

with action, such as those setting forth the encounter between the Russian Baltic Fleet and the British fishing boats, an episode developed in the author's earlier book about the voyage of this fleet. The absence of references to sources, however, leaves in limbo the identity and general significance of the "unscrupulous bureaucrat" who reported ship movements from Copenhagen in exchange for "great sums of money," thus helping to lead the Baltic fleet into trouble. The assertion that Witte returned from the Portsmouth conference "to a deservedly warm welcome" will mislead the reader, however, since the author gives no reference concerning Witte's reception by his family, friends, or any other special group, and these words are invalid unless by "warm" the author implies the resentful mood of Russia in 1905.

One of the serious drawbacks of the book is that its bibliography contains only two books, one of them the author's own *Witnesses of Tsushima* and the other a diary of a Russian colonel. One is left wondering where the pictures were found and what the sources were for the rest of the information, particularly that dealing with Japan, about which there is no reference at all. The question of sources becomes of special interest when one finds an assertion, such as the one on page 22, that Russia did not expect Japan to go to war. I am sure the author must realize that this is true only in a very limited sense, otherwise the Russian military and naval preparations long before the outbreak of war would be meaningless, as would the warnings of responsible persons at the time. Again, on page 51, the author states that General Stackelberg was one of the few Russian generals willing to learn from the Japanese, but the reader is left wondering about the source and the broader significance of this observation. Finally, on the very last page of the book the author notes that President Roosevelt received the Nobel Peace Prize and then, without any qualifying detail about its relevance and in complete disregard of accuracy, adds the statement that this was quite an achievement for a man who had "more or less single-handedly launched the Spanish-American War a few years previously."

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- A. V. KRIVOSHEIN (1857–1921 G.): *EGO ZNACHENIE V ISTORII ROSSII NACHALA XX VEKA*. By *K. A. Krivoshein*. Paris, 1973. 351 pp. Paper.

This work is a detailed personal and professional biography of father by son. A. V. Krivoshein was born in 1857 in Warsaw, the son of an army officer and the grandson of a peasant. His success in government was due to his abilities and tireless work. He completed high school in Warsaw and graduated from the law school of St. Petersburg University. Shortly thereafter he entered government service, and in 1896 was appointed deputy chief (in 1902, the chief) of the Resettlement Administration, the agency in charge of peasant migration to Siberia. In 1906–8 he was director of two state land banks.

In May 1908 Stolypin offered him the post of chief administrator for land settlement and agriculture, which he occupied until his dismissal in October 1915. Thus Krivoshein became the chief executive official who implemented Stolypin's agrarian laws: the decree of November 9, 1906; the law of June 14, 1910; and the land settlement regulations of March 4, 1906, and of May 29, 1911. Krivoshein

was totally dedicated to the huge task of assisting the peasants to withdraw legally from the commune and then to consolidate their scattered strips into enclosed holdings. Some 1.2 million enclosed farms were formed on about 30 million acres, and millions of peasants waited for their turn to become masters of additional enclosures. Krivoshein also supported peasant migration to Siberia. More than three million land-hungry peasants crossed the Ural Mountains, and the great majority of them found a new, prosperous life. (See D. W. Treadgold, *The Great Siberian Migration*, Princeton, 1957.)

Finally, at the time of the Duma Monarchy the government, jointly with the *zemstvos*, began—after a delay of fifty years—seriously to organize agronomic help to the peasants, including the supply of agricultural machines and tools and mineral fertilizers. As a result of these activities the productivity of the peasant lands during the short period of 1906–14 showed a remarkable increase. All these tasks obviously were very costly, and the budget of the chief administration for land settlement and agriculture grew under Krivoshein's stewardship from 36 million rubles in 1906 to 146 million in 1914.

Krivoshein strove for cooperation between the government and society, the latter represented by the *zemstvo* institutions in the provinces and by the Duma in the center. This the author of the book emphasizes in his chapter "We and They" (pp. 146–53).

