

met violent deaths (whether by execution, suicide, or murder). There is a good deal of other circumstantial evidence that leads the reader down the same road—for example, the testimony of the dead man's doctor, and of his mistress, that he intended to escape abroad on March 10, and the irregular character of the autopsy—but the three facts listed above will, I think, be conclusive for most readers.

Scholars will perhaps find the book's greatest value in Mrs. Sterling's twenty interviews with persons involved in the incident who were still alive in 1968. These interviews took place mainly in Prague, but also in London and Glasgow. The subjects interviewed ranged from Masaryk's butler and his purser, and his three foreign service secretaries, to the director of the Criminal Investigation Department of the Office of Prosecutor General, charged by the Dubček leadership with conducting a formal inquiry into Masaryk's death. The usefulness of these interviews is reduced, however, by the author's failure to indicate in most instances whether they took place before or after the Soviet occupation of August 21, 1968. The work is without footnotes but is provided with a brief bibliography.

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WINTER IN PRAGUE: DOCUMENTS ON CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNISM IN CRISIS. Edited by *Robin Alison Remington*. With an introduction by *William E. Griffith*. Czech and Slovak translations revised by *Michael Berman*. Cambridge, Mass. and London: M.I.T. Press, 1969. xxviii, 473 pp. \$12.50.

INTERVENTION. By *Isaac Don Levine*. New York: David McKay Co., 1969. vii, 152 pp. \$4.95.

REPORT ON MY HUSBAND. By *Josefa Slánská*. Translated from the Czech and with an introduction by *Edith Pargeter*. New York: Atheneum, 1969. xviii, 208 pp. \$5.95.

Each in its own way, these three books deal with the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Remington work, like most documentary collections, has a lasting value, and its importance is likely to increase if new evidence should come to light, for example, a report on the Dubček-Brezhnev conversations, that would enable us to re-evaluate the events of 1968. The stated purpose of the collection is to document the experiment of Prague's attempt "to sweep the ashes of Stalinism from the Czechoslovak road to Socialism" (p. xi); and this attempt to prove a thesis might have been a cause of editorial analyses whose validity has already become dubious and the omission of documents pertaining to the May 1968 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, at which Alexander Dubček warned against "the most serious danger" of "the emergence of antiparty and anti-socialist forces that might launch a struggle for power."

The role played by Dubček in the Czechoslovak events in 1968 has been as much misunderstood as was that of Władysław Gomułka in the "Polish revolution" of 1956. It seems that many journalists and observers have been either unaware of, or unable to comprehend, the nature of "political manipulation" that has characterized modern politics, according to a Czech philosopher, Karel Kosík (pp. 395–98 in Remington). Politics, Kosík says, which is characterized by "the manipulation of masses in an atmosphere of fear and hysteria," can exist "in a system where

everything can be manipulated"; and "manipulation techniques assume and require permanent hysteria, fear and hope." But there have been those who have refused to be manipulated; and they have created problems for the manipulators. One such person was Lieutenant General Václav Prchlik, who let the cat out of the bag when he clearly indicated in his televised press conference on July 15, 1968, that the real cause of the dispute between Prague and Moscow was the Soviet demand to station its troops in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet press charged this unsophisticated military man with revealing state secrets, and, upon Soviet request, Dubček shortly afterward removed him from the key post in the party controlling the armed forces. Remington should be commended for publishing a monitored version of the press conference.

There are some editorial oversights and inaccuracies in Remington's book; for example, Antonín Novotný is listed as "President of the Republic 1953–1968," whereas between 1953 and 1957 Antonín Zápotocký was the president of the Republic. General Josef Pavel, former deputy minister of interior and minister of interior in the post-January 1968 government, an official of the party, is said to have been "jailed for anti-Communist activities" in the 1950s (p. xxiv). These and other errors subtract little from the value of the book; the documents, not the editorial comments, are important.

