¹ The research which explicitly pursues the incentive approach advanced here includes: Payne, James L., Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven 1968)Google Scholar; Woshinsky, Oliver H., “Incentives to Political Action: Connecticut Legislators” (unpublished, 1968)Google Scholar; Payne, , “Toward the Valid and Reliable Determination of the Incentives of Political Participants” (unpublished, 1968)Google Scholar; McCullough, Michael P., “The Brazilian Congress” (unpublished, 1969)Google Scholar; Woshinsky, , “The Political Incentives of French Deputies” (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University 1971)Google Scholar; Payne, ‘The Dominican Politician; An Incentive Analysis of Political Leaders in the Dominican Republic” (unpub., 1971). Two other works which, while not explicitly focused on incentives, have identified politicians who correspond to one or more of our incentive types are Barber, James D., The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life (New Haven 1965)Google Scholar, and the study by Wildavsky, Aaron (in which the senior author participated), “The Goldwater Phenomenon: Purists, Politicians, and the Two-Party System,” The Review of Politics, xxvii (July 1965), 386–413CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Under this definition specific aims, such as the desire for employment, are not “incentives,” since they are instrumental values and not emotional needs. To avoid confusion, we suggest that desired instrumental or external values in politics be called “goals.”

³ The reader will notice that neither “power” nor “money” appear as incentives on our list, even though they are most commonly—and superficially—advanced as “motives” in politics. Space limitations preclude a lengthy discussion of the complex issues involved here. We simply note that we found neither of these terms appropriate for describing fundamental emotional needs of political leaders. Both terms generally connote instrumental goals or resources which men wish to obtain in order to satisfy basic drives (incentives). They are not themselves incentives as we define them.

⁴ Readers may wish to consult the following autobiographies for illustrations of incentive types. Status: The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan (Philadelphia 1925)Google Scholar. Program: The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin (New York 1955)Google Scholar; The Autobiography of Sol Bloom (New York 1948)Google Scholar; Smith, Frank E., Congressman from Mississippi (New York 1964)Google Scholar. Mission: Chambers, Whittaker, Witness (New York 1952)Google Scholar; Koestler, Arthur, Arrow in the Blue (New York 1952)Google Scholar. Obligation: Buckley, William F. Jr., The Unmaking of a Mayor (New York 1967)Google Scholar; Spender, Stephen, in Crossman, Richard, ed., The God that Failed (New York 1952)Google Scholar; Gandhi, M. K., Gandhi's Autobiography (Washington 1960)Google Scholar. Game: Farley, James A., Behind the Ballots (New York 1938)Google Scholar.

⁵ The incentives of all respondents have been classified on the basis of the totality of the interview. We give excerpts only as illustrative of specific attitudes of each type of participant The excerpts in themselves would be inadequate to determine incentives.

⁶ Barber (fn. 1), 94–95, encountered the same negative attitude toward leaders among his “Advertisers” who, we believe, correspond to status incentive participants.

⁷ This phrase comes from Chambers (fn. 4), 196, whose autobiography provides an illustration of the mission participant. Chambers’ religious need appears obvious when he writes: “The ultimate choice I made [to accept Communism] was not for a theory or a party. It was—and I submit that this is true for almost every man and woman who has made it—a choice against death and for life. I asked only the privilege of serving humbly and selflessly that force which from death could evoke life, that might save, as I then supposed, what was savable in a society that had lost the will to save itself.”

⁸ It does not follow, of course, that all Gaullists, Social Christians, or Marxist-Leninists in politics have a mission incentive.

⁹ In Wildavsky (fn. 1), 394; the “Purist” type corresponds to our obligation incentive.

¹⁰ Ibid., 397–98.

¹¹ Barber (fn. 1), 130–54, reports that his “Reluctants,” who correspond to our obligation type, found politics distasteful and alien.

¹² The other incentive was conviviality—a need for friendly interaction with, and personal acceptance by, others. We have omitted discussion of conviviality because it seems so rare at the higher leadership level.

¹³ The use of the “unknown” category is a function of the level of confidence the investigator requires for his incentive identifications. Rarely will the investigator be wholly unable to make a judgment about a respondent's incentive, and in this sense “unknowns” need never appear (e.g., the Woshinsky French Deputy study). If, however, one desires to sacrifice comprehensiveness for a higher level of reliability, then one places in the “unknown” category those interviews which might be unclear to other evaluators (e.g., the Payne Dominican study).

¹⁴ Conviviality, see footnote 12.

¹⁵ This expectation follows from an analysis of the determinants of the status incentive found in Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (in. 1), 27–41.

¹⁶ For this reason, we suspect, it was astonishingly easy for “pragmatic moderates” to regain control of the Republican Party which many believed was permanently and fatally captured by “dogmatic conservatives.”

¹⁷ Our guess about obligation participants in the Democratic (McCarthy) anti-war movement is somewhat supported by Keniston's, KennethYoung Radicals (New York 1968)Google Scholar. This study of twelve leaders of the 1967 Vietnam Summer is rather skimpy on incentive-relevant information (and is not, of course, aimed at incentives), but several quotations are suggestive; see, for example, pp. 114–15, 123, 135, 158–59, 210–11, 216. Also see Wildavsky, Aaron, “The Meaning of ‘Youth’ in the Struggle for Control of the Democratic Party” (mimeo 1969)Google Scholar, and Soule, John W. and Clarke, James W., “Amateurs and Professionals: A Study of Delegates to the 1968 Democratic National Convention,” American Political Science Review, lxiv (September 1970), 888–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ For suggestive illustrations see: Boyd, James, “Harry Dent, the President's Political Coordinator,” New York Times Magazine, February 1, 1970, p. 12Google Scholar; Manley, John F., “Wilbur D. Mills: A Study in Congressional Influence,” American Political Science Re-view, lxiii (June 1969), 442–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Lieberman, Joseph I., The Power Broker (Boston 1966)Google Scholar—a political biography of John Bailey.

¹⁹ See: Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (fn. 1); Woshinsky, “The Political Incentives of French Deputies” (fn. 1); Payne, “The Determinants of Electoral Fraud: An Analysis of Colombian Elections, 1930–1966” (unpub. 1970).