maintenance of the status quo: Europe's independence. While the military weakness of Europe reassures Moscow, limits on her industrial potential are regarded with secret favor by the Americans.

The latter, so the argument continues, are now in the process of taking over Europe economically. Their cheap dollar buys up entire industries, while their heavy participation in others makes everything, from production methods to the rate of employment of the labor force, dependent on decisions *not* made in Europe. American firms are today in virtual control of such key industries as oil, petro-chemicals, car manufacturing, civilian airplanes, computers, even detergents. At the other end of the spectrum, an increasing number of publishing houses have also been lately acquired by American interests.

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It is not difficult to see from the nature of these arguments that a policy aimed at making Europe less dependent on the United States has many, varied, and also distinguished partisans. A good number of them are recruited among labor leaders, politicians, and Common Market officials who may agree on little else. These views were explained to me in a summary fashion last summer by an intelligent German politician: "Although we should not say so, we are glad de Gaulle speaks the way he does to the Americans. Nobody else would dare."

Our second question was: Can the Gaullist "grand design" succeed? An additional question is: Should we wish it success? De Gaulle is the first to agree that the world is primarily governed by considerations of national security, that is by military realities. That is why he, and his military advisors, among them General Pierre Gallois, reversed their trust in American atomic protection of Europe. The U.S., now directly exposed to attack by Soviet missiles, would not protect Western Europe in case retaliatory missiles might hit New York and Chicago too. Indeed, as if to confirm this analysis, Washington recommends a graduated escalation for such an eventuality; meanwhile, however, Europe would fall under the non-atomic boots of Soviet soldiery.

The fact is, however, that Europe has no alternative other than trusting the credibility and efficacy of the American atomic umbrella. The Germans are in best position to know this, and to know also the insufficient credibility and efficacy of the French *force de frappe*. Why would de Gaulle sacrifice Paris, any more than Washington would sacrifice New York, for the defense of Berlin or Milan? De Gaulle's analysis of American intentions can be turned against him, too.

But aside from defense considerations, it is becoming clear to most Europeans that while certain acts and words of the General are designed to strengthen Europe, others are just as firmly undermining her common policies and interests. It bears repeating — since doubt is cast systematically on the issue nowadays — that the immense majority of Europeans, and Frenchmen, cling tenaciously and through sober arguments to the American alliance. They are literally filled with horror when de Gaulle acts to discard this alliance, makes anti-German speeches in Poland, denounces the United States in Southeast Asia, and courts the Kremlin's favors. Such policies are emphatically *not* those that my above-quoted German interlocutor approved; outside of the Communists, such policies are applauded only by the frivolous and nihilistic elements who see in them something new and "self-creating" in the Sartrian sense, and free because irresponsible.

Many things might have turned out differently if de Gaulle, and France, possessed the *means* of carrying out this one objective: making of Europe a partner of *equal power* and comparable military power with the United States. Clearly, de Gaulle does not possess the means, and all his verbal brilliance cannot hide the fact. Thus he becomes an instrument (of Moscow), a negligible quantity (for Washington), and a factor of division (for Western Europe); by no means a world-shaping, positive force. His personality is ultimately responsible for this quasi-tragedy: the figure is immense, but the man inside the figure is cold, ruthless, vindictive. Many admire him, nobody loves him, everybody mistrusts him. And only America can afford to remain indifferent to him.

correspondence

"THROUGH THIN & THICK"

San Francisco, Calif.

Dear Sir: While I am duly appreciative of having you recall my series of articles on "The Nuclear Obsession," and especially my observations on the anti-ballistic missile debate, I must protest at even the indirect implication that I agree with your editorial remarks in the October 1967 issue of *worldview*. For reasons that I hope to make clear, I am convinced that your latest views are extraordinarily wide of the mark. To put it bluntly, I think you are trapped in the world of imagery; from that perspective, *any* disagreement between Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff must always be resolved in favor

of the Secretary, since your world of imagery simply does not permit you to support a "military" viewpoint on any issue at all.

