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Russia–Tariff Treatment: Identifying Systematic Violations of WTO Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2018

KARA M. REYNOLDS  and
BORIS RIGOD
KARA M. REYNOLDS*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, American University
BORIS RIGOD*
Affiliation:
Hausfeld LLP
*
*Email: reynolds@american.edu.
**Email: boris.rigod@hausfeld.
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Abstract

In October 2014, the European Union requested consultations with Russia under the WTO's dispute settlement system regarding Russia's tariff treatment of various agricultural and manufacturing products. Although most of the measures challenged by the EU were individual tariff lines, the final measure in its complaint was a ‘more general measure’ referred to as the systematic duty variation. A WTO Dispute Panel eventually ruled that the EU failed to establish the systematic nature of the duty treatment afforded by Russia to certain products. In this paper, we explore the Dispute Panel's ruling, as well as how claims of systematic non-compliance are treated in other legal settings. We conclude by exploring whether future WTO Panels should instead consider statistical evidence of systematic treatment to promote compliance.

Type
Review Article
Information
World Trade Review , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , April 2018 , pp. 291 - 312
Copyright
Copyright © Kara M. Reynolds And Boris Rigod 2018 

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