to strengthen the continuity of government under bombing conditions.

¹⁸ See USSBS, “German Morale,” I, p. 103.Google Scholar

¹⁹ The separatist movements which flourished for a time during the Russian Civil War were motivated in large part by political and social opposition to the Bolsheviks in control of Russia proper.

²⁰ If there is very great destruction of life relative to destruction of material resources, this conflict may be somewhat mitigated. It is even conceivable that all the survivors might be made “richer” in terms of property than before. Despite this possibility, it seems more likely that a substantial dispossessed class will exist.

²¹ For a useful discussion of martial law, see Fairman, Charles, “The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency,” Harvard Law Review, LV (June 1942), pp. 1253–302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The discussion of Lincoln's use of martial law in die Civil War (pp. 1278–89) is particularly interesting.

²² “United States Civil Defense,” which represents a civil defense plan issued by the National Security Resources Board in 1950 before formation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, does discuss martial law as a last-resort measure (p. 16). Since its formation, however, the FCDA appears to have ignored and, by implication, frowned on planning for the use of military force to support the laws or to prevent anarchy in the emergency period. “This Is Civil Defense” (1951) outlines the responsibilities of the armed forces bearing on atomic attack (pp. 11–12) without reference to this problem.“Police Services” (1951) nowhere mentions the use of military force or die problems posed by the probable inability of the courts to dispense justice.

²³ On these points, see New York Times, June 17, 1955, p. 10, col. 4, and June 18, 1955. p. I. col. 3.

²⁴ “A Program for the Nonmilitary Defense of the United States,” A Statement on National Policy by The Special Policy Committee on Nonmilitary Defense Planning of the National Planning Association. Press release of May 9, 1955, pp. 23–25.

²⁵ See New York Times, June 28, 1955, p. 26, col. 5.

²⁶ The experience of the Bolsheviks after their seizure of power in Russia is interesting in this connection. According to Dobb, their immediate aim was not socialization, but the conquest of key positions to consolidate the political power they had already won. Lenin's first priority was to keep industry running, largely under private ownership, but with Bolshevik central direction. The transition to“war communism” was due primarily to political and military developments. See Dobb, M., Soviet Economic Development Since igiy, London, 1948, pp. 82–124.Google Scholar Similarly, the Chinese Communists have moved rather slowly in extending total state control over economic activity.

²⁷ The first three of these relate to the distribution of economic power within the accepted process of economic decision-making, while the fourth implies a radical change in the process itself. Actually, of course, the existing “free enterprise” process is already “socialized” to a substantial degree by government regulation and intervention in economic decisions governing the use of and returns from property, and in wartime there is normally some further accentuation of this development.

²⁸ Our hundred largest metropolitan areas probably contain over 50 per cent of the total national wealth, worth about $500 billion at current price levels.

²⁹ The discussion which follows emphasizes the difficulties of equitable compensation even after the emergency. For the duration of the emergency period, the only compensa tion it seems feasible to pay will be largely in the form of relief.

³⁰ To some extent, financial institutions and corporations have begun to store copies of essential records in locations presumably safe from bombing destruction.

³¹ On these points, see Cavers, D. F., “Legal Measures to Mitigate the Economic Impact of Atomic Attack,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, IX (September 1953), pp. 269–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³² A debt moratorium, combined with the probable inflation which is to be anticipated in the period following the bombing, might eventually have the effect of extinguishing the real value of prewar debts.

³³ Imagine, for example, a totally destroyed area. Firms or individuals outside the destroyed area who have title to the destroyed property will suffer a complete loss of their assets (assuming no immediate compensation). If debts are owed to persons or firms in the destroyed area, however, and even if the creditor individuals or firms are completely wiped out, there will still in general be legal heirs outside the bombed areas who can make claims good against the debtor firms.

³⁴ That is to say, instances of cooperation, self-sacrifice, and heroism in the history of disaster have been matched by instances of exploitation and selfishness. In general, it appears that the former tend to predominate in the immediate post-crisis era, gradually giving way to the latter. Ikle and Kincaid (op. cit.) conclude that this is a universal pattern in disasters, both natural and man-made.

³⁵ It is possible, however, that debts may be placed under moratorium even where the debtors are still in a position to pay, in order to control the financial crisis arising out of bombing.

³⁶ See, for example, the expenditure rationing proposal made by Shaw, E., Scitovsky, T., and Tarshis, L. in Mobilizing Resources for War, New York, 1951.Google Scholar Such proposals require, however, an effectively functioning financial system, as well as sufficient enforcement power to ensure proper segregation of consumption and non-consumption incomes.

³⁷ Most of the following details are from Chamber of Commerce of the United States, “War Damage Indemnity,” September 1950. The working of the Japanese program is described in great detail in USSBS, Civilian Defense Division, “Final Report Covering Air-raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Japan,” pp. 177–91.

³⁸ In the Philippines, for example, losses were compensated “in full” (but only in terms of prewar values, replacement costs being approximately triple original costs) up to $500, and in the proportion of 52.5 per cent over this amount. See U.S. Philippine War Damage Commission, “Final and Ninth Semi-Annual Report,” March 31, 1951. Apparently the working of the Japanese scheme was considered generally fair and adequate by the public despite the inflation which reduced the real value of the payments. USSBS, Civilian Defense Division, “Final Report,” p. 182.

³⁹ This should not be taken as admitting that the situations are in fact comparable. For one thing, both Hitler and Lenin were leading movements with sufficient resources and mass support to pose a threat to the governments in power for years before they actually seized control. In addition, each movement was in part the product of an ideological preparation which had gone on for decades. In these circumstances, analysis would very likely have given considerable weight to the possibility of victory for the radical group, given a sufficiently desperate social situation.