¹ See parts of Robert Stern's volume not reviewed here, and Krugman, Paul R., ed., Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986).Google Scholar This literature is surveyed by David Richardson, J., “The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy,” International Organization 44 (Winter 1990), 107–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Baldwin, David, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Schott, Jeffrey J., assisted by Elliott, Kimberly Ann, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1985)Google Scholar; Jentleson, Bruce W., Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).Google Scholar

³ Balassa, Bela and Noland, Marcus, Japan in the World Economy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1988)Google Scholar; Calder, Kent E., “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” World Politics 40 (July 1988), 517–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Inoguchi, Takashi and Okimoto, Daniel I., eds., The Political Economy of Japan, vol. 2, The Changing International Context (Stanford, C A: Stanford University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Prestowitz, Clyde V. Jr, Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead (New York: Basic Books, 1988)Google Scholar; Samuels, Richard J., The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Wolferen, Karel van, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation (New York: Knopf, 1989).Google Scholar

⁴ See Aggarwal, Vinod K., Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Conybeare, John A. C., Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Finlayson, Jock A. and Zacher, Mark W., Managing International Markets: Developing Countries and the Commodity Trade Regime (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; and Winham, Gilbert R., International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).Google Scholar In addition, Cohen, Benjamin J. reviews two of the present books and others in “The Political Economy of International Trade,” International Organization 44 (Spring 1990), 261–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ Schattschneider, , Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935).Google Scholar

⁶ The sample for the latter tests is already limited to cases with relatively high import competition; this truncation might account for departures from common sense.

⁷ See also Lavergne, Réal P., The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs: An Empirical Analysis (Toronto: Academic Press, 1983)Google Scholar, Table 7.2; Cline, William R., Exports of Manufactures from Developing Countries (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984)Google Scholar, Table 2–6, on non-tariff barriers; and Pugel, Thomas A. and Walter, Ingo, “U.S. Corporate Interests and the Political Economy of Trade Policy,” Review of Economics and Statistics 67 (August 1985), 471Google Scholar, on company activity toward trade legislation.

⁸ See Destler, I. M. and Odell, John S., Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in U.S. Trade Politics (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1987)Google Scholar, as well as Bhagwati, Protectionism. Little work has been done to investigate such political opposition in other countries.

⁹ See Takacs, Wendy E., “Pressures for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis,” Economic Inquiry 19 (October 1981), 687–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gallarotti, Guilio M., “Toward a Business Cycle Model of Tariffs,” International Organization 39 (Winter 1985), 155–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Cassing, James, McKeown, Timothy, and Ochs, Jack, “The Political Economy of the Tariff Cycle,” American Political Science Review 80 (September 1986), 843–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ For a general review and case for the affirmative, see Frey., Bruno S. “They Public Choice View of International Political Economy,” International Organization 38 (Winter 1984), 199–223.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ In one famous passage Weber put his own formulation as follows: “Not ideas, but material and ideal interests directly govern man's conduct. Yet very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interests.” Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Religionssoziologie, vol. 1, p. 252, quoted in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans., ed., and with an introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 63–64. Albert O. Hirschman contends that the traditional economic approach, which disregarding values such as public morality, presents too simple an account of even such fundamental processes as production and consumption. “Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic Discourse,” Economics and Philosophy 1 (April 1895), 7–21.

¹² See Goldstein, Judith, “The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of U.S. Agricultural and Manufacturing Policies,” International Organization 43 (Winter 1989), 31–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For comprehensive reviews, see Odell, John S., U.S. International Monetary Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 58–78Google Scholar and passim, and Hall, Peter A., ed., The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).Google Scholar For recent related applications, see Adler, Emanuel, “Ideological ‘Guerrillas’ and the Quest for Technological Autonomy: Brazil's Domestic Computer Industry,” International Organization 40 (Summer 1986), 673–706CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rohrlich, Paul Egon, “Economic Culture and Foreign Policy: The Cognitive Analysis of Economic Policy Making,” International Organization 41 (Winter 1987), 61–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Odell, John S., “From London to Bretton Woods: Sources of Change in Bargaining Strategies and Outcomes,” Journal of Public Policy 8 (July-December 1988), 287–316CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and other articles in the same issue; Kapstein, Ethan B., “Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking Regulations,” International Organization 43 (Spring 1989), 323–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Haas, Peter M., “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control,” International Organization 43 (Summer 1989), 377–404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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¹⁶ Stephen V. Marks and John McArthur extend this analysis specifically to congressional voting on protection for the automobile industry; they find that ideology also influences this behavior independently of constituency interest, at least when the member faces a low opportunity cost of voting his or her beliefs. “Empirical Analyses of the Determinants of Protection: A Survey and Some New Results,” in Odell, John S. and Wille', Thomas D., eds., International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange between Economics and Political Science (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).CrossRefGoogle Scholar More relevant for trade policy are Katzenstein, Peter, ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978)Google Scholar; Pastor, Robert A., Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980)Google Scholar; John Ikenberry, G., Lake, David A., and Mastanduno, Michael, eds., The State and American Foreign Economic Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; and Mares, David, “Domestic Institutions and Shifts in Trade and Development Policy: Colombia 1951–1968,” in Odell and Willett (fn. 16), 193–224.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Hall, , Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Also see Haggard, Stephan, “The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), 91–120CrossRefGoogle Scholar, which links this innovation to requirements of international trade negotiations, and thus to the fourth analytical perspective.

