

be addressed are land ownership, land use and protected areas. He argues that the only way forward is in allowing sustainable trade at all levels, excluding endangered species, while meeting ecological, social and economic criteria. Interestingly, he examines parallels in fisheries and the multiple measures needed to regulate trade, a good model to work with. Lombard and du Plessis describe how a plant used for medicinal purposes by indigent people has not had a good relationship with CITES, and Jepson explains how conservation politics can impede the work of science and local consensus in trying to uphold regulations for an Indonesian parrot.

Description of case studies of illegal trade in non-wildlife goods is a good exercise in demonstrating how useful methods can be derived from these studies. Lowe describes the narcotics trade and Brodie explains the trade in illicit antiques, noting the interesting distinction whereby illegal goods become legal through a portal country. Brack examines ozone-depleting substances, fisheries and timber, the last two items better served in the previous section. He notes that reducing supply and demand, and controlling illegal trade, are the main areas on which it is most profitable to concentrate. He quotes an estimate that 40% of timber is illegally felled in Indonesia, compared to Oldfield's quote of 70%, highlighting the difficulty of obtaining meaningful figures in the wildlife trade.

Cooney concludes by discussing three points. She suggests that the aim is to stop detrimental trade, not just to make it illegal, and she points out the attractiveness of regulation to authorities. She notes that a ban is set when there is a limited/finite source. Bans can reduce demand in some cases, but they are not always necessary. As with several of the authors, Cooney points out that regulations work when there are positive incentives for compliance, and that stakeholders need to be involved in decision-making steps. She suggests that there is a lack of awareness of CITES objectives, obligations and procedures, although she does not give any examples or references for her conclusion. It was a little confusing when she then stated that CITES has a high level of legitimacy and acceptance as a negotiating forum.

The book is very readable and provides an overview of the issues involved that is understandable, without resorting to long quotes of regulations and conventions. There are a few editorial issues that might have been addressed, but the main suggestion would be that a short explanation of the important players, such as the Convention on Biodiversity, multilateral environmental agreements, UN Environment Programme, as well as CITES, is needed in the Introduction or Background section to place them in context. The list of acronyms and abbreviations and the index do aid navigation of the terminology and text. The examples and case studies allow an appreciation of how complex the problems are and why quick fixes so desired by governments and people alike cannot work.

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### ***Defending Animal Rights***

T Regan (2001). University of Illinois Press, 1325 South Oak Street, Champaign, IL 61820, USA. 179 pp. Hardback (ISBN 0 252 02611 X). Price \$24.95.

Tom Regan has already earned himself a reputation as one of the key philosophers within the field of animal ethics. In *The Case for Animal Rights* (University of California Press, 1983), he presents an alternative view to the utilitarianism of Peter Singer and others. Like most utilitarians he argues that we have extensive duties to non-human animals, duties in which we are failing given the conditions in which animals are currently kept and used in modern, intensive animal production and animal-based research. However, the way in which he

defends these duties, and the status he accords to them, would be anathema to the committed utilitarian.

Utilitarians always focus on welfare. In debate about animal ethics, they often argue that the way livestock are treated in agriculture and research causes suffering and a lack of positive welfare that is not outweighed by the benefits such treatment delivers in cheap food and scientific and biomedical advances. Many of those who take this view go further and insist that reformed animal care and use would involve much less animal suffering, and much better animal lives, at no great cost to ourselves. However, according to Regan the key issue is not welfare but rights: we have a duty to avoid using animals merely as a means to benefit others (principally, of course, ourselves). We should treat our fellow creatures, in the phrase of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, as ends in themselves; and this is incompatible with our exploitation of them as research tools and sources of food.

This is a pretty radical view. Whereas a utilitarian might approve of ‘welfare friendly’ animal production or the use of animals in vital research in which properly defined endpoints prevent the animals from suffering, Reganite rights theorists will reject both of these kinds of animal use, because they violate the rights of the animals. As Regan puts the matter in the present book, the rights view (in his handling of it) “is opposed to human utilization of nonhuman animals in principle and seeks to end it in practice. Its practical implications are abolitionist, not reformist” (p 24).

