With World War II and the explosion of the atomic bomb, the critical importance of organized research and development (R & D) to weapons development and to international relations became obvious to everyone. It created new problems in national policy, deriving essentially from the mobilization and the close involvement of university science and industrial technology with strategic and quasistrategic aims. And it changed the rules of the game in international relations by increasing, by many orders of magnitude, the costs of waging all-out war.

These twelve organizations appear to have little in common. They are public and private, national and international, profit-making and charitable, religious and secular, civil and military, and, depending on one's perspective, benign and nefarious. Yet they do share three characteristics. First, each is a relatively large, hierarchically organized, centrally directed bureaucracy. Second, each performs a set of relatively limited, specialized, and, in some sense, technical functions: gathering intelligence, investing money, transmitting messages, promoting sales, producing copper, delivering bombs, saving souls. Third, each organization performs its functions across one or more international boundaries and, insofar as is possible, in relative disregard of those boundaries.

Until recently, the commonly accepted notion of human social development held that static “traditional” societies passed through a dynamic transitional period and came to rest again as “modern” industrial societies. Such simplistic stage and linear development theories have now been formally superseded by Huntington's formulation of development and decay as concurrent processes with no necessary endstate. There remains, however, an implicit assumption that highly populated, urbanindustrial societies with continuously growing economies are the proper goal of development, and that the current internal political and economic processes of third-world nations are the proper subject of study.

With the seating of the representatives of the People's Republic of China, membership in the United Nations system has now become almost universal. The major exception to the general rule of universality is the exclusion of the divided nations: Germany (combined population: 68,000,000), Korea (combined population: 47,000,000), and Vietnam (combined population: 35,000,000).

None of the divided nations hold membership in die United Nations proper, although all three of the Western-affiliated sectors have been given observer status at the UN.

The recent presidential election in Chile and the subsequent installation of Salvador Allende as “The first popularly elected Marxist president in the Western Hemisphere” have once again brought that isolated republic to the attention of the academic community, journalistic commentators, and the public at large. This is not the first time that Chile has experienced such world-wide interest in its domestic political affairs: the emergence of the so-called “Socialist Republic” in 1932, the Popular Front experience of 1938–41, and the 1964 election of the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei marked other occasions when interest in Latin American politics has shifted to Chile. But perhaps never before has so much interest been lavished on tlie country as following the events of September, 1970.

The debate over the “tyranny of the weak” has been revived by recent developments in Vietnam and die continuing confrontation in the Middle East. Although some observers conclude that improved understanding among the large powers has weakened the power of the smaller allies, others maintain that the weaker states continue to show amazing intractability. A clarification of these questions should start with an examination of some of the concepts that can fruitfully be applied to a case study witit some potential for comparative analysis.

IN the early 1960's a great deal of “scare” literature was produced concerning Latin America. The titles and subtitles of many of the books and articles written during the period help bear this contention out: “The Eleventh Hour,” “Reform or Revolution,” “Evolution or Chaos.” The concern of scholars and public officials, stemming principally from the Cuban revolution, was that Latin America was about to explode in violent upheaval, that unless democratic reforms were quick in forthcoming, the Latin American nations would soon be the victims of Castro-Communist takeovers. The “one-minute-to-midnight” mentality shaped not only a great deal of official thinking and policy with regard to Latin America during the 1960's, but also permeated, in varying degrees of sophistication, the large body of development literature dealing with the area.

Is foreign economic expansion in some sense an “institutional necessity” for corporate capitalism in the United States? Is there something inherent in the internal dynamics of American capitalism that creates such strong pressures for foreign private investment that the U.S. Government must consider the creation and preservation of an international system that facilitates such expansion to be among our most vital national interests? What yardstick can measure the opportunities, the needs, die necessity of investing abroad, or tie cost and risk if tiie option of foreign private investment is threatened

Why did the Johnson Administration decide in the late 1960's to deploy a ballistic missile defense system in the United States? In attempting to answer this question we need to seek an understanding of several distinct decisions and actions. The most puzzling event occurred in San Francisco on September 18, 1967, when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara delivered an address to the editors and publishers of United Press International. McNamara devoted the first fourteen pages of his talk to a general discussion of the strategic arms race, emphasizing the limited utility of nuclear weapons and the fact that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had gained any increased security from the arms race. With this as background, he turned to a specific discussion of the ABM issue

Integration theorists are increasingly turning their attention away from an examination of the relationship of gains to the integration process and towards the elaboration of complex models in which the salience of the former is obscured. As this variable appears to influence the durability of integrative systems among third-world countries and, by entering into actor calculations of alternatives, effects changes within the integrative system, an analysis is warranted which places the relationship of gains to the integration process in bolder relief.

