Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Note on Official Documents
- Abbreviations
- The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense
- Part One A War is Generated
- 1 Who Was to Blame and Why It Matters
- 2 The Syrian Connection
- 3 Egypt Flexes Its Muscle
- 4 Historical Opportunity for Israel
- Part Two Cold War Togetherness
- Part Three The First Victim of War
- Part Four Rallying Round Self-Defense
- Part Five War Without Limit?
- Part Six Peace Sidelined
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
3 - Egypt Flexes Its Muscle
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Note on Official Documents
- Abbreviations
- The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense
- Part One A War is Generated
- 1 Who Was to Blame and Why It Matters
- 2 The Syrian Connection
- 3 Egypt Flexes Its Muscle
- 4 Historical Opportunity for Israel
- Part Two Cold War Togetherness
- Part Three The First Victim of War
- Part Four Rallying Round Self-Defense
- Part Five War Without Limit?
- Part Six Peace Sidelined
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
On May 16, Egypt made a military move, bringing troops into Sinai, near the Israel-Egypt armistice line, to supplement the troop force that Egypt ordinarily maintained in Sinai. Shams Badran, Minister of Defense, told Soviet Ambassador Dmitri Pozhidaev that Egypt wanted to have troops in place for an attack “that will begin immediately if Israel attacks Syria.” Egyptian Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer explained to Pozhidaev a deterrent aim: “Israel will not risk starting major military actions against Syria, because if it does Egyptian military units, having occupied forward initial positions on this border will immediately move out on the basis of the mutual defense agreement with Syria.”
Ambassador Yost shared Amer's analysis: “No doubt the Egyptian government decided sometime between May 13 and 16 that, in view of its assessment of the threat to Syria, it must move some of its armed forces up to the Sinai Armistice Line in order to deter Israel or to come to Syria's assistance if deterrence failed.” So too did Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol. On May 16, as the Egyptian deployment was under way, Eshkol told the Israeli cabinet:
In light of information and requests reaching Egypt from Syria regarding Israel's intentions to take extensive actions against Syria, in light of Israeli declarations and warnings over the last few days, and in light of the difficult situation in which Egypt has found itself following April 7, Egypt decided that it cannot sit by idly given the current state of affairs.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-DefenseQuestioning the Legal Basis for Preventive War, pp. 15 - 26Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012