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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
On 23 October 2002, a group of about 50 Chechens seized a Moscow theatre and held hundreds of people hostage, threatening to shoot their captives and blow up the building if Russian security amassed outside the theatre attacked. Their demand, that the operations mounted by the Russian army in Chechnya cease, was not taken into account by the authorities who, from the outset, declared that they would not negotiate. The crisis was brought to an end when special troops stormed the theatre, using gas in order to incapacitate the hostage-takers, and averted the detonation of a massive explosion that might have killed all the hostages. Up to 40 Chechens were killed as well as 129 theatregoers.
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36. Tadić jurisdiction Decision, supra n. 14, para. 70.
37. ‘To us it is absolutely of no fundamental importance as of now, the question of Chechnya's dependence or independence from Russia. Only one matter is fundamental to us. We will no longer allow this territory to be used as a bridgehead for attack on Russia. We won't allow!’ Statement of the President of the Russian Federation on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Press Bulletin of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, No. 65 (3225) Special Issue, 21 November 2000.
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42. Pilloud, C., Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C. and Zimmermann, B., eds., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva, ICRC/Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987) para. 4463Google Scholar. However Professor Hampson claims that ‘[i]t is not clear whether the dissident armed forces must manifest the ability to apply the Protocol by doing so or if it is sufficient that they have the capacity or ability to do so’. Hampson, F., ‘Human rights and humanitarian law in internal conflicts’, in Meyer, M.A., ed., Armed conflict and the New Law: Aspects of the 1977 Protocols and 1981 Weapons Convention (London, British Institute of International and Comparative Law 1989) p. 67Google Scholar.
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44. Schindler, loc. cit. n. 27, p. 148.
45. Tadić jurisdiction Decision, supra n. 14.
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49. Usually, international organisations do not pay much attention to internal disturbances unless they lead to a high level of civilian casualties, in which case Common Article 3 is applicable.
50. Pictet, J., Commentary on Geneva I (Geneva, ICRC 1952) p. 52Google Scholar.
51. Yet, ‘the mere fact that the ICRC offers its services in a country does not necessarily imply that serious humanitarian problems have been observed there […]; other parameters also have a bearing on the decision’. Harroff-Tavel, M., ‘Internal Violence’, IRRC No. 294 (1993) p. 201Google Scholar.
52. Amnesty International Expresses Condolences, EUR 46/052/2002, 26 October 2002, http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/russia10262002.html, 13 February 2002. &&&
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54. Prosecutor v. Kupreskić et al, No. ICTY-IT-95-16, 14 January 2000, para. 535.
55. In an interview with NTV, Barayev stated that ‘We are acting on the orders of the supreme military emir’, […] ‘Our military emir is Shamil Basayev, you all know him well’. Vernidoub, A., ‘FSB Says Barayev Acted on Orders From Above’, 1 11 2002Google Scholar, http://www.gazeta.ru/2002/ll/01/FSBsaysBaray.shtml.
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59. Interviewed, Barayev declared the following ‘Maskhadov — he is our president… And though we have repeatedly heard that nobody reports to Maskhadov, nobody recognises him, this — I do not know how to say it your way — this, as they say, is lies and libel. We do report to him and do recognise him. And our talks with Maskhadov…’ Supra n. 55.
60. ‘The Russian Prosecutor's Office accuses Zakayev of forming illegal bandit formations, killing 302 people, including two clergymen, captivity and mutilation, any of which could have been subjects of his camp lectures.’ Russian Information Centre, ‘Bad News for Akhmed Zakayev’, 31 January 2003.
61. There is no doubt that ‘the ban on hostage-taking is one of the most firmly established rules of international humanitarian law, dating back to articles 46 and 50 of the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land’. Burgos, H. Salinas, ‘The Taking of Hostages and International Humanitarian Law’, IRRC No. 270 (1989) p. 201Google Scholar.
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65. Prosecutor v. Manić, Decision No. IT-95-ll-R61,T, 8 March 1996, para. 11.
66. Prosecutor v. Kupreskić etal., No. ICTY-IT-95-16, 14 January 2000.
67. Prosecutor v. Manić, supra n. 65, para. 11.
68. Naulilaa Incident Arbitration, Portugal v. Germany 2 RIAA (1928) p. 1012.
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71. In a report on the situation in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, the High Commissioner for Human Rights concludes that an independent, wide-ranging inquiry commensurate with the scale of allegations of serious human rights abuses in the region has not been carried out, although the Government of the Russian Federation has established a number of constructive mechanisms. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/38, 26 February 2002.
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76. Kalshoven, loc. cit. n. 62, pp. 341–342.
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100. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was requested by the applicant in the Las Palmeras case to gauge the legality of the killing of a Colombian national in the light of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. However, the Court did not rule on humanitarian law and restricted itself to the application of Article 4 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. Las Palmeras, IACHR, Ser. C No. 90, Judgement of 6 December 2001.
101. Supra n. 41.
102. Heintze, loc. cit. n. 26, p. 76.
103. For example, Art. 12 of the Convention on Terrorism clearly states that it is not applicable if the hostage situation takes place in the framework of an armed conflict and that only humanitarian law is then applicable, thereby delineating the scope of application of both sets of rules, human rights/criminal law and humanitarian law. One should nonetheless bear in mind that this Convention is not applicable in the given case as there is no transborder element.
104. Salinas Burgos, loc. cit. n. 61, p. 198.
105. UN General Assembly, Drafting Of An International Convention Against The Taking Of Hostages, Resolution 31/103, UN Doc. A/RES/31/103, 15 December 1976.
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