¹ Beck, G, ‘The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court, the Primacy of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz’ (2011) 17 European Law Journal 471CrossRefGoogle Scholar. As the Kompetenz-Kompetenz debate makes clear, the concepts of constitutional identity and constitutional pluralism are closely related. The doctrine of constitutional pluralism accepts the legitimacy of national constitutional courts’ constitutional identity claims, but suggests that conflicts between the European Court of Justice and national constitutional courts should be resolved through dialogue and mutual accommodation rather than through uncompromising assertions of primacy.

² See for instance, MacCormick, N, ‘The Maastricht Urteil: Sovereignty Now’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 259CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Walker, N, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Maduro, M Poiares, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action’, in Walker, N (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart, 2003), p 502Google Scholar; Kumm, M, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism’, in Dunoff, JL and Trachtman, JP (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp 258–324CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Avbelj, M and Komarek, J (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart, 2012)Google Scholar; Bogdandy, A von and Schill, S, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1Google Scholar; Goldmann, M, ‘Constitutional Pluralism as Mutually Assured Discretion’ (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 119CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Walker, N, ‘Constitutional Pluralism Revisited’ (2016) 22 European Law Journal 333CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ See Kelemen, R D, ‘On the Unsustainability of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 136CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For critical responses to Kelemen's analysis, see for instance N Walker, ‘Constitutional Pluralism Revisited’, op cit; Bobic, A, ‘Constitutional Pluralism is Not Dead’ (2017) 18 German Law Journal 1395CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ See note 3 above and see also Kelemen, R D, ‘The Dangers of Constitutional Pluralism’ in Davies, G and Avbelj, M (eds) Research Handbook on Pluralism and EU law (Edward Elgar, 2018), pp 392–403CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Article 4(2) TEU states, ‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government’. For the genesis of this provision, see Besselink, L, ‘National and Constitutional Identity before and after Lisbon’ (2010) 6(3) Utrecht Law Review 36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ For an example of such a defence of constitutional pluralism against these developments, see the discussion in Lawrence's contribution to the current volume.

⁷ Costa v ENEL, C 6/64, EU:C:1964:34, p 594.

⁸ Similarly, see Cruz, J Baquero, ‘Another Look at Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union’ (2016) 22(3) European Law Journal 356, p 369CrossRefGoogle Scholar, arguing that, ‘The discourse of constitutional pluralism is built on the basis of this unrealistic vision’.

⁹ Costa v ENEL, note 7 above, p 594.

¹⁰ See Fabbrini, F, ‘After the OMT Case: The Supremacy of EU Law as the Guarantee of the Equality of the Member States’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 1015CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ For a presentation of the European Commission (and CJEU's) approach to the concept of rule of law, see COM(2014) 158 final, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law. For a more general discussion of the tensions between rule of law and legal pluralism, see Tamanaha, B, ‘The Rule of Law and Legal Pluralism in Development’ (2011) 3 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an early critique of constitutional pluralism in the EU from the perspective of legal philosophy, see Letsas, G, ‘Harmonic Law: The Case Against Pluralism’ in Dickson, J and Eleftheriadis, P (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2012)Google Scholar.

¹² Fabbrini, note 10 above, p 1016.

¹³ Kelemen, note 4 above. See also Baquero Cruz, note 8 above, p 368, where he explains that constitutional pluralism, ‘undermines the main objective of integration and the basic social function of law’. For further exploration of the logical contradictions inherent in constitutional pluralism, see Kelemen, note 3 above, p 146, who points out that, ‘Governments seeking to avoid obligations of EU law could evade them by enacting constitutional norms that contradict these obligations’. Notably, even some prominent scholars who are critical of the CJEU's approach to the question of Kompetenz-Kompetenz agree that the doctrine of constitutional pluralism is based on an obfuscation of the fact that in cases of normative conflict, ultimately some judicial authority must have the final say. See eg G Davies, Constitutional Disagreement in Europe and the Search for Pluralism (2010) Eric Stein Working Paper 1/2010; and Loughlin, M, ‘Constitutional Pluralism: An Oxymoron?’ (2014) 3(1) Global Constitutionalism 9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ See Maduro, note 2 above, p 501.