I have only two objections to the content of the author's narrative. In my opinion, he underestimates the role of Stolypin and exaggerates the role of Witte in the agrarian reforms. The author writes: "Elementary historical justice demands to pay due tribute to Witte's capital role [*sic*] in the preparation of the reform" (p. 46). The reasons for this tribute are to be found in two of Witte's *zapiski* of 1904–5, which severely criticized communal land tenure. The fact remains that without the action of Stolypin and his staff (including deputy Interior Minister Gurko) Witte's *zapiski* (with many others) would have been quietly resting on the shelves of archives. Witte did not help to realize Stolypin's agrarian reforms but on the contrary sharply criticized and tried to curb them. In discussing the agrarian law in the State Council Witte confessed on March 16, 1910: "In theory I am a partisan of personal property (for peasants), but in practice I doubt whether it should be given to them or not."

Second, the author calls the years 1914–15 the time of A. V. Krivoshein's "*de facto* premiership" (pp. 209 ff.), on the grounds that the tsar was well disposed toward him and accepted his recommendation for appointing several cabinet members, including, unfortunately, the *de jure* premier, Goremykin. In reality, the old, hardened bureaucrat, Goremykin, was not inclined to obey anyone except the tsar, and he showed this clearly during his conflict with the other cabinet members, including Krivoshein, in August and September of 1915. Moreover, the tsar's favorable disposition, unstable and unpredictable, was not enough to ensure *de facto* premiership. The tsar favored even more Interior Minister Maklakov, who was openly hostile toward the Duma and the public institutions.

The last state service performed by A. V. Krivoshein was in the capacity of the head of civil administration in 1920 in the Crimea, under General Wrangel. He died in Berlin in October 1921.

Krivoshein's book is based on a broad range of sources and literature on the subject. Each chapter is followed by notes with references to the sources of his statements in the text, but there is no index. The book deserves the attention of

professional historians as well as interested laymen. A. V. Krivoshein, like S. Iu. Witte and P. A. Stolypin, was one of the few outstanding statesmen at the turn of the century who could have led Russia on the road of prosperity and peaceful evolution, if . . . But there were too many "ifs" in the international situation, as well as inside the country.

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DIPLOMACY AND REVOLUTION: THE SOVIET MISSION TO SWITZERLAND, 1918. By *Alfred Erich Senn*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974. ix, 221 pp. \$9.95.

This volume describes the tangled web of events that led to the establishment and expulsion of the first Soviet mission to Switzerland in 1918. The Bolshevik efforts in Zurich and Bern during the last year of World War I assumed unusual significance, because Switzerland was one of the few places on the Continent where plans for the international Communist revolution could be prepared more or less openly.

Professor Senn has worked primarily in the Bundesarchiv in Bern, in the records of the French Ministry of War in Vincennes, and in the available published Soviet sources to reconstruct the main events of the period. The result is a montage of relatively minor figures in the history of international socialism, but the narrative of their activities in Switzerland and of their relations with one another and the Swiss government is an informative chapter in the history of the Communist movement.

The Soviet-sponsored mission functioned in Switzerland from May to November 1918 under the leadership of J. A. Berzin. His activities were often supplemented and complicated by the actions of persons such as Henri Guilbeaux, Angelica Balabanova, and Edward Holzmann, to mention only three of the scores of revolutionaries who moved in and out of the country during these months.

One of the intriguing themes that emerges from the volume deals with the difficulties of the Swiss government. Dedicated simultaneously to absolute neutrality, to a policy of granting asylum to exiles of all political convictions, and to the necessity of maintaining domestic security, the Swiss authorities faced an impossible situation in trying to cope with the Bolsheviks, their sympathizers, and their plots. They could not decide whether the Berzin mission ought to be given diplomatic status. They could not determine the amount of propagandistic activity that ought to be tolerated. They were frequently criticized by Entente diplomats for being too lenient with the Russian leftists, but they were often chastised by the left-wing Swiss socialists for not being tolerant enough of the Russian revolutionaries. Switzerland had indeed become, as Senn says, a "battlefield" between the ideologies of Soviet Russia and the West in the closing days of the war. The final chapters of his book convey with admirable facility the tensions that prevailed in the cities and countryside in November, just before the mission was finally expelled.

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