¹ Przeworski, , “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy,” in O'Donnell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Philippe, and Whitehead, Laurence, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 63Google Scholar.

² James Madison found “property” to be “the most enduring source of faction” long before Marx made his observations. See Federalist no. 10, in Hamilton, Alexander, Jay, John, and Madison, James, The Federalist (New York: Modern Library, 1938), 47–53Google Scholar.

³ See Rusinow, Dennison, “Nationalities Policy and the National Question,” in Ramet, Pedro, ed., Yugoslavia in the 1980s (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 143–44Google Scholar; Bukowski, Charles, “Politics and the Prospects for Economic Reform in Yugoslavia,” Eastern European Politics and Societies 2 (Winter 1988), 104Google Scholar. See also Szelenyi, p. 13.

⁴ See Judt, Tony, “The Dilemmas of Dissidence: The Politics of Opposition in East-Central Europe,” Eastern European Politics and Societies 2 (Spring 1988), 185–241CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ See Neuberger, Egon and Duffy, William, Comparative Economic Systems (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1976), 114–17Google Scholar; Montias, Michael, “Types of Communist Economic Systems,” in Johnson, Chaimers, ed., Change in Communist Systems (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970), 117–35Google Scholar; Wiles, Peter, Political Economy of Communism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962)Google Scholar; Nove, Alec, Economics of Feasible Socialism (New York: Allen & Unwin, 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Brus, Wlodzimierz, Socialist Ownership and Political Systems (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975)Google Scholar.

⁶ See esp. Alain Touraine's account in Solidarity: Poland 1980–1981 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)Google Scholar, and Ascherson, Neal, The Polish August (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1982)Google Scholar.

⁷ Certainly, the availability of Soviet support for the traditional apparat in Poland in 1981 and its unavailability in 1989 is a key factor that explains why events in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and to some degree even Romania had such dramatically different denouements. That is, the possibility of Soviet intervention was an important element in the Polish declaration of martial law: one reason why Jaruzelski could rely on the loyalty of the Polish army was, presumably, the very real threat that the Soviets would otherwise do the job. Such a threat could not be made in Czechoslovakia in 1989, with the result that the Czechoslovak armed forces could not be counted upon by the regime; as for the DDR, the Soviet-controlled command structure of the army meant Honecker could not even issue orders to it over Soviet objections. In Romania, where Ceausescu, without a Warsaw Pact backup, did call out the army against demonstrators, the result was military desertion.

⁸ Compare also Jenson, Jane and Ross, George, The View from Inside (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984)Google Scholar with Hahn, Werner, Democracy in a Communist Party (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)Google Scholar.

⁹ Tarrow, Sidney, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969)Google Scholar; Turone, Sergio, Storia del sindicato in Italia, 1943–69 [History of the Italian labor movement, 1943–69] (Bari: Laterza, 1974)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ See Carter, April, Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982)Google Scholar; Rusinow, Dennison, The Yugoslav Experiment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)Google Scholar.

¹¹ The “dissolution” of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the formation of the Hungarian Socialist Party from its reform-wing ashes was, of course, a predictable part of the strategy aimed at positioning the party on the center-left. So, too, was the (unsuccessful) demand of radical reformists within the party to expel its more conservative elements openly, an action that would have made the new party's claim to the center more credible by, in effect, creating a party on its left.

¹² It is important to note here that success in becoming a socialist party in terms of internal organization and programmatic commitments is by no means equivalent to achieving electoral victory as one. In fact, the “new” Hungarian Socialist Party is likely to be forced into opposition, following the springtime parliamentary elections, for several reasons: (1) If the reemergence of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party on its left in late 1989 has had the benefit of giving some credibility to the HSP's claim to be in the center, it has also meant that the latter's control of ex-HSWP organizational resources is subject to challenge at precisely the moment it needs to mobilize these resources for the election. (2) It is difficult to imagine an electorally successful socialist party anywhere without a working class constituency at its core, no matter how eclectic and moderate its program may be. Yet one of the peculiarities of the current political climate in Hungary is the illegitimacy of attempts to mobilize voters on the basis of class—particularly for a party seeking to disassociate itself in voters' minds from its communist past. (3) Finally, although the HSP is campaigning against communism as hard as every other party is, the political history of its leaders makes that claim somewhat unconvincing. Equally important, it makes the HSP uniquely unacceptable as a coalition partner to its rivals and hence unlikely to be included in a future government.