Isaac Don Levine analyzes the causes and consequences of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. To get answers to the question "Why did Moscow do it?" he went to all the Balkan countries and visited several West European centers where he interviewed important political personalities. Sometimes he identifies those persons; on other occasions, for obvious reasons, his informants preferred to remain anonymous. Simply stated, his general conclusion appears to be that the Soviets are preparing themselves for war, and in order to have their rear secured, they had to have their troops in Czechoslovakia. By the invasion they have achieved their objective, although they had to pay a price for it politically. (Incidentally, this reviewer, who spent most of the summer of 1968 in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, noticed that the real issue separating Moscow and Prague early in 1968 was the stationing of Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia. The view that military and strategic considerations tipped the scales in favor of intervention was stated in his paper "The Soviet Bloc: An Appraisal," presented at the 1968 annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. The Office of External Research, U.S. Department of State, has made copies of it available to interested scholars.)

Levine makes several hints at the clouding of the real issues by the manipulators, and the confusing of the symptoms and effects of the dispute with its causes. He is a seasoned student of Communist affairs, and his journalistic style makes the book easy and interesting reading.

Josefa Slánská gives a personal account of the experiences of the widow of the former secretary-general of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia who was hanged as a spy and traitor in 1952, and was posthumously rehabilitated in 1963. During the "liberalization process" in Czechoslovakia in 1968 illegalities and terror of the Stalinist trials were denounced in broadcasts and publications. Aside from being an example of those writings, Slánská's book also helps to explain why the many Czechoslovak Communists, who professed their complete loyalty to Moscow, were unwilling to part with the limited autonomy that they had acquired during the Khrushchev era for fear that the Soviet military presence in Czechoslovakia might easily lead to a recurrence of Stalinist terror in which they themselves might perish. Slánská mentions in her report that her husband was arrested and liquidated on orders from Moscow, although she herself could not believe it at the time it

happened. She had to go through "a moral hell," she tells us, when she had to listen to her own son who was brought up in the Communist fashion of blind trust in the party and its leader Stalin, and who accepted the charges against his father at face value, saying to her, "If Stalin says so, then it must be true" (p. 143).

Although Slánská condemns those who did not care for "the honest Communists" whose bones were broken and teeth knocked out as being people without "a conscience," she was no different when her husband was in power. Slánský was coresponsible for the liquidation of thousands of non-Communists, and he received the Order of February for it. The innocent victims of Slánský, who also included some Communists, are not even mentioned in her book. Slánská, who never ceased to be a true believer, had a premonition dream in May 1968; and it is likely that it will come true, as her two previous premonitions did. Perhaps the third ordeal will make her realize that she was wrong when she believed in the Communist Party—the god that failed—and that what she and her nation need is not the nonfeasible "socialism with a human face" but the feasible "democracy with a human heart."

As the Czech philosopher Karel Kosík quoted above put it, the Czech question has been a world-wide question; and he believes that "our present crisis can be solved as a world crisis." Despite the Soviet occupation of his country, he calls for the abolition of the "system of general manipulability." It would seem that only God could do that; and, thus, symbolically, Remington concludes his documentary collection with "A Prayer for Tonight" by Karel Čapek.

All three books are very useful indeed.

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BERZEVICZY GERGELY, A REFORMPOLITIKUS (1763–1795). By *Éva H. Balázs*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1967. 388 pp. Ft. 70.

Gergely Berzeviczy (1763–1822) was one of the precursors of the nineteenth-century Hungarian reform movements. His views differed, however, in many respects from the gentry liberalism that sustained the Hungarian reform movements of the pre-March era. His deviation from the tenets of nineteenth-century gentry liberalism in Hungary has been responsible for the long-delayed assessment of his career, yet the same characteristic also is the reason for his attraction to students of Hungarian and Central European history. The descendant of a noted gentry family of northeastern Hungary, he sympathized from his youth with the reforms of Joseph II. He was especially interested in the possibilities of modernizing the stagnant Hungarian economic system. In his principal treatise of 1806 he pointed out, however, that economic reforms were tied necessarily to the emancipation of the peasants and to the improvement of their economic and social conditions. He viewed the Hungarian relationship to the empire and to the nationalities issue from this fundamental point of view. Though he sympathized with the Hungarian noble movement of 1790, he did so because he realized the fallacy of a centralized political structure for the empire. At the same time he showed little regard for the Hungarian linguistic movement and gentry-led national manifestations after 1790, but emphasized the great need to modernize the economic and political structure of Hungary.

This study is a most successful portrayal of the early life and personal development of Berzeviczy to 1795 done by a noted Hungarian historian associated with the Hungarian Historical Institute. Of particular value is her examination of Berzeviczy's student years at Göttingen and of the impact on his thought of sojourns