If there was any overall theme to my series of articles, it was that all of us had to spend a great deal of effort on trying to synthesize into a workable whole the viewpoints we hold on a wide variety of international issues. I tried to argue that the military questions we faced were indeed tough ones, but that they could better be understood by playing them off against other foreign policy questions. I argued against the nonproliferation treaty, for example, partly because it seemed to me that a U.S.-USSR nuclear "concert" would be unnecessarily anti-Chinese in character. It seemed curious to me that the people most interested in the nonproliferation treaty were precisely those most interested in normalizing U.S.-Chinese relations, it being obvious to me that the two policy approaches had not been placed alongside each other for purposes of direct comparison. Admittedly, rationality and logic are not the hallmarks of international politics, but I must continue to argue that such policy comparisons are most useful. Given this approach, your remarks on the A.B.M. questions need instant rebuttal.

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You appear to have forgotten a few of the basics that have surrounded the A.B.M. issue. It has been only a very few months, for example, since the issue was explored in terms of "A.B.M. or no A.B.M." instead of the way it is mentioned now, "thin A.B.M. versus massive A.B.M." There are great differences between these two versions of the problem. When I wrote my article, the U.S. was engaged in an all-out effort to obtain agreement from the USSR that it would cease and desist *any* further development or deployment of an A.B.M. system. The argument, in other words, turned on an alleged continuation of a U.S.-USSR "arms race," not on the issue of a "thin" U.S. A.B.M. defense against either "accidental" or Chinese attacks. You seem to have lost sight of these vastly different approaches.

The decision to opt for a "thin" A.B.M. defense must be viewed in terms of our failure to get agreement from the Russians to stop the whole thing on the grounds that it is a waste of resources. The Soviets did not rise to the bait and, whether we like it or not, we must contend with the question of why they reacted the way they did. For my part, I suggested a few months ago that one does not "stop" arms races when the defense appears to be overtaking the offense. I suggested also that the U.S. had glorified defensive weaponry in its diplomacy at the time of the Bay of Pigs affair. And I added that the USSR might not be too eager to abandon an historic Soviet addiction for defensive weaponry. I am not up-to-date enough to know if the Soviets have achieved a technological breakthrough of paramount significance. All I know is that news reports continue to mention exotic "X-ray" breakthroughs which could have significant impact upon the A.B.M. issue. The point is that the U.S. decision can be viewed only in the context of the failure to reach agreement with the USSR; your image world of blustering generals and militaristic congressmen simply will not do.

From this point, the problems in logic seem to proliferate. There is a vast difference between arguing against any A.B.M. system at all, as was the fashion a few months ago, and arguing against a "heavy" system. The same debating points simply do not apply to both arguments. A few months ago, the entire discussion was cast in terms of a U.S.-USSR arms race; now, if we are to accept (as you do) the McNarama argument, we should build an A.B.M. to defend ourselves against the Chinese. If you do in fact agree with this approach, it follows that you have accepted the argument that the Chinese are irrational, aggressive, and incapable of joining the world community. On overall balance, I would not expect you to take this position—but that is the inescapable logic of your support of the so-called McNamara position as opposed to the so-called Joint Chiefs argument.

Perhaps the remainder of what I have to say can be classified as "debating points," but I think them important enough to spell out. You should have noted by now, first of all, that it will not do to classify the A.B.M. as merely another intensification of the arms race. It is virtually impossible to be worse off *with* an A.B.M. than *without* it. You do not seem fazed at all by the realization that Secretary McNamara, in a total reversal of 1962 arguments (in his famous Ann Arbor speech) that nuclear wars will be fought in a "clean" manner (weapons versus weapons instead of weapons versus society), now argues that deterrence means that the aggressor must be certain that his entire society will be destroyed. What could possibly be wrong with trying to prevent such an eventuality through construction of a wholly *defensive* system?

Second, and in connection with what has been said above, the development of a "thin" A.B.M. system could only have the effect of encouraging the Chinese to increase their offensive capabilities, could it not? Why do you imply that a "massive" A.B.M. system will encourage the Soviets to produce more offensive weapons and that a "thin" system will *not* encourage

the Chinese to produce more offensive weapons?

