Law is a social institution. Indeed, it is more: it is one of Man's better inventions in that it has made co-existence possible between large numbers of people and has enabled them to achieve within a framework of control and co-ordination more than individuals could achieve on their own. Law is not by any means the only mode of social regulation, nor may it even be thought paramount; but it is important and pervasive and, as such, deserves to be respected by every society. If a society falters in respect of its law, that could be heralding its undoing. Is that an extravagant statement? Let us see what has been taking place of late in the industrial sphere, which is vital enough to national existence.

This paper is divided into two sections. In the first section I examine the central role played by the concept of ‘legal validity’ in positivist theories of law. I suggest that this concept is capable of varying interpretations, of which some are wholly inapplicable to case law, while others are inappropriate, suggesting a misleading model of case law reasoning.

In the second section, I examine Hart's account of legal validity and the rule of recognition. I suggest that Hart's theory is inadequate because it fails to perceive the special nature of binding practices. I argue that the notion of a binding practice provides the most fruitful basis for an understanding of the common law, and explains the status of case law independently of Hart's account in terms of ‘legal validity’ and the rule of recognition.

It is the purpose of this lecture to suggest that ignorance of the law is a serious social problem in this country and to consider ways in which this problem might be cured or, at least, alleviated. It is proper to start however with a disclaimer. The first half of this lecture will contain many examples of ignorance of the law and might give the impression that I am concerned to attack the ignorant. This is not so. Though some of the examples of ignorance may well be culpable, my predominant concern is with defective institutional arrangements which are the primary source of the ignorance.

What are the prospects for research in the area of labour law in the 1980s? This article argues that the main concern of research should be with legislative intervention in labour relations and should address itself to two inter-related questions: what lies behind the legislation? and how does the legislation function? We make some suggestions about the methodologies and theoretical perspectives of this research.

The urgent need to focus upon legislation requires little justification in view of the fundamental changes in the content of labour law in the last 17 years, particularly since 1971.

Stare decisis provides the framework of certainty in the codeless English legal system. Even since 1966, when the House of Lords announced its power to depart from earlier authority, it has shown great reluctance to do so and has underlined this need for certainty. Given the small number of cases that filter through to the House of Lords, it is, however, the Court of Appeal that plays the vital role in the supervision of the lower courts and in the maintenance of support for the strict theory of binding precedent. Situated at the focal point of our legal system it is responsible, according to Lord Scarman, for its ‘stability, its consistency and its predictability’. Orthodox theory demands that the Court of Appeal, at least in its Civil Division, be bound by its own decisions and look to the House of Lords or Parliament to deal with unsatisfactory law. Yet recently, the Master of the Rolls held that an earlier Court of Appeal decision should, in part, be ignored. It would appear, therefore, that Lord Denning's ‘one man crusade’ (to quote Lord Diplock in Davis v Johnson) against the strict application of stare decisis in the Court of Appeal continues. This article will consider Lord Denning's various pronouncements throughout his career on precedent as it affects the Court of Appeal and will attempt to assess the theoretical justifications of his unorthodox views.

The equitable doctrine of breach of confidence has been much publicised recently: not only in the news, one might say, but of it, as the legal peg upon which the British Steel Corporation hung their attempt to discover the source of a leak in their own organisation by claiming discovery of that source as an unknown wrongdoer. This is, ironically, a case of the biter bit, for it was not so long ago that it was suggested that journalists’ sources might be protected by the doctrine of breach of confidence. The purpose of this article is to question the validity of that assertion, by attempting to show that breach of confidence operates in a field entirely independent of the rules of evidence.

This paper has two starting points, one theoretical the other practical. The theoretical starting point is Ronald Dworkin's rights thesis; the practical starting point is the controversial case of Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment. Our concern is to examine the relationship between the rights thesis and public law disputes such as Bushell. We suggest that this examination throws up some important leads as regards the development of a normative theory of adjudication for public law cases.