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Leys, Colin
1982.
Introduction to the Sociology of “Developing Societies”.
p.
332.
Article contents
Building Authority: A Return to Fundamentals
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
Extract
Until recently, most of the literature on political development has centered primarily on nation building. Relatively little expenditure of time and energy has been directed toward some of the most gnawing political problems that confront leaders in industrializing societies: how to remain at the apex of power; what steps must be taken to create and then preserve public authority; and by what means leaders mobilize support and secure compliance with policy decisions when their brittle governmental structure is simultaneously confronted with crises of integration, mobilization, and distribution. The imperative need is to raise questions concerning (i) how authority is built and maintained, and (2) the means by which political leaders implement policy when they are confronted with a skeptical and volatile population. Those are the ends toward which this article is directed.
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- Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1974
References
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