The book is a collection of nine essays written in the 1990s and revised for joint publication in which Regan develops and defends the idea of animal rights. The essays are generally written in a lucid style and they may appeal both to readers who are familiar with the previous book and to readers who do not have a taste for weighty philosophical books with long lines of argument.

The latter will particularly benefit from the opening pair of essays. In the first, “Ethical theory and animals”, Regan gives a fair-minded and admirably clear overview of the various ethical positions concerning man’s moral relationship with animals. The text, numbering about 20 pages, covers not only traditional ethical theories such as contractarianism, utilitarianism and the rights view, but also recent developments in ethical theory such as environmental ethics and “ecofeminism”. This text could clearly serve as reading material for students needing a brief introduction to animal ethics. In the second essay, “Animal Liberation: What’s in a name?”, Regan discusses the different goals of those who are united in trying to improve the conditions of animals. He draws some very clear and useful distinctions between clarion calls such as ‘Anticruelty’, ‘Animal Welfare’ and ‘Animal Liberation’. There are, he concludes, clear differences of ethical outlook among those who work to improve the lot of animals, and no good will come from trying to sweep these differences under the carpet.

The next three essays engage in the philosophical arguments for and against the idea of animal rights. They are written clearly, with minimal philosophical jargon. However, for readers unfamiliar with modern moral philosophy they may still present a difficult ride. A possible benefit of spending time and effort exploring the arguments would be a real sense of what philosophy of the analytical school, to which Regan clearly belongs, is really all about. Philosophical beliefs cannot be tested empirically. The only way to work out whether or not to adopt them is to engage in critical debate with those who disagree. Someone who continues, reasonably, to hold a view after being confronted with hostile arguments can be said to have done what he or she can to substantiate that view — although it is of course likely that, along the way, the view will have been modified and clarified in certain respects. All these features of analytic philosophy are in ample evidence in Regan’s work.

It follows from what has been said that there is not, and maybe never will be, unanimous answers to questions about how man is obliged to treat non-human animals. This is one of the reasons why, when teaching animal ethics, one is obliged to present not just one's own views or the views of a favourite philosopher, but a range of ethical positions. There is no doubt that one of the positions that should be taught and discussed is the animal rights view, and in the opinion of the present reviewer Regan is the most cogent and accessible advocate of this view.

Even if it is granted that animal ethics courses should find room for several views or schools of thought, some may think that Regan's animal rights view is too extreme or bizarre to be on the list. For two reasons I disagree with this. First, it is my experience that views similar to Regan's are in fact held by many students and other people — not, of course, in an overtly theoretical guise, but implicitly in connection with specific issues such as the treatment of companion animals. Second, the rights view contrasts vividly with the kind of utilitarian approach in which harsher ways of treating animals are accepted as long as this secures an important (eg biomedical) benefit that would otherwise be unavailable. In this way, it both enlivens and clarifies the issues at stake.

I believe that a middle ground between utilitarianism and the radical rights view of Regan is well worth exploring. The view that all animal use should be abolished seems too strong, even if pets are excluded from the ban. (For reasons that are not entirely clear, Regan does not seem to be against pets in principle.) On the other hand, there is much to be said for the granting of limited rights to animals. These rights need not include the right not to be killed. But consistently with this, they could ensure that it is *never* acceptable to inflict strong pain or other forms of intense suffering on animals in the course of animal research, that animals for food production should *always* be housed so that their most important physiological and behavioural needs are met, and that slaughter animals should be transported and killed in a humane way. An approach of this sort would preserve and protect domestic animals, rather than removing them from the surface of the earth, which would seem to be end result of Regan's abolitionist view.

