

SCORCHED EARTH: THE RUSSIAN-GERMAN WAR, 1943–1944. By *Paul Carell*. Translated from the German by *Ewald Osers*. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1970. 556 pp. \$12.50.

It is unusual to find a volume of military history so well written. This book, a sequel to the author's *Hitler Moves East*, continues his fascinating story of the Soviet-German campaigns of World War II. In addition to a wide range of published materials, including many Soviet military memoirs, the author has combed through the official archives and has collected diaries and accounts of many German participants. Some of these are documentary materials from the time of the war; others are later recollections. Carell does not provide source references. He focuses first on considerations at High Command and senior field command levels and then shifts to the perspective of action on the battlefield as experienced by individual participants. In short, we are given a vivid, coherent narrative that conveys the personal feelings of the armies at war at different levels, and alternately as seen on opposite sides of the line.

The book is written principally from a German point of view. Nonetheless, the author has attempted—on the whole, rather successfully—to be objective. He has that rare romantic regard for the individual courage and achievement of those on both sides whom he finds responsible for successes in the enterprise of combat. Hitler emerges as increasingly responsible for German failures. Stalin, by contrast, is seen as less inclined to ignore and override the advice (which was often, but not always, good) of his trusted senior military men. Khrushchev is shown to be basically a sound and sensible representative in the field.

The author (in line with the main current of Soviet military historiography) attributes decisive significance to the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943. That battle, rather than Stalingrad, is held to have marked the real turning point and end of German prospects for victory. This conclusion, in the judgment of the reviewer, is correct. Among the other campaigns covered, the siege of Leningrad and its successful lifting are particularly dramatic.

In a brief review it is, of course, not possible to do more than indicate the general approach of the author and the scope of his work. This book is a well-researched, good “evocative” history. One hopes for a third volume to complete the story of the Soviet-German campaigns of World War II.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

*Department of State, Washington, D.C.*

YALTA. By *Diane Shaver Clemens*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. x, 356 pp. \$8.50.

In the aftermath of World War II, Roosevelt and his advisers were bitterly attacked for selling out to or being duped by the Russians at the Crimean conference in February 1945. Lately we are told that instead of being traitors or fools, the American leaders cunningly deprived the Soviet Union of the fruits of victory. Mrs. Clemens, claiming to be the first person to undertake in English a study of the conference per se, is extraordinarily receptive to the second interpretation. Her book began as a study in decision-making, complete with a complicated model showing the pattern of decisions at Yalta. This part of the volume is ably done, incorporating