¹⁵ On the risks posed to the EU legal order by the trend of more national constitutional courts challenging the supremacy of EU law, see D Sarmiento, ‘The OMT Case and the Demise of the Pluralist Movement’ (Despite Our Differences Blog, 21 September 2015), at https://despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com/2015/09/21/the-omt-case-and-the-demise-of-the-pluralist-movement; R Uitz, ‘National Constitutional Identity in the European Constitutional Project: A Recipe for Exposing Cover Ups and Masquerades’ (Verfassungsblog, 11 November 2016).

¹⁶ While the descent towards authoritarianism is most advanced in these two member states, there are early signs that the autocratic blueprint pioneered by Orbán is now being deployed by leaders in Romania and Bulgaria. See eg Council of Europe Venice Commission, Opinion – Romania, No. 924/2018, 13 July 2018 and Opinion – Bulgaria, No. 855/2016, 9 October 2017.

¹⁷ The persistence of authoritarian regimes at the state level within broadly democratic federal unions is common around the world, from Latin America, to Asia, to the post-Civil War United States. Partisan politics often plays a key role in the survival of these autocratic regimes, with national level parties protecting local autocrats if they contribute votes to their national coalition. See Gibson, E, Boundary Control (Cambridge University Press, 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ Kelemen, R Daniel, ‘Europe's Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe's Democratic Union’ (2017) 52(2) Government and Opposition 211CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ See Ellis, R, The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States’ Rights and the Nullification Crisis (Oxford University Press, 1987)Google Scholar.

²⁰ See Levinson, S, ‘The Twenty-first Century Rediscovery of Nullification and Secession in American Political Rhetoric’ (2014) 67 Arkansas Law Review 17Google Scholar.

²¹ Moore was removed from his position as chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court as a result of his defiance of federal law. See J Adler, ‘Roy Moore is Constitutionally Illiterate’ (The Weekly Standard, 15 November 2017), at https://www.weeklystandard.com/jonathan-h-adler/roy-moore-is-constitutionally-illiterate.

²² Kelemen, note 4 above; Sarmiento, note 15 above, Uitz, note 15 above.

²³ It may be worth noting that they do so in a broader context where authoritarian populists have successfully capitalised on the amplification (if not fabrication in some instances) of identity-based narratives/fears and nationalist sentiments. See recently, Political Capital Institute, Beyond Populism. Tribalism in Poland and Hungary (2018), at http://www.politicalcapital.hu/news.php?article_read=1&article_id=2277.

²⁴ The Dictator's Learning Curve. Inside the Global Battle for Democracy (Harvill Secker London, 2012), p 4.

²⁵ G Halmai, ‘Legally Sophisticated Authoritarians: The Hungarian Lex CEU’ (Verfassungsblog, 31 March 2017), at http://verfassungsblog.de/legally-sophisticated-authoritarians-the-hungarian-lex-ceu.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ See Pech, L and Scheppele, K Lane, ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU’ (2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁰ D Kochenov, L Pech, and K Lane Scheppele, ‘The European Commission's Activation of Article 7: Better Late than Never?’ (EU Law Analysis, 23 December 2017), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2017/12/the-european-commissions-activation-of.html; T Koncewicz, The Polish Counter-revolution Two and a Half Years Later: Where Are We Today? (Verfblog, 7 July 2018) at https://verfassungsblog.de/the-polish-counter-revolution-two-and-a-half-years-later-where-are-we-today.

³¹ European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded, 2017/2131(INL). For background and a critical analysis, see S Carrera and P Bárd, ‘The European Parliament Vote on Article 7 TEU against the Hungarian government’ (CEPS Commentary, 14 September 2018).

³² For an overview of some of the main arguments used by autocrats to justify their actions and hide their intentions, see D Kochenov and P Bárd, Rule of Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU. The Pitfalls of Overemphasising Enforcement (RECONNECT, July 2018) Working Paper No. 1.

³³ Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Michaniki AE v Ethniko Symvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ypourgos Epikrateias, C-213/07, EU:C:2008:544, para 33.

