This article explores traditional conceptions of non-justiciability in British Courts in honour of Francis Mann. It highlights the move by domestic courts away from traditional ‘no-go’ areas towards a more nuanced and balanced understanding of the respective roles and competences of the executive and the judiciary; and sees this as a not unfavourable development in an era when domestic recourse is often the only practicable means by which an individual, as opposed to a State, may obtain redress for alleged misconduct on the international plane.

The 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change is relevant to human rights law, not for what it says about human rights— which is next to nothing—but for what it says about the need to address the risk of climate change taking global temperatures above 1.5 or 2 °C. The Agreement could work, or it could fail by a large margin, but those who want to influence the outcome can still do so. That includes the human rights community. Since climate change is plainly a threat to human rights, how should the UN human rights institutions respond? Should they use their existing powers of oversight to focus attention on how States parties implement (or fail to implement) commitments made in the Paris Agreement? Or should they recognize a right to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment? Either choice would represent a significant contribution to the debate on human rights and climate change, giving humanity as a whole a voice that at present is scarcely heard.

This article examines the applicability of the European Convention for Human Rights (ECHR) when a State loses control over parts of its territory. It argues that the jurisprudence of the European Court for Human Rights, which insists on residual positive obligations based in sovereign title over territory, is problematic and needs to be rethought. The Court's current approach is not only likely to provoke backlash, since it requires it to decide politically explosive questions of sovereign title, but does so for very little practical benefit for the protection of human rights. The article therefore explores more preferable alternatives.

The second half of the twentieth century saw major improvements in the legal regime for fisheries management. This notwithstanding, the deep seas remain largely unregulated under international law, until recently only being covered by the general environmental and management provisions found in UNCLOS. In light of this regulatory gap, this article evaluates the potential law-making effects, if any, of the FAO Deep-Sea Fisheries Guidelines, a voluntary instrument designed to provide States with a regulatory framework for the management of their deep-sea fisheries. It considers how the Guidelines may inform, interpret and influence the content of the general high-sea obligations in UNCLOS. Despite the vagueness and generality of those provisions, some indication of their substantive content has been given in recent decisions, particularly the South China Sea Arbitration. By assessing their compatibility, and their level of acceptance by the international community, this article argues that the FAO Deep-Sea Guidelines are beginning to have a law-making effect by providing an authoritative interpretation of the general high-sea obligations found in UNCLOS relating to deep-sea fisheries.

The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001 came into force in 2009, providing a much-needed international legal framework for the protection of underwater cultural heritage (UCH). This article explores the reasons why the UK has neglected to ratify the Convention and why accession should now be prioritized. In doing so, the article reconciles the UK's stance with the agreement; moving the State into a position where it can reconsider ratification. In this context, it examines the definition of UCH and the purpose of the Convention, the extension of sovereign immunity for wrecked warships, and the likelihood of creeping coastal State jurisdiction beyond the competences conferred by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This transformative analysis moves forward the debate on these issues and is of international significance to States that have been similarly hesitant to ratify the Convention until now.

Following the proliferation of private standards in the global supply chain trade, it has become clear that these can have adverse effects on international commerce and world welfare in the same way that government-imposed mandatory regulations do. However, the scope of the obligation of WTO Members in relation to the regulation of private standards remains vague and open to divergent interpretations under WTO law. This article starts from the premise that the debate should move beyond the search for a reasonable interpretation of relevant WTO disciplines and instead begin to consider normative questions concerning the legitimacy and accountability of transnational private regulation in global governance and the potential role of the WTO in regulating such private authority. The article explores what justifies the role of the WTO, a multilateral intergovernmental organization, in regulating transnational private standards and how a regulatory mechanism might be designed and implemented in practice.

Overriding mandatory laws present one of the most pervasive and delicate problems of international arbitration because they affect party autonomy in both its substantive and procedural dimensions. The tension between these concepts both in theory and in practice is a classic emanation of the public–private divide, which is particularly problematic in international and transnational settings. This tension is even stronger in the context of economic integration and regulation, such as in the EU Internal Market. This article revisits and conceptualizes the operation of overriding mandatory laws in the context of arbitration from the perspectives of conflict of laws, public law, and EU law. Drawing on the principles of effectiveness and proportionality, it proposes a practical rather than a theoretical solution to the dialectical relationship between private and public interests in legal certainty.

This article explores the procedural environmental rights practice of regional human rights and environmental protection systems through a comparative lens in order to identify the ways in which existing developments and current trends can inform and enrich the procedural dimension of the right to water. The study suggests that enhanced levels of transparency, public engagement and justiciability in water-related decisions are significant steps towards the achievement of the substantive dimension of the right to water and highlights the potential for cross-fertilization between such regimes towards good water governance.

In the wake of increasing corporate disasters, there has been an urgent need to address the impact of business on human rights. Yet business responsibilities for human rights are mainly voluntary and best understood as ‘soft law’. Recently, however, States have begun negotiations for an internationally binding treaty in this area, suggesting that there is a need to turn to ‘hard law’ to increase the efficacy of business and human rights (BHR) initiatives. This article argues that because soft and hard law concepts are not dichotomous, BHR governance need not become ‘hard law’ to be effective. Rather ‘hardened’ soft law instruments can be equally effective.

Article 7(2) of the Brussels Regulation, 2012 confers jurisdiction, in matters relating to tort, on the courts of the Member State in which the harmful event occurred. In Bier v Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, the CJEU held that this covers both the place where the event which caused the damage takes place and the place where the damage itself takes place. In later cases, however, it held that does not cover the place where the victim claims to have suffered financial damage following upon initial damage arising and suffered by the victim in another Member State. A problem arises if there is no physical harm but only financial loss or some other kind of non-physical harm. It is not always clear in such a situation where the damage occurs. This article considers this problem with special reference to pure financial loss but also two other torts in which no physical harm occurs: defamation and intellectual-property infringement.

This article notes the judgment in Sophocleous v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in which the High Court dealt with the law applicable to civil claims arising out of alleged acts of torture committed by British military and security services in the colony of Cyprus in the 1950s. The judgment is important because it sheds light on some underexplored corners of choice of law (law governing the external aspects of vicarious liability and of accessory liability in tort) and reaches the conclusion, which runs against the grain of other recent judgments given in civil claims brought against the Crown for the external exercise of governmental authority, that English law governs.

In its 2015 judgment in the Costa Rica v Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that Nicaragua's establishment of a military presence in disputed territory violated the territorial sovereignty of Costa Rica. Two judges considered that Nicaragua's actions had constituted a breach of Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter, but the majority of the judges chose not to pronounce on the issue. Whilst it has been clarified that the prohibition of the use of force applies to a disputed territory, it seems less clear as to whether such force has to be violent in nature, causing injury to human beings or damage to property, for it to be in breach of Article 2(4). The ICJ's Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory case strongly indicated that the construction of the wall breached Article 2(4). If a State establishes a military presence to change the status quo in a disputed territory, it would not be regarded as a ‘peaceful’ means of settling the territorial dispute. Therefore, such behaviour would violate Article 2(3), under which States shall settle their international disputes ‘exclusively’ by peaceful means. Furthermore, to constitute an unlawful use of force under Article 2(4), the establishment of a military presence in a disputed territory does not have to be violent but should involve coercion that makes it materially impossible for other claimants to restore the status quo ante without risking human injury or damage to property.