¹³ See Sabel, Charles and Piore, Michael, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ See Szelenyi's follow-up piece, “Eastern Europe in an Epoch of Transition: Toward a Socialist Mixed Economy?” in Stark, David and Nee, Victor, eds., Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989), 208–33Google Scholar, at 222.

¹⁵ The impact of government policies on private entrepreneurship is carefully outlined in Rupp, Kalman, The Red Entrepreneurs (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ See Comisso, Ellen and Marer, Paul, “The Economics and Politics of Reform in Hungary,” International Organization 40 (Spring 1986), 421–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also Comisso, , “Introduction: State Structures, Political Processes, and Collective Choice in CMEA States,” International Organization 40 (Spring 1986), 195–238CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ See Janos Kis, “Társadalmi Szerzödés” [Social compact], samizdat ms., 1986.

¹⁸ Berend, Ivén, “Continuity and Changes of Industrialization in Hungary after the Turn of 1956–7,” Acta Oeconomica 27, nos. 3–4 (1981), 221–51Google Scholar; Lészló Antal, “Historical Development of the Hungarian System of Economic Control and Management,” Ibid., 251–67; Szamuely, László, “The First Wave of the Mechanism Debate in Hungary (1954–1957),” Acta Oeconomica 29, nos. 1–2 (1982), 1–24Google Scholar.

¹⁹ See Hough, Jerry and Fainsod, Merle, How the Soviet Union is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Staniszkis, Jadwiga, Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 150–71Google Scholar; Révesz, Gábor, Perestroika in Eastern Europe: Hungary's Economic Transformation, 1945–1988 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989)Google Scholar.

²⁰ The dynamics of the political opening outside Hungary and Poland were somewhat different and, with the exception of Romania, were cases of “external push” rather than of “domestic pull.” That is, in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, the economic situation was not nearly so serious as in heavily indebted Hungary and Poland; economic reform was on the agenda only to the degree the Soviet Union had been able to put it there. Nor was the top leadership of the communist parties in those states seriously divided about the undesirability of liberalization. Consequently, if a split in the elite was to come, it had to be engineered from outside, and it was here that Mikhail Gorbachev and the CPSU provided the spark—whether by supporting (and possibly even encouraging and eliciting) the Hungarian decision to allow East Germans to cross the border into Austria, by (one must assume) denying hardliners in the DDR access to the kind of force a “Chinese solution” might have required, or by reprimanding the Czech party for its intransigence to the point where its leaders permitted the student demonstration that started the opposition ball rolling and, once it was in motion, by publishing Soviet apologies for the 1968 invasion. The result was indeed internal party strife, but it was less within the top leadership than between it and lower-level elites based in local party organizations. Thus, while there is clearly no denying the importance of broad social forces in sweeping away the ancien regime, one must also acknowledge the role that forces within the communist parties themselves played in eliciting and channeling those pressures. Bulgaria was perhaps the extreme case: there, the Communist Party literally abandoned its leading role before the opposition requested it to do so. Even in Hungary, it can be argued that the militant reformist wing of the HSWP—with the implicit support of Moscow—did more to destroy the party than did all the opposition groups together.

²¹ It may, however, be correct to say that once a ruling Leninist party abandons its leading role, a centrally planned economy cannot be maintained. Such a proposition need not assume—as does Brzezinski—that authoritarianism is limited to Leninist forms, nor that economic alternatives are limited to central planning and free enterprise.

²² Nuti, “Pcrestroika: The Economics of Transition between Central Planning and Market Socialism,” paper presented at the 7th Panel meeting of Economic Policy, London, April 21–22, 1988, p. 28.

²³ Analogously, plans to sell state assets to private investors are much less pronounced in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, and even Romania—states where debt levels remain manageable (for how long, of course, is an open question).

²⁴ See Szelenyi (fn. 14).

²⁵ See Csanadiné, Maria, “A vállalatnagyság, a jövedelmezöség, és a preferenciók néhány összefuggése [Some interdependencies between enterprise size, profitability, and special government preferences], Pénzügy Szemle 23 (February 1970), 105–21Google Scholar; Déak, Andrea, “On the Possibility of Enterprise Decisions on Investment,” Eastern European Economics 14 (Winter 1975–1976), 14–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁶ See Woodall, Jean, The Socialist Corporation and Technocratic Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nuti, Mario, “Large Corporations and the Reform of Polish Industry,” Jahrbuch der Wirtschaft Osteuropas 7 (1977), 346–405Google Scholar; Nuti, , “Industrial Enterprises in Poland, 1973–80: Economic Policies and Reforms,” in Jeffries, Ian, ed., The Industrial Enterprise in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1981), 39–62Google Scholar.