²⁰ Goldstein, “Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), 179–218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²¹ Ikenberry, , “Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), 242.Google Scholar

²² For other recent examples of synthesis, see David Mares (fn. 17), and Gowa, Joanne, “Public Goods and Political Institutions: Trade and Monetary Processes in the United States,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), 15–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Other recent research on American government is also developing institutionally richer models. See, e.g., Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Weingast, Barry R., “The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power,” American Political Science Review 81 (March 1987), 85–104CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Baron, David P. and Ferejohn, John A., “Bargaining in Legislatures,” American Political Science Review 83 (December 1989), 1,181–1,206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁴ For other recent reconsiderations of the hegemony debate, see Russett, Bruce, “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony,” International Organization 39 (Spring 1985), 207–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Snidai, Duncan, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985), 579–614CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Gowa, Joanne, “Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?” World Politics 41 (April 1989), 307–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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²⁶ Cognitive interpretations might seem to introduce some interpretive or phenomenological elements, but in many cases they are offered as primitive social-scientific hypotheses to be sharpened and tested in principle in the same manner as other hypotheses.

²⁷ See Kindleberger, Charles, “The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820–1875,” Journal of Economic History 35 (1975), 20–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McCord, Norman, The Anti-Corn Law League, 1838–1846 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958)Google Scholar; Richardson, J. H., British Economic Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1936)Google Scholar; Lieber, Robert J., British Politics and European Unity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).Google Scholar

²⁸ Ashley, Percy, Modern Tariff History: Germany-US-France, 3d ed. (New York: Dutton, 1926)Google Scholar; Röpke, Wilhelm, German Commercial Policy (London: Longmans, Green, 1934)Google Scholar; Glissman, H. and Weiss, F., “On the Political Economy of Protection in Germany,” Staff Working Paper No. 427 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, October 1980).Google Scholar Companion World Bank papers cover several other countries.

²⁹ Caves, Richard E., “Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure,” Canadian Journal of Economics 9 (May 1976), 278–300CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Helleiner, G. K., “The Political Economy of Canada's Tariff Structure: An Alternative Model,” Canadian Journal of Economics 10 (May 1977), 318–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁰ See fn. 3; also Richard Friman, H., “Rocks, Hard Places, and the New Protectionism: Textile Trade Policy Choices in the United States and Japan,” International Organization 42 (Autumn 1988), 689–724.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³¹ E.g., Katzenstein, Peter, ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978)Google Scholar; Conybeare, John A. C., “Tariff Protection in Developed and Developing Countries,” International Organization 37 (Summer 1983), 441–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gallarotti (fn. 9).

³² A sampling of recent works that are related in some way could include Hosoya, Chihiro, “Relations between the European Communities and Japan,” Journal of Common Market Studies 18 (December 1979), 159–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Volker, E.L.M., ed., Protectionism and the European Community (Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers, 1983)Google Scholar; Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William, and Webb, Carole, eds., Policy Making in the European Community, 2d ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1983)Google Scholar; Kahler, Miles, “European Protectionism in Theory and Practice,” World Politics 37 (July 1985), 475–502CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hilf, Meinhard, Jacobs, Francis G., and Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, eds., The European Community and the GATT (Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers, 1986)Google Scholar; Winham (fn. 4), passim; Baldwin, Robert E., Hamilton, Carl B., and Sapir, André, eds., Issues in US-EC Trade Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Koopmann, Georg and Scharrer, Hans-Eckart, “EC Trade Policy beyond 1992,” Intereconomics 23 (September/October 1989), 207–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and works cited earlier.

³³ For windows into those topics, see, respectively Cappelan, Adne, Gleditsch, Nils Peter, and Bjerkholt, Olav, “Military Spending and Economic Growth in the OECD Countries,” Journal of Peace Research 21 (November 1984); 361–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Faini, Riccardo, Annez, Patricia, and Taylor, Lance, “Defense Spending, Economic Structure and Growth: Evidence among Countries and over Time,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 32 (April 1984); 487–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Goldstein, Joshua, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Holzman, Franklyn D. and Legvold, Robert, “The Economics and Politics of East-West Relations,” in Fred Bergsten, C. and Krause, Laurence B., eds., World Politics and International Economics (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1975)Google Scholar; Baldwin, David, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985)Google Scholar; and Hufbauer et al. (fn. 2).

³⁴ Holsti, K. J., in “Politics in Command:. Foreign Trade as National Security Policy,” International Organization 40 (Summer 1986), 643–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar, suggests reasons for such variations. James Alt and Barry Eichengreen formalize such linkages as “parallel games,” and explore their implications in “Parallel and Overlapping Games: Theory and an Application to the European Gas Trade,” in Odell and Willett (fn. 16).

³⁵ See Haggard, Stephan and Simmons, Beth A., “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), 491–517.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁶ Lake (p. 225) notes historical cross-national contrasts supporting the importance of state centralization.

³⁷ See Gowa, Joanne, “Public Goods and Political Institutions: Trade and Monetary Policy Processes in the United States,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), 15–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar On the other hand, changes in the structure of trade interests over the long term might also reshape the institutions that permit this result.

³⁸ This suggestion is elaborated further in Dillon, Patricia, Odell, John S., and Willett, Thomas D., “Future Directions in the Analysis of Trade Policies,” in Odell and Willett (fn. 16), 273–83.Google Scholar