³⁴ B Novak, ‘Hungary's Constitutional Identity Is Whatever Viktor Orbán Says It Is’ (Budapest Beacon, 28 March 2018), at https://budapestbeacon.com/hungarys-constitutional-identity-is-whatever-viktor-orban-says-it-its.

³⁵ Case 22/2016 quoted and translated by Halmai, G, ‘Abuse of Constitutional Identity. The Hungarian Constitutional Court on Interpretation of Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law’ (2018) 43(1) Review of Central and East European Law 23, pp 34–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁶ Kochenov and Bárd, note 32 above, p 12.

³⁷ Halmai, note 35 above, p 41.

³⁸ Ibid, p 25.

³⁹ Hungary lost the annulment action it brought alongside Slovakia against the Council of the EU's decision of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. See Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, EU:C:2017:631.

⁴⁰ R Staudenmaier, ‘Hungary's Orbán Tells Germany: “You Wanted the Migrants, We Didn't”’ (DW, 8 January 2018), at http://p.dw.com/p/2qV1w?tw.

⁴¹ OSCE, Hungary Parliamentary Elections, 8 April 2018, ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report, 27 June 2018, p 2.

⁴² Unofficial translation of Bill number T/332, Seventh Amendment of the Basic Law of Hungary, Budapest, May 2018, provided by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, at https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/T332-Constitution-Amendment-29-May-2018-ENG.pdf.

⁴³ Novak, note 34 above.

⁴⁴ Speech at the 28th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp, 22 July 2017, at https://visegradpost.com/en/2017/07/24/full-speech-of-v-orban-will-europe-belong-to-europeans.

⁴⁵ European Parliament resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012), 2012/2130(INI) [2016] OJ C75/09, Rec K.

⁴⁶ Ibid, Rec M.

⁴⁷ Article 2, Unofficial translation of Bill number T/332, note 42 above.

⁴⁸ The use of quotation marks is required as the changes adopted by the Polish authorities are not ‘reforms’ but rather a set of unconstitutional measures whose main effect, if not main goal, ‘has been to hamper the constitutionally protected principle of judicial independence’ so as ‘to enable the legislative and executive branches to interfere with the administration of justice’. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers on His Mission to Poland, A/HRC/38/38/Add.1, 5 April 2018, para 72.

⁴⁹ The Chancellery of the Prime Minister, White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary, Warsaw, 7 March 2018, at https://www.premier.gov.pl/en/news/news/the-government-presents-a-white-paper-on-the-reforms-of-the-polish-justice-system.html.

⁵⁰ COM(2017) 835 final, Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, para 173.

⁵¹ White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary, note 49 above.

⁵² First President of the Supreme Court, Opinion on the White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary, Warsaw, 16 March 2018 (on file with the authors).

⁵³ Iustitia, Polish Judges Association, Response to the White Paper, Warsaw 2018, VIII.2.A, p 106.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary, note 49 above.

⁵⁷ O Varol, ‘Stealth Authoritarianism’ (2015) 100 Iowa Law Review 1673, p 1717.

⁵⁸ Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 (English version at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2009/06/es20090630_2bve000208en.html), para 216.

⁵⁹ White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary, note 49 above (bold in original).

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ M Steinbeis, Interview with W Sadurski, ‘What Is Going on in Poland Is an Attack against Democracy’ (Verfblog, 15 July 2016) at https://verfassungsblog.de/what-is-going-on-in-poland-is-an-attack-against-democracy.

⁶² First President of the Supreme Court's Opinion on the White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary, Warsaw, 16 March 2018 (on file with the authors).

⁶³ Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117, para 34.

⁶⁴ CC, 27 juillet 2006, Loi relative au droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l'information, n° 2006–540 DC, spéc. cons. 19: « Considérant, en premier lieu, que la transposition d'une directive ne saurait aller à l'encontre d'une règle ou d'un principe inhérent à l'identité constitutionnelle de la France, sauf à ce que le constituant y ait consenti ». See Dubout, E, ‘Les regles ou principe inhérents à l'identité constitutionelle de la France: une supra-constitutionnalité’ (2010) 3 RFDC 224Google Scholar.

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⁶⁶ European Parliament resolution of 3 July 2013, note 45 above, Rec M.

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