

ROBERT KILWARDBY by José Filipe Silva, [Great Medieval Thinkers], Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020, pp. xvi + 304, £22.99, pbk

With the eight hundredth anniversary of the arrival of the Dominicans in Oxford in 1221 it is timely to have Robert Kilwardby OP added to this OUP series of Great Medieval Thinkers. Kilwardby's own Oxford career must have been a generation later, in the middle of the century, with his election as provincial of the English Dominican Province to follow in 1261 and appointment as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1272.

Kilwardby wrote the usual commentary on the *Sentences*, though his has some unusual features. He was also the author of an encyclopaedic work, the *De ortu scientiarum*. His probable or disputed authorship of other surviving writings is discussed in brief in the introductions to this study, with a useful comparative table of the various attempts to determine which are really his. A list of printed editions is included in the Bibliography.

One of Kilwardby's most important legacies was his commentary on textbooks of the Arts course. His commentaries on grammar are among the oldest of their kind to survive. His commentaries on Aristotle, both the *logica vetus* and the *logica nova* were also important. The commentary on the *Prior Analytics* seems to have been especially influential. That on the *Posterior Analytics* may postdate that of Robert Grosseteste but was certainly one of the earliest to be attempted as the new universities began to include them in the syllabus.

The author explains that his original intention was to set Kilwardby's 'major findings' in 'contrast' with those of his contemporaries, but the space-limits of the series in which it appears did not allow that. He has therefore written a discussion of Kilwardby's own thought, intended for a non-specialist readership and with a restricted set of references to the texts and what he describes as a 'minimum' secondary literature. Where there is a translation he cites it, including the Latin where necessary for clarity and where there is no published version for reference.

This self-imposed limitation may make it rather less easy for the newcomer to judge from this study how important Kilwardby (1215-1279) was in a generation of contemporaries as well-studied as Albertus Magnus (d.1280), Aquinas, and Bonaventure, who both died in 1274. These scholars all knew one another and worked in a university world where academe was already showing signs of being competitive and well-connected.

The main body of the book consists of a detailed analysis of Kilwardby's thinking, treated in a sequence of topics. There are chapters on 'Being'; 'Being Logical'; 'Knowing'; 'Behaving'; 'Believing'; and 'Incarnating', each with a prefatory note explaining Silva's own approach. Silva has sought to show what Kilwardby thought and why, what he took from the standard authorities and how he made it his own. The strength of this analysis lies in its clarity on the points of modern as well as medieval

philosophical importance Kilwardby raised, and on which he often took a distinctive view.

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AQUINAS ON BEATIFIC CHARITY AND THE PROBLEM OF LOVE by Christopher J. Malloy, *Emmaus Academic*, Steubenville, Ohio, 2019, pp. 288, \$34.95, hbk

A title is not insignificant. In this case it draws the reader immediately into the complex problem both ancient and new – the problem of love. Augustine synthesized the problem centuries ago in two simple statements quoted in the opening lines of Malloy’s book: ‘The love of self unto the contempt of God’, and ‘the love of God unto the contempt of self’ (p.1).

Are love of self and love of God mutually exclusive; is self-love *necessarily* egotistical such that true beatitude as union with God negates any form of authentic love of happiness *per se*? Eloquent philosophers and theologians, including Ramírez, Gallagher, and Sherwin, to name only a few, have employed Thomas Aquinas’s writings to resolve the dilemma. Malloy’s extension of the discussion suggests that these expositions are neither exhaustive nor completely successful. Here, lack of success indicates not lack of intelligence or effort, but rather, the *gravitas* of a topic. One does not have to be learned to understand what is at stake: How can one rightly acknowledge the coexistence of love of God and an individual’s pleasure? If human pleasure necessarily implies egocentrism and selfishness does it not negate true love of God? Must not true love of God be totally disinterested?

Malloy enters the arena prepared to defend love of God above all things as the *bonum proprium* of man, while at the same time arguing that based on the Creator-creature relationship, God can be called ‘most perfectly one’s *bonum suum*’ (p.127). This relational aspect of human nature leads him to conclude that ‘God allows to flourish in the human person the natural order of love that emanates from His creative hand’ (p.252). To achieve his goal Malloy first speaks to contemporary and historical critiques of Aquinas and distorted teachings. Mentioning Luther, Kant, Feuerbach, *et al.*, in passing, he accents contemporary critics such as Lutheran theologian Anders Nygren, who describes Aquinas’s teaching on love as eudaimonism at its finest (pp.87ff). Though the critics’ arguments and conclusions differ, traces of voluntarism often emerge; thus the debate inevitably makes reference to Duns Scotus. Malloy does not dedicate copious pages to Scotus, but he opens by conceding that Scotus and