Of the remaining four essays in the book, two should be of particular interest to the readers of this journal: "Understanding Animal Rights Violence" and "Ivory Towers should not a Prison Make". In these essays, Regan speaks not only in his capacity as a moral philosopher but also as an animal rights advocate and member of the animal rights movement. The first essay addresses the issue of means and ends in the animal rights movement. Regan acknowledges that some members of the movement of which he is part "believe that violent acts against property carried out in the name of animal liberation, as well as liberation of the animals themselves (the theft of property, given current law), are perfectly justified" (p 147). He does not share this belief and opposes all forms of violence in the name of animal liberation, but he has some understanding of why animal activists think in the way they do.

At the end of the essay he asks what can be done to "lessen animal rights violence". The essence of his reply is that animal rights people should be encouraged to feel they have a genuine voice in animal welfare reform by the adoption of "incremental abolitionist change". Thus a start could be made with the banning of animal testing of cosmetics or the banning of fur farming (a real life example not mentioned by Regan himself). It is surely a good idea to try to engage in a genuine dialogue with radical animal welfare activists. Lack of recognition and dialogue will only serve to make these people more radical and more violent. However, I

have sincere doubts about reforms, such as the banning of mink farming, which do not serve to address a genuine animal welfare issue.

The second essay deserving particular mention is about the role of the moral philosopher, and by implication any other scholar or scientist, as an advocate. In this connection, Regan considers not only the defence of an idea or position (in his case, that of animal rights), but also engagement in political action to promote the idea (in his case, by being active in the animal rights movement). According to Regan it is not the job of the philosopher as such to engage in political action: "... when philosophers engage in such activities as these, they do so *as concerned citizens, not as ethical philosophers*" (p 154). Even though he does not clearly say so, I take this to mean among other things that one is not permitted to use one's position as a university teacher to advocate a certain political course in one's teaching. As a teacher, one should strive to be objective, and when it comes to teaching animal ethics, this means that one should aim to give a fair presentation of various ethical positions and leave it to students to make up their own minds — as I am sure Regan did when he was still active as a university teacher. That this is a difficult task is no excuse for not trying.

But when the philosopher (or any other scholar or scientist) leaves the classroom he is, according to Regan, clearly permitted to engage in political activities: "My own position ... is that we should be willing to take the strength of our convictions out of our studies and into the streets. It is, I think, entirely appropriate for moral philosophers to agitate politically and publicly for a cause in which they believe. Indeed I am inclined to go further. By my lights, a willingness to gather with other partisans at the barricades, so to speak, is part of our wholeness as moral agents in the world; it is *a way* (though not the only one) to assess our moral integrity ... It is a strange understanding of moral development, I think, that says we have gone as far as we should when we have sought merely to understand the world, there being no need to join with others in trying to change it" (pp 162–163).

I do not disagree with this statement, and I would endorse the last sentence (with its neat homage to Marx) particularly warmly. However, I think there is a lengthy discussion to be had on how to draw the line between one's role as an independent academic and one's role, if one has one, as the advocate of a cause. Unfortunately this discussion is missing in Regan's essay. Instead he goes to great lengths to present and discuss how he and his radical views have been attacked and slandered by colleagues.

As should be abundantly clear by now, I believe that Tom Regan's book repays study. Much indeed can be learned from it. However, one serious misgiving about the book as a whole needs to be aired. Surprisingly, within these pages, discussion of concrete examples of animal issues is conspicuous by its absence. There is not a single reference to *Animal Welfare* or any other of the journals in which those involved in applied animal welfare science publish their results. There is absolutely no doubt that Regan is sincerely interested in the plight of animals, but one cannot avoid the conclusion that he is at his most comfortable when not testing his opinions on the treatment of laboratory and farm animals against some real (and potentially disturbing) facts. The lack of interest in, and collaboration with, animal welfare science is a shortcoming not only in Regan's otherwise impressive work but also in that of other academic philosophers who write about animal ethics.

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