Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Chavismo, Populism, and Democracy
- 3 Measuring the Populist Discourse of Chavismo
- 4 Party System Breakdown and the Rise of Chavismo
- 5 The Causes of Populism in Comparative Perspective
- 6 Populist Organization: The Bolivarian Circles in Venezuela
- 7 Populist Policy: The Missions of the Chávez Government
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix A The Populist Speech Rubric
- Appendix B Test of the Sampling Technique
- Appendix C Test of Interaction Effects
- References
- Index
Appendix C - Test of Interaction Effects
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Chavismo, Populism, and Democracy
- 3 Measuring the Populist Discourse of Chavismo
- 4 Party System Breakdown and the Rise of Chavismo
- 5 The Causes of Populism in Comparative Perspective
- 6 Populist Organization: The Bolivarian Circles in Venezuela
- 7 Populist Policy: The Missions of the Chávez Government
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix A The Populist Speech Rubric
- Appendix B Test of the Sampling Technique
- Appendix C Test of Interaction Effects
- References
- Index
Summary
In order to test for interaction effects between the indicators of sympathy with Chávez's populist discourse and indicators of the other, traditional explanations for the party system breakdown, I ran several new versions of Model 2 from Table 4.5 (the model using Informal rather than Education and Class). Specifically, I interacted Honest, Fight Corruption, and Constitutional Reform separately with (1) each of the retrospective economic evaluations (sociotropic and pocketbook), (2) Informal, and (3) Promote Decentralization, Guarantee Human Rights, and Protect Environment. Because all of these but the retrospective economic evaluations are dummy variables, I created the interaction measure by simply multiplying the two components; hence, a 1 indicates that both effects are present, while a 0 indicates that one or both of them are not. In the case of the retrospective economic evaluations, the resulting scale instead goes from 0 to 3, similar to that of the original economic indicator. In keeping with best practice, I include both the interaction term and the component indicators (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).
Table C.1 presents results from just one of these estimations, using Fight Corruption × Pocketbook Retrospective as the interaction effect.
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- Information
- Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective , pp. 259 - 262Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010