

of agitation have changed significantly over time. Kuznetsov cites the 1922 census data showing that over 93 percent of the CPSU members had eight or fewer grades of schooling; thus the party itself provided the audience for the agitator (p. 82). Now, with rising educational levels, each member of party, government, and public organizations is expected to function as agitator, with the primary party organization exerting coordinating responsibility. Agitation is to be specialized, differentiated by occupational and educational characteristics of audiences, and less narrowly production-oriented (Khrushchev's error). Obviously referring to *détente*, Kuznetsov asserts that the more frequent contacts with capitalist countries are opening new channels of communication, new sources of hostile propaganda. It will be the task of agitation to counteract this "ideological subversion," which seeks to promote nationalism, neutralism, and the "de-ideologization of public life" (p. 178). Agitation is to be directed also toward those who "in one way or another escape the influence" of other forms of political communication (p. 248), a statement that supports recent findings of Soviet sociologists relating to the uneven saturation of the mass media in the Soviet Union.

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THE SOVIET INTELLIGENTSIA: AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ROLES OF SOVIET INTELLECTUALS DURING THE 1960s. By *L. G. Churchward*. London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. xiv, 204 pp. \$10.00.

This small volume makes a welcome contribution to an important and much misunderstood topic. There are three major prevailing Western misconceptions about the characteristics and role of Soviet intellectuals. One is the persisting image of the prerevolutionary Russian intelligentsia which is sometimes transferred to the Soviet intelligentsia who survived the purges and the new generations which have matured since. Another attitude imposes the Western model of intellectuals on the Soviet setting. The third makes generalizations about Soviet intellectuals on the basis of its tiny fraction engaged assertively in political dissent, as frequently reported in the Western mass media. The work reviewed here is free of these misconceptions and provides a sensible and well-informed account of the characteristics of contemporary Soviet intellectuals and their various subtypes.

Many of the disputes concerning the functions and attributes of Soviet intellectuals hinge on our definition of the intellectual. If, as is frequently done in the West, we define intellectuals as critical, marginal, dissatisfied, and poorly integrated, then we may conclude that there is no intelligentsia in the Soviet Union, only hordes of technicians and a few malcontents. The author's definition is simple and unambiguous: "I regard the intelligentsia as consisting of persons with a tertiary education (whether employed or not), tertiary students, and persons lacking formal tertiary qualification but who are professionally employed in jobs which normally require a tertiary qualification" (p. 6). To overcome the limitations of such a definition he also provides a typology of contemporary Soviet intellectuals based on their political attitudes, in an increasing order of alienation from the system. Thus he classifies them as careerist professionals (estimated at three quarters of the total), humanist intelligentsia, open oppositionists, and the lost intelligentsia (pp. 136-39).

Churchward shows that the major factor determining the social roles and political attitudes of Soviet intellectuals is their high degree of integration into the system: "The basic role of the Soviet intelligentsia is to provide high-level specialists for all branches of human endeavour, including government and administration" (p. 90). He also notes that a "clear distinction cannot be drawn between intellectuals and the *apparatchiki*" (p. 123). If so, the author's belief that they significantly influence policy-making is questionable, since it is hard to decide in what capacity—apparatchik or intellectual—they do so and with what degree of autonomy.

In addition to such issues the book also discusses and documents the social, ethnic, sexual, and occupational composition of Soviet intellectuals, their training, recruitment, internal differentiation and life-styles, using Soviet sociological data. This is an indispensable volume for a better understanding of the Soviet intelligentsia in the 1960s and the present.

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MEZHDUNARODNYE DOGOVORY V SOVREMENNOM MIRE: VO-
PROSY PRAVA MEZHDUNARODNYKH DOGOVOROV V SVETE
RABOTY VENSKOI KONFERENTSII OON, 1968–1969 GG. By *A. N.*
Talalaev. Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia," 1973. 247 pp. 93 kopeks.

Peaceful coexistence is linked with ideological struggle in the Soviet Communist Party program of 1961. Talalaev uses his Moscow University textbook to this end: to explain minute details while flaying bourgeois authors and imperialist powers for attempting to prevent progressive development. Progressivism is shown to require acceptance of universality of treaties (no state may be excluded from adherence to treaties of general concern), rejection of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, acceptance of a multilateral treaty as binding to which reservations have been entered if other parties do not object, rejection of a treaty as ineffective if negotiated under conditions of duress or fraud or in violation of imperative norms, and rejection of a treaty designed to foster colonialism or aggression.

Soviet practice is praised while other practice is derided, sometimes with incomplete exposition. For example, the thirty-five-second ratification of a treaty by the Japanese Diet is compared with the report by the foreign minister and other speeches in Supreme Soviet committees prior to ratification by the Presidium. A fair account would require comparison of the Communist Party consideration and the Japanese committee consideration leading up to the floor drama.

Clearly the USSR as an established power now wants predictability of law. Thus Talalaev disapproves of unilateral denunciation of treaties under *rebus sic stantibus* and praises *pacta sunt servanda*. Regrettably he omits consideration of disputes over interpretation of an obligation. Thus he finds the Soviet side has never violated a treaty, while others often do. The example he gives is the delayed opening of a second front in France by the Allies in 1942. His students ought to hear the debate over what the obligation was. And what of Yalta?

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