

add authority to his account of the 1950s. The book deals fully with the Hungarian revolt, less so with the Prague Spring. Indeed, the account of U.S. policy in October–November 1956 deserves very high marks. Kovrig speculates that Dulles's "perhaps gratuitous assurance" (in Dallas on October 27) that the United States under no circumstances would use force strengthened the hand of those Soviet leaders who favored repressing the Hungarian revolt. Since we know the Politburo was divided on that decision, it may have been so. Dulles's purpose was surely to persuade the Soviets that they could have security without repression, and in that he failed. But the determining facts were those of power, not Suez or confusion in Washington. Kovrig makes clear that the United States could not have done anything effective militarily (unless it chose to use atomic weapons), and the Soviets were aware of that. Indeed the Soviet repression of the Hungarians, like other Soviet actions in East Central Europe over the years, took place almost without reference to the United States. The shades of difference in U.S. declaratory policy—as it moved from nonacceptance to liberation to bridge-building and finally to peaceful coexistence, a term invented in the Soviet Union—depended mainly on how loudly Washington chose to advertise its impotence.

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THE ODER-NEISSE BOUNDARY AND POLAND'S MODERNIZATION: THE SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPACT. By *Z. Anthony Kruszewski*. Foreword by *Morton A. Kaplan*. Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. xvii, 246 pp. \$16.50.

One-third or more of the prewar Polish territory was taken over by the Soviet Union as a consequence of World War II, while Poland was pushed far west into one-time German territories, up to the Oder-Neisse line. Thus Berlin found itself almost at commuting distance from the Polish border.

In 1939 this entire area was inhabited by about 7 to 8 million people, over 6 million of them German nationals. More than 3 million Germans fled or were transferred during the war; the remaining 3.5 million were transferred in a gigantic *Ostflucht* by 1945–59. What remained, in addition to some Germans, was about one million or more of so-called autochthonic Polish population, who declared themselves Poles, knew the language, and were permitted to stay. Towns and villages, ports and factories, lay abandoned. This vacuum was again filled by a mass migration of about 6 to 7 millions. People from the Eastern Polish territories, taken over by the Soviet Union, were moved toward the West. Streets and villages were filled with an entirely new population. A new society was formed on a territory which was first vacated like rented rooms, and then filled with new tenants.

Somehow those changes were marked on maps and in school atlases and diplomatic manuals, but the great historical drama resulted in little if any major interest of historians and social scientists in the West. This gap is filled with skill and expertise by the balanced and scholarly Kruszewski volume. Kruszewski, in a clear and well-organized presentation, tells us about the new society which emerged in this area and was molded together by two powerful though sometimes opposing forces—the Communist Party and the Catholic Church. (The official functions of

the Communist administration in this area were often initiated with a Holy Mass.) In a coercive, authoritarian way a new socioeconomic base was formed, which sometimes suffered reverses.

Kruszewski has written an honest and highly informative book. He tells us candidly about the intolerant, sometimes unambiguously oppressive nationality policies, but on the other hand he gives an unconditional and fair picture of the achievements. In consequence a new, quite different nation has emerged. A mass of peasants were brought into this Polish melting pot. Institutions and values began to change, while intergroup tensions between the autochthonic population and the newcomers appeared and increased.

Kruszewski illustrates his volume with excellent statistical tables, and supplies a fine and extensive bibliography. Indeed the book is a very useful contribution, a service to scholars of the East European area.

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REVOLUTION AND TRADITION IN PEOPLE'S POLAND: EDUCATION AND SOCIALIZATION. By *Joseph R. Fiszman*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. xxii, 382 pp. \$15.00, cloth. \$7.50, paper.

Professor Fiszman has written an interesting and thought-provoking book on education in present-day Poland. He was given access to research material collected by official Polish institutions and organizations (the Union of Teachers and the Atheist Society), which very few Western scholars have been allowed to see and use. This by itself should draw the attention of all who study the internal development of the countries of the Soviet bloc in Europe, and who are nearly always starved for factual material on so many matters. On the other hand, as the author admits, the statistics made available to him are very imprecise, or are completely silent on many important aspects of Polish education (p. xviii). Thus we are never given the hard facts about the earnings of teachers or a comparison of these with the salaries of other social groups (in the very last chapter, on page 318, the author just mentions the "extremely low salaries of teachers, especially at the lower levels"). Neither is much attention given to the astonishing condition of employment which refuses Polish teachers any contractual arrangement with the employers, and gives the latter the right to fire a teacher without even a day's notice (p. 128). Yet the teacher is obliged by law to stay in his place of work at least three years, whatever the circumstances (p. 83).

Fiszman decided to tackle the problem which is the most difficult for a Westerner dependent on the good will of officials: the politics behind education in a country ruled by Communists. One can fully appreciate his effort not to become a propagandist of the proscribed line. But while he succeeds in many cases, he fails in the, to me, most important ones. Fiszman rightly sees in the Roman Catholic Church the institutionalized opposition to the party line on education. Yet not once does he use the impressive sociological works on this very problem by highly trained Catholic scholars, who work in the Catholic University in Lublin, unique in Eastern Europe; the Polish author most quoted on these matters in his book is Mr. M. Kozakiewicz, a leader of the insignificant Atheist Association. The author's view on religion, and other typical expressions of Polish culture, is that they are remnants