²⁷ See McClellan, David, ed., Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford University Press, 1977)Google Scholar. See also Wilde, Oscar, “The Soul of Man Under Socialism,” in Howe, Irving, ed., Essential Worlds of Socialism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 411–28Google Scholar.

²⁸ See Oskar Lange, “The Economist's Case for Socialism” and “Marxian Economics and Modern Economic Theory,” in Howe (fn. 27), 699–736; Brus (fn. 5); Horvat, Branko, The Political Economy of Socialism (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1982)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Marx, Karl, “The Communist Manifesto,” in McClellan, David, ed., Marxism: Essential Writings (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 33Google Scholar.

³⁰ Horvat, , An Essay on Yugoslav Society (White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1969), 22Google Scholar.

³¹ Mises, Ludwig von, “Economic Calculation in Socialism,” in Bornstein, M., ed., Comparative Economic Systems, 3rd ed. (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1974), 126Google Scholar, 125.

³² See, for example, Milenkovitch, Deborah, Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971)Google Scholar; Comisso, Ellen, Workers' Control Under Plan and Market (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; Burkett, John, The Effects of Economic Reform in Yugoslavia (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1983)Google Scholar; Estrin, Saul, Self-management: Economic Theory and Yugoslav Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)Google Scholar.

³³ See Comisso, Ellen, “Self-Management and Bargaining,” Journal of Comparative Economics 4 (June 1980), 192–208CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tyson, Laura, Yugoslav Economic Performance in the igyos (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1981)Google Scholar.

³⁴ See Bajt, Alexander, “Efikasnost samoupravnog privredjivanja” [Efficiency in a self-managed economy], Privredna kretanja Jugoslavije, no. 147 (1977), 29–49Google Scholar.

³⁵ Alexander Bajt, personal communication to the author. See also Lydall, p. 112.

³⁶ This thesis is elaborated at length in Comisso, Ellen, “Market Failures and Market Socialism: Economic Problems of the Transition,” Eastern European Politics and Societies 2 (Fall 1988), 433–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁷ See Tyson, Laura, “A Permanent Income Hypothesis for the Yugoslav Firm,” Economica 44 (November 1977), 393–408CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ Estrin (fn. 32), 91.

³⁹ See Comisso (fn. 36), 445.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Yair Aharoni's discussion, in Vernon, p. 131, of investment dilemmas in British nationalized firms. The problem is also examined in Vernon, Raymond and Aharoni, Yair, eds., State-Owned Enterprises in Western Economies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981)Google Scholar.

⁴¹ See Tardos, Marton, “The Conditions of Developing a Regulated Market,” Acta Oeconomica 36, no. 1–2 (1986), 67–89Google Scholar.

⁴² Readers should bear in mind, of course, that the political constraint of maintaining a socialist economy, under which most of these schemes were originally floated, no longer exists in most cases. Nevertheless, the discussion retains its theoretical interest and relevance to the debate on the viability of market socialism outlined above.

⁴³ See Marton Tardos, “Property Rights in Hungary,” paper presented to the conference on “Plan and/or Market,” Institut fur die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Vienna, December 15–18, 1988 (mimeo).

⁴⁴ See Jensen, Michael and Meckling, William, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,” in Putterman, Louis, ed., The Economic Nature of the Firm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 209–30Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ A New York Times report discussing the effects of global linkages between national stock exchanges reveals that “since 1980, foreign trading in United States securities has increased by 19 percent annually. … American purchases of foreign equities have increased by about 30 percent annually. …” Nevertheless, international trade in equity shares still remains a relatively small proportion of total equity exchanges. See “The Realities of ‘Friday the 13th’,” New York Times, October 22, 1989.

⁴⁶ Wlodzimierz Brus, “Evolution of the Communist Economic System: Scope and Limits,” in Stark and Nee (fn. 14), 276.

⁴⁷ See Przeworski, Adam and Sprague, John, Paper Stones (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Panebianco, Angelo, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 273Google Scholar.