The application of economic sanctions against Rhodesia and the results of that effort raise the question of the effectiveness of economic coercion as an instrument of foreign policy. A review of U.S. economic coercion against Cuba, in effect since June 1960, and against the Dominican Republic during the period 1960–1962 may be timely and instructive. By exploring the steps leading to the application of U.S. economic coercion, its objectives, and its concrete impact on the target states it may be possible to develop some useful generalizations about the role of economic weapons as tools of foreign policy.

Corruption may be defined in a legal or normative sense, and in some societies the two definitions may be coincident. In the legal sense, corruption is self-regarding behavior on the part of public functionaries that directly violates legal restrictions on such behavior. Normatively, a public functionary may be considered corrupt whedier or not a law is being violated in the process. A legally corrupt person may arouse no normative reprobation; a person judged corrupt by normative standards may be legally clean. What is common to both definitions is the notion of the abuse of public power and influence for private ends. It can safely be assumed that any society or political system manifests some level of one or the other, or both of these forms of corruption.

Bureaucrats perceive politics bureaucratically. They would wish it to be an orderly process. Therefore, when officers of “new” or “developing” nations take power, they seek to legitimize the administrative state. Their model is bureaucracy, but government and administration are found to be very different from the model. Organization does not meet all problems; neither does the issuance of “the right orders.” The goals of administration cannot be achieved without the active compliance of much of the population. What is more, compliance must be active: passive acceptance alone is not enough.

The Hungarian economic reform was introduced in the beginning of 1968. It clearly represents the most radical postwar change, in the economic system of any COMECON country, which has been maintained over a period of years and gives promise of continuity. It has rightly been heralded as a major shift to decentralization, since centralized physical planning of the activities of enterprises was essentially ended widi its introduction. But a study of the new economic mechanism's functioning at the enterprise level, three years after its introduction, suggests a somewhat different interpretation of the reform from the ones most commonly given.

The categorization of states according to size has long been a part of world politics. Rothstein notes, for example, that the formalization of the categories of great and small powers occurred as a result of the signing of the Treaty of Chaumont in 1817. Recently, the concept of size has received an increasing amount of attention as a factor affecting foreign policy. One manifestation of this is the renewed interest in die foreign policy behavior of small states. In his pre-theory of foreign policy, Rosenau includes size as one of three “genotypic” variables assumed to exert a major influence on foreign policy. In addition, empirical studies have shown size to be an important factor underlying variations in the international behavior of nation-states.

Frequently debated, infrequently resolved, but crucial to the study of international relations is the issue of the relative influence of personal factors and role factors in decision-making. Are national decision-makers so constrained by their roles that they have little individual freedom? Or, conversely, are their policies shaped in major ways by their own individual preferences

Theorists in the field of political integration have already established that first-rank states usually assume leadership of the process of what I term external political integration. (The concept itself is neutral: Several autonomous political units merge into a larger one, which may take the form of a loosely-knit confederation, a full federation, or a unitary state.) To use Karl Deutsch's terminology, die leading states usually operate as “core areas.” This phenomenon shows that a first-rank state usually regards its relationship with the process of integration as arising out of the theoretical demands of its prestige.

Macro-Quantitative Analysis, edited by John V. Gillespie and Betty A. Nesvold, should be welcomed by students of cross-national empirical theory and research. It places important reference materials at the fingertips of the analyst, and should stimulate him to take stock of the state of his art. Moreover, it should prove a boon to teaching. I find it hard to conceive of an undergraduate or graduate course on cross-national theory and research which would not benefit from this volume.

Most international lawyers are committed to the belief that law, rather than being a mere fig leaf for the raw thrust of national power, is an independent variable exerting, in Tony D'Amato's apt phrase, a certain pressure on national decision-makers. This fraternal consensus fractures, however, as soon as discussion turns to the questions, what is die exact nature of the phenomenon generally called law which influences decision, and how or why does it achieve the asserted effect

In an earlier issue of this journal, we presented our findings on the composition of the interstate system, along with the diplomatic importance or “status” attributed to each member by die others in the system. Covering the period between the Napoleonic Wars and the onset of World War II, we set out both to calculate the ranking of the states every five years during those 125 years, and to make explicit the criteria by which system membership and status ranks were established. Our major motivation was to identify the empirical domain within which our own research would go forth and to develop certain indicators which were relevant to me Correlates of War project; it also seemed likely that these data might be of use to others in tiie scholarly community.