Third, and perhaps most fascinating of all, is your juxtaposition of "money" and "value" questions. I cannot improve upon Admiral Rickover's recent testimony before a Congressional committee as to the defects of "cost-effectiveness" analysis. How, in all honesty, does one place a dollar value upon the possibility that a number of lives might be saved in certain circumstances? In an earlier rejoinder to one of my critics, I pointed out that everyone should read both Secretary McNamara's official statement on the A.B.M. and the one issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We simply must get out of the straitjacket imposed by the world of imagery; in this instance, the military leaders are advocating the development of purely defensive weapons and are being accused in the process of trying to accelerate the arms race. Certainly there has to be some "value" attached to attempts to neutralize the offensive weapons of a potential enemy.

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In sum, about all I can ask is that you make a more rigorous attempt to sort out and deal with the precise questions that face you and all of us in connection with an issue as intricate as this one. If, on the surface, the position of the American Security Council appears ludicrous to you, please re-examine their statements in terms of the possible threat from the USSR and the Chinese. If all we need consider is the Chinese threat, then perhaps the Council's warnings are overdone; but if, on the other hand, there is a genuine Soviet threat, the Council may not be far off the mark. In either case, you must examine your conclusion in the light of what you want to achieve in other policy arguments. Please do not let yourself fall into the trap of *always* opposing the military solely because you cannot abide a military viewpoint.

Jack Walker

The Editor Replies:

If the October editorial inadvertently implied that Mr. Walker shared our views on the A.B.M. debate we regret it and are pleased to dissociate our views from those expressed in his letter.

Whatever the term "your world of imagery" means to Mr. Walker—it means little to us—it has served to confuse him. It is Mr. Walker, not our earlier editorial, who speaks of "blustering generals and militaristic congressmen." Nor did we describe anything about the National Security Council as "ludicrous"; we described that organization as a "private organization that has much prestigious support" and quoted its position on the A.B.M. There is nothing in the editorial to support Mr. Walker's charge that we cannot abide a military viewpoint. For whatever reason, he has assigned us to a world that is not ours.

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To more substantive points: the editorial was primarily analytic and descriptive; it was not hortatory or prescriptive. Admittedly the editorial did not mention, let alone analyze, all of the relevant issues. Mr. Walker mentions some of these, quite correctly noting that we should consider them not in isolation but in relation to other foreign policy issues. An adequate response to Mr. Walker's considered letter would develop two main points: first, that a consideration of all the issues relevant to foreign policy would still leave large room for disagreement; second, the A.B.M. decision involves not only foreign policy issues but important domestic issues Mr. Walker has ignored.

To sketch in some of these points, Mr. Walker says flatly that "It is virtually impossible to be worse off *with* an A.B.M. than without it." Mr. McNamara says that the A.B.M. shield would be "massive, costly, but highly penetrable" and an invitation to speed up what most citizens would label an arms race. It is unlikely that Walker and McNamara are both correct. It has also been suggested, quite logically, that pressure for atmospheric testing will correspond to the growth of the A.B.M. These points merit steady examination.

Mr. Walker ignores domestic considerations, but it has been plausibly suggested that McNamara accepted even the thin A.B.M. less because of a potential Chinese threat than because of present domestic political pressure. The Aesopian character of much of the A.B.M. debate supports such a supposition. The matter of money and values also needs serious consideration within terms of domestic policy. The U.S. may be able to produce bullets and butter but it is presently being done at the expense of the most disadvantaged members of our society. Our foreign policy decisions and their military implementation are not wholly separable from the conditions of our society and cannot adequately be considered apart from them.

Mr. Walker emphasizes throughout his letter the need for reason and logic, and Mr. McNamara concluded his remarks on the A.B.M. by saying, "What the world requires in its 22nd Year of the Atomic Age is not a new race toward armament. What the world requires in its 22nd Year of the Atomic Age is a new race toward reasonableness." On that need possibly Mr. Walker, Mr. McNamara and *worldview* policy can agree.